// revCheck should check the certificate for any revocations. It
// returns a pair of booleans: the first indicates whether the certificate
// is revoked, the second indicates whether the revocations were
// successfully checked.. This leads to the following combinations:
//
// false, false: an error was encountered while checking revocations.
//
// false, true: the certificate was checked successfully and
// it is not revoked.
//
// true, true: the certificate was checked successfully and
// it is revoked.
//
// true, false: failure to check revocation status causes
// verification to fail
func revCheck(cert *x509.Certificate) (revoked, ok bool) {
for _, url := range cert.CRLDistributionPoints {
if ldapURL(url) {
log.Infof("skipping LDAP CRL: %s", url)
continue
}
if revoked, ok := certIsRevokedCRL(cert, url); !ok {
log.Warning("error checking revocation via CRL")
if HardFail {
return true, false
}
return false, false
} else if revoked {
log.Info("certificate is revoked via CRL")
return true, true
}
if revoked, ok := certIsRevokedOCSP(cert, HardFail); !ok {
log.Warning("error checking revocation via OCSP")
if HardFail {
return true, false
}
return false, false
} else if revoked {
log.Info("certificate is revoked via OCSP")
return true, true
}
}
return false, true
}
// Handle implements an http.Handler interface for the bundle handler.
func (h *Handler) Handle(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) error {
blob, matched, err := api.ProcessRequestFirstMatchOf(r,
[][]string{
[]string{"certificate"},
[]string{"domain"},
})
if err != nil {
log.Warningf("invalid request: %v", err)
return err
}
flavor := blob["flavor"]
bf := bundler.Ubiquitous
if flavor != "" {
bf = bundler.BundleFlavor(flavor)
}
log.Infof("request for flavor %v", bf)
var result *bundler.Bundle
switch matched[0] {
case "domain":
bundle, err := h.bundler.BundleFromRemote(blob["domain"], blob["ip"], bf)
if err != nil {
log.Warningf("couldn't bundle from remote: %v", err)
return err
}
result = bundle
case "certificate":
bundle, err := h.bundler.BundleFromPEMorDER([]byte(blob["certificate"]), []byte(blob["private_key"]), bf, "")
if err != nil {
log.Warning("bad PEM certifcate or private key")
return err
}
serverName := blob["domain"]
ip := blob["ip"]
if serverName != "" {
err := bundle.Cert.VerifyHostname(serverName)
if err != nil {
return errors.Wrap(errors.CertificateError, errors.VerifyFailed, err)
}
}
if ip != "" {
err := bundle.Cert.VerifyHostname(ip)
if err != nil {
return errors.Wrap(errors.CertificateError, errors.VerifyFailed, err)
}
}
result = bundle
}
log.Info("wrote response")
return api.SendResponse(w, result)
}
// worker does all the parsing and validation of the certificate(s)
// contained in a single file. It first reads all the data in the
// file, then begins parsing certificates in the file. Those
// certificates are then checked for revocation.
func worker(paths chan string, bundler chan *x509.Certificate, pool *sync.WaitGroup) {
defer (*pool).Done()
for {
path, ok := <-paths
if !ok {
return
}
log.Infof("Loading %s", path)
fileData, err := ioutil.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
log.Warningf("%v", err)
continue
}
for {
var block *pem.Block
if len(fileData) == 0 {
break
}
block, fileData = pem.Decode(fileData)
if block == nil {
log.Warningf("%s: no PEM data found", path)
break
} else if block.Type != "CERTIFICATE" {
log.Info("Skipping non-certificate")
continue
}
cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(block.Bytes)
if err != nil {
log.Warningf("Invalid certificate: %v", err)
continue
}
log.Infof("Validating %+v", cert.Subject)
revoked, ok := revoke.VerifyCertificate(cert)
if !ok {
log.Warning("Failed to verify certificate.")
} else if !revoked {
bundler <- cert
} else {
log.Info("Skipping revoked certificate")
}
}
}
}
func main() {
var addr, conf string
flag.StringVar(&addr, "a", "127.0.0.1:9876", "`address` of server")
flag.StringVar(&conf, "f", "server.json", "config `file` to use")
flag.Parse()
var id = new(core.Identity)
data, err := ioutil.ReadFile(conf)
if err != nil {
exlib.Err(1, err, "reading config file")
}
err = json.Unmarshal(data, id)
if err != nil {
exlib.Err(1, err, "parsing config file")
}
tr, err := transport.New(exlib.Before, id)
if err != nil {
exlib.Err(1, err, "creating transport")
}
l, err := transport.Listen(addr, tr)
if err != nil {
exlib.Err(1, err, "setting up listener")
}
var errChan = make(chan error, 0)
go func(ec <-chan error) {
for {
err, ok := <-ec
if !ok {
log.Warning("error channel closed, future errors will not be reported")
break
}
log.Errorf("auto update error: %v", err)
}
}(errChan)
log.Info("setting up auto-update")
go l.AutoUpdate(nil, errChan)
log.Info("listening on ", addr)
exlib.Warn(serve(l), "serving listener")
}
func parsePrivateKeySpec(spec string, cfg map[string]string) (crypto.Signer, error) {
specURL, err := url.Parse(spec)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var priv crypto.Signer
switch specURL.Scheme {
case "file":
// A file spec will be parsed such that the root
// directory of a relative path will be stored as the
// hostname, and the remainder of the file's path is
// stored in the Path field.
log.Debug("loading private key file", specURL.Path)
path := filepath.Join(specURL.Host, specURL.Path)
in, err := ioutil.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
log.Debug("attempting to load PEM-encoded private key")
priv, err = helpers.ParsePrivateKeyPEM(in)
if err != nil {
log.Debug("file is not a PEM-encoded private key")
log.Debug("attempting to load DER-encoded private key")
priv, err = derhelpers.ParsePrivateKeyDER(in)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
log.Debug("loaded private key")
return priv, nil
case "rofile":
log.Warning("Red October support is currently experimental")
path := filepath.Join(specURL.Host, specURL.Path)
in, err := ioutil.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
roServer := cfg["ro_server"]
if roServer == "" {
return nil, errors.New("config: no RedOctober server available")
}
// roCAPath can be empty; if it is, the client uses
// the system default CA roots.
roCAPath := cfg["ro_ca"]
roUser := cfg["ro_user"]
if roUser == "" {
return nil, errors.New("config: no RedOctober user available")
}
roPass := cfg["ro_pass"]
if roPass == "" {
return nil, errors.New("config: no RedOctober passphrase available")
}
log.Debug("decrypting key via RedOctober Server")
roClient, err := client.NewRemoteServer(roServer, roCAPath)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
req := core.DecryptRequest{
Name: roUser,
Password: roPass,
Data: in,
}
in, err = roClient.DecryptIntoData(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return priv, nil
default:
return nil, ErrUnsupportedScheme
}
}
func gencertMain(args []string, c cli.Config) error {
if c.RenewCA {
log.Infof("re-generate a CA certificate from CA cert and key")
cert, err := initca.RenewFromPEM(c.CAFile, c.CAKeyFile)
if err != nil {
log.Errorf("%v\n", err)
return err
}
cli.PrintCert(nil, nil, cert)
return nil
}
csrJSONFile, args, err := cli.PopFirstArgument(args)
if err != nil {
return err
}
csrJSONFileBytes, err := cli.ReadStdin(csrJSONFile)
if err != nil {
return err
}
req := csr.CertificateRequest{
KeyRequest: csr.NewBasicKeyRequest(),
}
err = json.Unmarshal(csrJSONFileBytes, &req)
if err != nil {
return err
}
switch {
case c.IsCA:
var key, csrPEM, cert []byte
if c.CAKeyFile != "" {
log.Infof("re-generate a CA certificate from CSR and CA key")
cert, csrPEM, err = initca.NewFromPEM(&req, c.CAKeyFile)
if err != nil {
log.Errorf("%v\n", err)
return err
}
} else {
log.Infof("generating a new CA key and certificate from CSR")
cert, csrPEM, key, err = initca.New(&req)
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
cli.PrintCert(key, csrPEM, cert)
default:
if req.CA != nil {
err = errors.New("ca section only permitted in initca")
return err
}
// Remote can be forced on the command line or in the config
if c.Remote == "" && c.CFG == nil {
if c.CAFile == "" {
log.Error("need a CA certificate (provide one with -ca)")
return nil
}
if c.CAKeyFile == "" {
log.Error("need a CA key (provide one with -ca-key)")
return nil
}
}
var key, csrBytes []byte
g := &csr.Generator{Validator: genkey.Validator}
csrBytes, key, err = g.ProcessRequest(&req)
if err != nil {
key = nil
return err
}
s, err := sign.SignerFromConfig(c)
if err != nil {
return err
}
var cert []byte
req := signer.SignRequest{
Request: string(csrBytes),
Hosts: signer.SplitHosts(c.Hostname),
Profile: c.Profile,
Label: c.Label,
}
cert, err = s.Sign(req)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// This follows the Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and
// Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates, v.1.1.6, from the CA/Browser
// Forum (https://cabforum.org). Specifically, section 10.2.3 ("Information
// Requirements"), states:
//
// "Applicant information MUST include, but not be limited to, at least one
// Fully-Qualified Domain Name or IP address to be included in the Certificate’s
// SubjectAltName extension."
if len(req.Hosts) == 0 {
log.Warning(generator.CSRNoHostMessage)
}
cli.PrintCert(key, csrBytes, cert)
}
return nil
}
func metricsDisallowed(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
log.Warning("attempt to access metrics endpoint from external address ", req.RemoteAddr)
http.NotFound(w, req)
}
// Handle responds to requests for the CA to generate a new private
// key and certificate on behalf of the client. The format for these
// requests is documented in the API documentation.
func (cg *CertGeneratorHandler) Handle(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) error {
log.Info("request for CSR")
req := new(genSignRequest)
req.Request = csr.New()
body, err := ioutil.ReadAll(r.Body)
if err != nil {
log.Warningf("failed to read request body: %v", err)
return errors.NewBadRequest(err)
}
err = json.Unmarshal(body, req)
if err != nil {
log.Warningf("failed to unmarshal request: %v", err)
return errors.NewBadRequest(err)
}
if req.Request == nil {
log.Warning("empty request received")
return errors.NewBadRequestString("missing request section")
}
if req.Request.CA != nil {
log.Warningf("request received with CA section")
return errors.NewBadRequestString("ca section only permitted in initca")
}
csr, key, err := cg.generator.ProcessRequest(req.Request)
if err != nil {
log.Warningf("failed to process CSR: %v", err)
// The validator returns a *cfssl/errors.HttpError
return err
}
signReq := signer.SignRequest{
Request: string(csr),
Profile: req.Profile,
Label: req.Label,
}
certBytes, err := cg.signer.Sign(signReq)
if err != nil {
log.Warningf("failed to sign request: %v", err)
return err
}
reqSum, err := computeSum(csr)
if err != nil {
return errors.NewBadRequest(err)
}
certSum, err := computeSum(certBytes)
if err != nil {
return errors.NewBadRequest(err)
}
result := map[string]interface{}{
"private_key": string(key),
"certificate_request": string(csr),
"certificate": string(certBytes),
"sums": map[string]Sum{
"certificate_request": reqSum,
"certificate": certSum,
},
}
if len(req.Request.Hosts) == 0 {
return api.SendResponseWithMessage(w, result, CSRNoHostMessage,
errors.New(errors.PolicyError, errors.InvalidRequest).ErrorCode)
}
return api.SendResponse(w, result)
}
// Bundle takes an X509 certificate (already in the
// Certificate structure), a private key as crypto.Signer in one of the appropriate
// formats (i.e. *rsa.PrivateKey or *ecdsa.PrivateKey, or even a opaque key), using them to
// build a certificate bundle.
func (b *Bundler) Bundle(certs []*x509.Certificate, key crypto.Signer, flavor BundleFlavor) (*Bundle, error) {
log.Infof("bundling certificate for %+v", certs[0].Subject)
if len(certs) == 0 {
return nil, nil
}
// Detect reverse ordering of the cert chain.
if len(certs) > 1 && !partialVerify(certs) {
rcerts := reverse(certs)
if partialVerify(rcerts) {
certs = rcerts
}
}
var ok bool
cert := certs[0]
if key != nil {
switch {
case cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm == x509.RSA:
var rsaPublicKey *rsa.PublicKey
if rsaPublicKey, ok = key.Public().(*rsa.PublicKey); !ok {
return nil, errors.New(errors.PrivateKeyError, errors.KeyMismatch)
}
if cert.PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey).N.Cmp(rsaPublicKey.N) != 0 {
return nil, errors.New(errors.PrivateKeyError, errors.KeyMismatch)
}
case cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm == x509.ECDSA:
var ecdsaPublicKey *ecdsa.PublicKey
if ecdsaPublicKey, ok = key.Public().(*ecdsa.PublicKey); !ok {
return nil, errors.New(errors.PrivateKeyError, errors.KeyMismatch)
}
if cert.PublicKey.(*ecdsa.PublicKey).X.Cmp(ecdsaPublicKey.X) != 0 {
return nil, errors.New(errors.PrivateKeyError, errors.KeyMismatch)
}
default:
return nil, errors.New(errors.PrivateKeyError, errors.NotRSAOrECC)
}
} else {
switch {
case cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm == x509.RSA:
case cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm == x509.ECDSA:
default:
return nil, errors.New(errors.PrivateKeyError, errors.NotRSAOrECC)
}
}
bundle := new(Bundle)
bundle.Cert = cert
bundle.Key = key
bundle.Issuer = &cert.Issuer
bundle.Subject = &cert.Subject
bundle.buildHostnames()
if flavor == Force {
// force bundle checks the certificates
// forms a verification chain.
if !partialVerify(certs) {
return nil,
errors.Wrap(errors.CertificateError, errors.VerifyFailed,
goerr.New("Unable to verify the certificate chain"))
}
bundle.Chain = certs
} else {
// disallow self-signed cert
if cert.CheckSignatureFrom(cert) == nil {
return nil, errors.New(errors.CertificateError, errors.SelfSigned)
}
// verify and store input intermediates to the intermediate pool.
// Ignore the returned error here, will treat it in the second call.
b.fetchIntermediates(certs)
chains, err := cert.Verify(b.VerifyOptions())
if err != nil {
log.Debugf("verification failed: %v", err)
// If the error was an unknown authority, try to fetch
// the intermediate specified in the AIA and add it to
// the intermediates bundle.
switch err := err.(type) {
case x509.UnknownAuthorityError:
// Do nothing -- have the default case return out.
default:
return nil, errors.Wrap(errors.CertificateError, errors.VerifyFailed, err)
}
log.Debugf("searching for intermediates via AIA issuer")
err = b.fetchIntermediates(certs)
if err != nil {
log.Debugf("search failed: %v", err)
return nil, errors.Wrap(errors.CertificateError, errors.VerifyFailed, err)
}
log.Debugf("verifying new chain")
chains, err = cert.Verify(b.VerifyOptions())
if err != nil {
log.Debugf("failed to verify chain: %v", err)
return nil, errors.Wrap(errors.CertificateError, errors.VerifyFailed, err)
}
log.Debugf("verify ok")
}
var matchingChains [][]*x509.Certificate
switch flavor {
case Optimal:
matchingChains = optimalChains(chains)
case Ubiquitous:
if len(ubiquity.Platforms) == 0 {
log.Warning("No metadata, Ubiquitous falls back to Optimal.")
}
matchingChains = ubiquitousChains(chains)
default:
matchingChains = ubiquitousChains(chains)
}
bundle.Chain = matchingChains[0]
}
statusCode := int(errors.Success)
var messages []string
// Check if bundle is expiring.
expiringCerts := checkExpiringCerts(bundle.Chain)
bundle.Expires = helpers.ExpiryTime(bundle.Chain)
if len(expiringCerts) > 0 {
statusCode |= errors.BundleExpiringBit
messages = append(messages, expirationWarning(expiringCerts))
}
// Check if bundle contains SHA2 certs.
if ubiquity.ChainHashUbiquity(bundle.Chain) <= ubiquity.SHA2Ubiquity {
statusCode |= errors.BundleNotUbiquitousBit
messages = append(messages, sha2Warning)
}
// Check if bundle contains ECDSA signatures.
if ubiquity.ChainKeyAlgoUbiquity(bundle.Chain) <= ubiquity.ECDSA256Ubiquity {
statusCode |= errors.BundleNotUbiquitousBit
messages = append(messages, ecdsaWarning)
}
// when forcing a bundle, bundle ubiquity doesn't matter
// also we don't retrieve the anchoring root of the bundle
var untrusted []string
if flavor != Force {
// Add root store presence info
root := bundle.Chain[len(bundle.Chain)-1]
bundle.Root = root
log.Infof("the anchoring root is %v", root.Subject)
// Check if there is any platform that doesn't trust the chain.
// Also, an warning will be generated if ubiquity.Platforms is nil,
untrusted = ubiquity.UntrustedPlatforms(root)
untrustedMsg := untrustedPlatformsWarning(untrusted)
if len(untrustedMsg) > 0 {
log.Debug("Populate untrusted platform warning.")
statusCode |= errors.BundleNotUbiquitousBit
messages = append(messages, untrustedMsg)
}
}
// Check if there is any platform that rejects the chain because of SHA1 deprecation.
sha1Msgs := ubiquity.SHA1DeprecationMessages(bundle.Chain)
if len(sha1Msgs) > 0 {
log.Debug("Populate SHA1 deprecation warning.")
statusCode |= errors.BundleNotUbiquitousBit
messages = append(messages, sha1Msgs...)
}
bundle.Status = &BundleStatus{ExpiringSKIs: getSKIs(bundle.Chain, expiringCerts), Code: statusCode, Messages: messages, Untrusted: untrusted}
// attempt to not to include the root certificate for optimization
if flavor != Force {
// Include at least one intermediate if the leaf has enabled OCSP and is not CA.
if bundle.Cert.OCSPServer != nil && !bundle.Cert.IsCA && len(bundle.Chain) <= 2 {
// No op. Return one intermediate if there is one.
} else {
// do not include the root.
bundle.Chain = bundle.Chain[:len(bundle.Chain)-1]
}
}
bundle.Status.IsRebundled = diff(bundle.Chain, certs)
log.Debugf("bundle complete")
return bundle, nil
}
// Handle receives the incoming request, validates it, and processes it.
func (h *AuthHandler) Handle(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) error {
log.Info("signature request received")
body, err := ioutil.ReadAll(r.Body)
if err != nil {
log.Errorf("failed to read response body: %v", err)
return err
}
r.Body.Close()
var aReq auth.AuthenticatedRequest
err = json.Unmarshal(body, &aReq)
if err != nil {
log.Errorf("failed to unmarshal authenticated request: %v", err)
return errors.NewBadRequest(err)
}
var req jsonSignRequest
err = json.Unmarshal(aReq.Request, &req)
if err != nil {
log.Errorf("failed to unmarshal request from authenticated request: %v", err)
return errors.NewBadRequestString("Unable to parse authenticated sign request")
}
// Sanity checks to ensure that we have a valid policy. This
// should have been checked in NewAuthHandler.
policy := h.signer.Policy()
if policy == nil {
log.Critical("signer was initialised without a signing policy")
return errors.NewBadRequestString("invalid policy")
}
profile, err := signer.Profile(h.signer, req.Profile)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if profile.Provider == nil {
log.Error("profile has no authentication provider")
return errors.NewBadRequestString("no authentication provider")
}
if !profile.Provider.Verify(&aReq) {
log.Warning("received authenticated request with invalid token")
return errors.NewBadRequestString("invalid token")
}
signReq := jsonReqToTrue(req)
if signReq.Request == "" {
return errors.NewBadRequestString("missing parameter 'certificate_request'")
}
cert, err := h.signer.Sign(signReq)
if err != nil {
log.Errorf("signature failed: %v", err)
return err
}
result := map[string]string{"certificate": string(cert)}
log.Info("wrote response")
return api.SendResponse(w, result)
}