// VerifyPKCS1v15 verifies an RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature.
// hashed is the result of hashing the input message using the given hash
// function and sig is the signature. A valid signature is indicated by
// returning a nil error.
func VerifyPKCS1v15(pub *PublicKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed []byte, sig []byte) (err error) {
hashLen, prefix, err := pkcs1v15HashInfo(hash, len(hashed))
if err != nil {
return
}
tLen := len(prefix) + hashLen
k := (pub.N.BitLen() + 7) / 8
if k < tLen+11 {
err = VerificationError{}
return
}
c := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig)
m := encrypt(new(big.Int), pub, c)
em := leftPad(m.Bytes(), k)
// EM = 0x00 || 0x01 || PS || 0x00 || T
ok := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[0], 0)
ok &= subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[1], 1)
ok &= subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(em[k-hashLen:k], hashed)
ok &= subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(em[k-tLen:k-hashLen], prefix)
ok &= subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[k-tLen-1], 0)
for i := 2; i < k-tLen-1; i++ {
ok &= subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[i], 0xff)
}
if ok != 1 {
return VerificationError{}
}
return nil
}
/*
Checks the username/password combination from the request. Returns
either an empty string (authentication failed) or the name of the
authenticated user.
Supports MD5 and SHA1 password entries
*/
func (a *BasicAuth) CheckAuth(r *http.Request) string {
s := strings.SplitN(r.Header.Get("Authorization"), " ", 2)
if len(s) != 2 || s[0] != "Basic" {
return ""
}
b, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(s[1])
if err != nil {
return ""
}
pair := strings.SplitN(string(b), ":", 2)
if len(pair) != 2 {
return ""
}
passwd := a.Secrets(pair[0], a.Realm)
if passwd == "" {
return ""
}
if strings.HasPrefix(passwd, "{SHA}") {
d := sha1.New()
d.Write([]byte(pair[1]))
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(passwd[5:]), []byte(base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(d.Sum(nil)))) != 1 {
return ""
}
} else {
e := NewMD5Entry(passwd)
if e == nil {
return ""
}
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(passwd), MD5Crypt([]byte(pair[1]), e.Salt, e.Magic)) != 1 {
return ""
}
}
return pair[0]
}
func secureCompare(given, actual string) bool {
if subtle.ConstantTimeEq(int32(len(given)), int32(len(actual))) == 1 {
return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(given), []byte(actual)) == 1
}
/* Securely compare actual to itself to keep constant time, but always return false */
return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(actual), []byte(actual)) == 1 && false
}
// CheckHashes verifies all the checksums specified by the "hashes" of the payload.
func CheckHashes(payload []byte, hashes Hashes) error {
cnt := 0
// k, v indicate the hash algorithm and the corresponding value
for k, v := range hashes {
switch k {
case notary.SHA256:
checksum := sha256.Sum256(payload)
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(checksum[:], v) == 0 {
return ErrMismatchedChecksum{alg: notary.SHA256}
}
cnt++
case notary.SHA512:
checksum := sha512.Sum512(payload)
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(checksum[:], v) == 0 {
return ErrMismatchedChecksum{alg: notary.SHA512}
}
cnt++
}
}
if cnt == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("at least one supported hash needed")
}
return nil
}
// CheckHashes verifies all the checksums specified by the "hashes" of the payload.
func CheckHashes(payload []byte, name string, hashes Hashes) error {
cnt := 0
// k, v indicate the hash algorithm and the corresponding value
for k, v := range hashes {
switch k {
case notary.SHA256:
checksum := sha256.Sum256(payload)
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(checksum[:], v) == 0 {
return ErrMismatchedChecksum{alg: notary.SHA256, name: name, expected: hex.EncodeToString(v)}
}
cnt++
case notary.SHA512:
checksum := sha512.Sum512(payload)
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(checksum[:], v) == 0 {
return ErrMismatchedChecksum{alg: notary.SHA512, name: name, expected: hex.EncodeToString(v)}
}
cnt++
}
}
if cnt == 0 {
return ErrMissingMeta{Role: name}
}
return nil
}
func TestDecodeHashPayloadReturnsCorrectString(t *testing.T) {
hashPayload := "9:1111:64:bXlzYWx0:bXlwYXNzd29yZA=="
r, n, l, salt, p, err := decodeHashPaylaod(hashPayload)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("Error encountered, %v", err)
}
saltRes := subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(salt, []byte("mysalt"))
pRes := subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(p, []byte("mypassword"))
if !(saltRes == 1) {
t.Error("aggg f****d")
}
if !(pRes == 1) {
t.Errorf("incorrect password hash decoded expected: mypassword but got %s", p)
}
if l != 64 {
t.Errorf("incorrect passwordHash length decoded expected: 64 but got %d", l)
}
if r != 9 {
t.Errorf("incorrect number of rounds decoded expected: 9 but got %d", r)
}
if n != 1111 {
t.Errorf("incorrect cost decoded expected: 1111 but got %d", n)
}
}
func NewHtpasswdValidator(filename string) Validator {
provider := HtpasswdFileProvider(filename)
return func(username string, passwd string) bool {
// realm is ignored
hashedPw := provider(username, "")
if strings.HasPrefix(hashedPw, "{SHA}") {
d := sha1.New()
d.Write([]byte(passwd))
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(hashedPw[5:]), []byte(base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(d.Sum(nil)))) != 1 {
return false
}
} else {
e := NewMD5Entry(hashedPw)
if e == nil {
return false
}
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(hashedPw), MD5Crypt([]byte(passwd), e.Salt, e.Magic)) != 1 {
return false
}
}
return true
}
}
// validateMetadata matches the given client nonce and pending time with the
// one cached in the identity whitelist during the previous login. But, if
// reauthentication is disabled, login attempt is failed immediately.
func validateMetadata(clientNonce, pendingTime string, storedIdentity *whitelistIdentity, roleEntry *awsRoleEntry) error {
// For sanity
if !storedIdentity.DisallowReauthentication && storedIdentity.ClientNonce == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("client nonce missing in stored identity")
}
// If reauthentication is disabled or if the nonce supplied matches a
// predefied nonce which indicates reauthentication to be disabled,
// authentication will not succeed.
if storedIdentity.DisallowReauthentication ||
subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(reauthenticationDisabledNonce), []byte(clientNonce)) == 1 {
return fmt.Errorf("reauthentication is disabled")
}
givenPendingTime, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, pendingTime)
if err != nil {
return err
}
storedPendingTime, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339, storedIdentity.PendingTime)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// When the presented client nonce does not match the cached entry, it
// is either that a rogue client is trying to login or that a valid
// client suffered a migration. The migration is detected via
// pendingTime in the instance metadata, which sadly is only updated
// when an instance is stopped and started but *not* when the instance
// is rebooted. If reboot survivability is needed, either
// instrumentation to delete the instance ID from the whitelist is
// necessary, or the client must durably store the nonce.
//
// If the `allow_instance_migration` property of the registered role is
// enabled, then the client nonce mismatch is ignored, as long as the
// pending time in the presented instance identity document is newer
// than the cached pending time. The new pendingTime is stored and used
// for future checks.
//
// This is a weak criterion and hence the `allow_instance_migration`
// option should be used with caution.
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(clientNonce), []byte(storedIdentity.ClientNonce)) != 1 {
if !roleEntry.AllowInstanceMigration {
return fmt.Errorf("client nonce mismatch")
}
if roleEntry.AllowInstanceMigration && !givenPendingTime.After(storedPendingTime) {
return fmt.Errorf("client nonce mismatch and instance meta-data incorrect")
}
}
// Ensure that the 'pendingTime' on the given identity document is not
// before the 'pendingTime' that was used for previous login. This
// disallows old metadata documents from being used to perform login.
if givenPendingTime.Before(storedPendingTime) {
return fmt.Errorf("instance meta-data is older than the one used for previous login")
}
return nil
}
// Winnow the data.
func Winnow(authKey *[32]byte, noncePrfx, in []byte) ([]byte, error) {
if len(in)%EnlargeFactor != 0 {
return nil, errors.New("Invalid data size")
}
out := make([]byte, len(in)/EnlargeFactor)
keys := make([]byte, 8*64)
nonce := make([]byte, 24)
copy(nonce[:8], noncePrfx)
var i int
var v byte
tag := new([16]byte)
macKey := new([32]byte)
defer zero(macKey[:])
var is01 bool
var is00 bool
var is11 bool
var is10 bool
for n := 0; n < len(out); n++ {
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(nonce[16:], uint64(n))
salsa20.XORKeyStream(keys, keys, nonce, authKey)
v = 0
for i = 0; i < 8; i++ {
copy(macKey[:], keys[64*i:64*i+32])
poly1305.Sum(tag, []byte("1"), macKey)
is01 = subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(
tag[:],
in[16*(n*16+i*2):16*(n*16+i*2+1)],
) == 1
poly1305.Sum(tag, []byte("0"), macKey)
is00 = subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(
tag[:],
in[16*(n*16+i*2):16*(n*16+i*2+1)],
) == 1
copy(macKey[:], keys[64*i+32:64*i+64])
poly1305.Sum(tag, []byte("1"), macKey)
is11 = subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(
tag[:],
in[16*(n*16+i*2+1):16*(n*16+i*2+2)],
) == 1
poly1305.Sum(tag, []byte("0"), macKey)
is10 = subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(
tag[:],
in[16*(n*16+i*2+1):16*(n*16+i*2+2)],
) == 1
if !((is01 && is10) || (is00 && is11)) {
zero(keys)
return nil, errors.New("Invalid authenticator received")
}
if is11 {
v = v | 1<<uint8(i)
}
}
out[n] = v
zero(keys)
}
return out, nil
}
func (sshClient *sshClient) passwordCallback(conn ssh.ConnMetadata, password []byte) (*ssh.Permissions, error) {
expectedSessionIDLength := 2 * common.PSIPHON_API_CLIENT_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
expectedSSHPasswordLength := 2 * SSH_PASSWORD_BYTE_LENGTH
var sshPasswordPayload struct {
SessionId string `json:"SessionId"`
SshPassword string `json:"SshPassword"`
}
err := json.Unmarshal(password, &sshPasswordPayload)
if err != nil {
// Backwards compatibility case: instead of a JSON payload, older clients
// send the hex encoded session ID prepended to the SSH password.
// Note: there's an even older case where clients don't send any session ID,
// but that's no longer supported.
if len(password) == expectedSessionIDLength+expectedSSHPasswordLength {
sshPasswordPayload.SessionId = string(password[0:expectedSessionIDLength])
sshPasswordPayload.SshPassword = string(password[expectedSSHPasswordLength:len(password)])
} else {
return nil, common.ContextError(fmt.Errorf("invalid password payload for %q", conn.User()))
}
}
if !isHexDigits(sshClient.sshServer.support, sshPasswordPayload.SessionId) ||
len(sshPasswordPayload.SessionId) != expectedSessionIDLength {
return nil, common.ContextError(fmt.Errorf("invalid session ID for %q", conn.User()))
}
userOk := (subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(
[]byte(conn.User()), []byte(sshClient.sshServer.support.Config.SSHUserName)) == 1)
passwordOk := (subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(
[]byte(sshPasswordPayload.SshPassword), []byte(sshClient.sshServer.support.Config.SSHPassword)) == 1)
if !userOk || !passwordOk {
return nil, common.ContextError(fmt.Errorf("invalid password for %q", conn.User()))
}
sessionID := sshPasswordPayload.SessionId
sshClient.Lock()
sshClient.sessionID = sessionID
geoIPData := sshClient.geoIPData
sshClient.Unlock()
// Store the GeoIP data associated with the session ID. This makes the GeoIP data
// available to the web server for web transport Psiphon API requests. To allow for
// post-tunnel final status requests, the lifetime of cached GeoIP records exceeds
// the lifetime of the sshClient, and that's why this distinct session cache exists.
sshClient.sshServer.support.GeoIPService.SetSessionCache(sessionID, geoIPData)
return nil, nil
}
func SecureCompare(given, actual []byte) bool {
if subtle.ConstantTimeEq(int32(len(given)), int32(len(actual))) == 1 {
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(given, actual) == 1 {
return true
}
return false
}
// Securely compare actual to itself to keep constant time, but always return false
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(actual, actual) == 1 {
return false
}
return false
}
func (sshClient *sshClient) passwordCallback(conn ssh.ConnMetadata, password []byte) (*ssh.Permissions, error) {
var sshPasswordPayload struct {
SessionId string `json:"SessionId"`
SshPassword string `json:"SshPassword"`
}
err := json.Unmarshal(password, &sshPasswordPayload)
if err != nil {
// Backwards compatibility case: instead of a JSON payload, older clients
// send the hex encoded session ID prepended to the SSH password.
// Note: there's an even older case where clients don't send any session ID,
// but that's no longer supported.
if len(password) == 2*psiphon.PSIPHON_API_CLIENT_SESSION_ID_LENGTH+2*SSH_PASSWORD_BYTE_LENGTH {
sshPasswordPayload.SessionId = string(password[0 : 2*psiphon.PSIPHON_API_CLIENT_SESSION_ID_LENGTH])
sshPasswordPayload.SshPassword = string(password[2*psiphon.PSIPHON_API_CLIENT_SESSION_ID_LENGTH : len(password)])
} else {
return nil, psiphon.ContextError(fmt.Errorf("invalid password payload for %q", conn.User()))
}
}
if !isHexDigits(sshClient.sshServer.support, sshPasswordPayload.SessionId) {
return nil, psiphon.ContextError(fmt.Errorf("invalid session ID for %q", conn.User()))
}
userOk := (subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(
[]byte(conn.User()), []byte(sshClient.sshServer.support.Config.SSHUserName)) == 1)
passwordOk := (subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(
[]byte(sshPasswordPayload.SshPassword), []byte(sshClient.sshServer.support.Config.SSHPassword)) == 1)
if !userOk || !passwordOk {
return nil, psiphon.ContextError(fmt.Errorf("invalid password for %q", conn.User()))
}
psiphonSessionID := sshPasswordPayload.SessionId
sshClient.Lock()
sshClient.psiphonSessionID = psiphonSessionID
geoIPData := sshClient.geoIPData
sshClient.Unlock()
// Store the GeoIP data associated with the session ID. This makes the GeoIP data
// available to the web server for web transport Psiphon API requests.
sshClient.sshServer.support.GeoIPService.SetSessionCache(
psiphonSessionID, geoIPData)
return nil, nil
}
// Match determines whether this KeyAuthorization matches the given token and key
func (ka KeyAuthorization) Match(token string, key *jose.JsonWebKey) bool {
if key == nil {
return false
}
thumbprint, err := Thumbprint(key)
if err != nil {
return false
}
tokensEqual := subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(token), []byte(ka.Token))
thumbprintsEqual := subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(thumbprint), []byte(ka.Thumbprint))
return tokensEqual == 1 && thumbprintsEqual == 1
}
// Returns true if the provided message is unsigned or has a valid signature
// from one of the provided signers.
func authenticateMessage(signers map[string]Signer, header *Header, msg []byte) bool {
digest := header.GetHmac()
if digest != nil {
var key string
signer := fmt.Sprintf("%s_%d", header.GetHmacSigner(),
header.GetHmacKeyVersion())
if s, ok := signers[signer]; ok {
key = s.HmacKey
} else {
return false
}
var hm hash.Hash
switch header.GetHmacHashFunction() {
case Header_MD5:
hm = hmac.New(md5.New, []byte(key))
case Header_SHA1:
hm = hmac.New(sha1.New, []byte(key))
}
hm.Write(msg)
expectedDigest := hm.Sum(nil)
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(digest, expectedDigest) != 1 {
return false
}
}
return true
}
func (uh *UsersSharedsecretHandler) Validate(snr *SessionNonceRequest, request *http.Request) (string, error) {
// Parse UseridCombo.
useridCombo := strings.SplitN(snr.UseridCombo, ":", 3)
if len(useridCombo) < 2 {
return "", errors.New("invalid useridcombo")
}
// TODO(longsleep): Add support for third field which provides the username.
expirationString, userid := useridCombo[0], useridCombo[1]
expiration, err := strconv.ParseInt(expirationString, 10, 64)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
// Check expiration.
if time.Unix(expiration, 0).Before(time.Now()) {
return "", errors.New("expired secret")
}
secret := uh.createHMAC(snr.UseridCombo)
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(snr.Secret), []byte(secret)) != 1 {
return "", errors.New("invalid secret")
}
return userid, nil
}
// EqualToPassword returns true if the password hash was derived from the provided password.
// This function uses constant time comparison.
func (ph *PasswordHash) EqualToPassword(password string) bool {
provided := NewSaltIter(password, ph.Salt, ph.Iter)
if len(ph.Hash) != len(provided.Hash) {
return false
}
return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(ph.Hash, provided.Hash) == 1
}
// Open decrypts and authenticates the ciphertext.
func (ctx *cbcAEAD) Open(dst, nonce, ciphertext, data []byte) ([]byte, error) {
if len(ciphertext) < ctx.authtagBytes {
return nil, errors.New("square/go-jose: invalid ciphertext (too short)")
}
offset := len(ciphertext) - ctx.authtagBytes
expectedTag := ctx.computeAuthTag(data, nonce, ciphertext[:offset])
match := subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(expectedTag, ciphertext[offset:])
if match != 1 {
return nil, errors.New("square/go-jose: invalid ciphertext (auth tag mismatch)")
}
cbc := cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(ctx.blockCipher, nonce)
// Make copy of ciphertext buffer, don't want to modify in place
buffer := append([]byte{}, []byte(ciphertext[:offset])...)
if len(buffer)%ctx.blockCipher.BlockSize() > 0 {
return nil, errors.New("square/go-jose: invalid ciphertext (invalid length)")
}
cbc.CryptBlocks(buffer, buffer)
// Remove padding
plaintext, err := unpadBuffer(buffer, ctx.blockCipher.BlockSize())
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
ret, out := resize(dst, len(dst)+len(plaintext))
copy(out, plaintext)
return ret, nil
}
// Verify returns true iff sig is a valid signature of message by publicKey.
func Verify(publicKey *[PublicKeySize]byte, message []byte, sig *[SignatureSize]byte) bool {
if sig[63]&224 != 0 {
return false
}
var A edwards25519.ExtendedGroupElement
if !A.FromBytes(publicKey) {
return false
}
h := sha512.New()
h.Write(sig[:32])
h.Write(publicKey[:])
h.Write(message)
var digest [64]byte
h.Sum(digest[:0])
var hReduced [32]byte
edwards25519.ScReduce(&hReduced, &digest)
var R edwards25519.ProjectiveGroupElement
var b [32]byte
copy(b[:], sig[32:])
edwards25519.GeDoubleScalarMultVartime(&R, &hReduced, &A, &b)
var checkR [32]byte
R.ToBytes(&checkR)
return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(sig[:32], checkR[:]) == 1
}
func (c *Conn) decryptTicket(encrypted []byte) (*sessionState, bool) {
if len(encrypted) < aes.BlockSize+sha256.Size {
return nil, false
}
iv := encrypted[:aes.BlockSize]
macBytes := encrypted[len(encrypted)-sha256.Size:]
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, c.config.SessionTicketKey[16:32])
mac.Write(encrypted[:len(encrypted)-sha256.Size])
expected := mac.Sum(nil)
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(macBytes, expected) != 1 {
return nil, false
}
block, err := aes.NewCipher(c.config.SessionTicketKey[:16])
if err != nil {
return nil, false
}
ciphertext := encrypted[aes.BlockSize : len(encrypted)-sha256.Size]
plaintext := make([]byte, len(ciphertext))
cipher.NewCTR(block, iv).XORKeyStream(plaintext, ciphertext)
state := new(sessionState)
ok := state.unmarshal(plaintext)
return state, ok
}
// ListNeighs lists the public keys of the neighbors of the node
func (clnt *Client) ListNeighs() ([]natrium.EdDSAPublic, error) {
req := textprot.TextReq{
Verb: "NEIGH_LIST",
}
resp, err := clnt.execCmd(req)
var ninf textprot.NeighInfo
err = ninf.FromString(resp.Blob)
if err != nil {
clnt.sok.Close()
return nil, ErrBadSocket
}
// do the checks
pubkey := directory.DefaultProvider("").PublicKey()
err = pubkey.Verify(ninf.Json.HashValue(), ninf.Signat)
if err != nil {
clnt.sok.Close() // this server is really bad, go away now
return nil, ErrBadCrypto
}
if ninf.Json.Expires < int(time.Now().Unix()) ||
subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(clnt.CurrentPublic(), ninf.Json.IssuedTo) != 1 {
clnt.sok.Close()
return nil, ErrBadCrypto
}
// return the val
var toret []natrium.EdDSAPublic
for _, v := range ninf.Json.NeighList {
toret = append(toret, natrium.EdDSAPublic(v))
}
return toret, nil
}
// compareStrings compares two strings in constant time.
func compareStrings(a, b string) bool {
if len(a) != len(b) {
return false
}
return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(a), []byte(b)) == 1
}
func (c *Crypter) DecryptBox(ciphertext []byte, kdfNum uint8) ([]byte, error) {
if len(c.ChainVar) == 0 {
c.ChainVar = make([]byte, CVLen)
}
ephPubKey := ciphertext[:c.Cipher.DHLen()]
dh1 := c.Cipher.DH(c.Key.Private, ephPubKey)
cv1, cc1 := c.deriveKey(dh1, c.ChainVar, kdfNum)
header := ciphertext[:(2*c.Cipher.DHLen())+c.Cipher.MACLen()]
ciphertext = ciphertext[len(header):]
senderPubKey, err := c.cipher(cc1).Decrypt(header[c.Cipher.DHLen():], append(c.Key.Public, ephPubKey...))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if len(c.PeerKey.Public) > 0 {
if len(c.PeerKey.Public) != len(senderPubKey) || subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(senderPubKey, c.PeerKey.Public) != 1 {
return nil, errors.New("pipe: unexpected sender public key")
}
}
dh2 := c.Cipher.DH(c.Key.Private, senderPubKey)
cv2, cc2 := c.deriveKey(dh2, cv1, kdfNum+1)
c.ChainVar = cv2
body, err := c.cipher(cc2).Decrypt(ciphertext, append(c.Key.Public, header...))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
padLen := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(body[len(body)-4:]))
return body[:len(body)-(padLen+4)], nil
}
// VerifyMAC verifies the MAC is valid with ConstantTimeCompare.
func VerifyMAC(h hash.Hash, value []byte, mac []byte) error {
m := CreateMAC(h, value)
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(mac, m) == 1 {
return nil
}
return fmt.Errorf("Invalid MAC:%s", string(m))
}
// ReadPubEK reads the public part of the endorsement key when no owner is
// established.
func ReadPubEK(f *os.File) ([]byte, error) {
var n nonce
if _, err := rand.Read(n[:]); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
pk, d, _, err := readPubEK(f, n)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Recompute the hash of the pk and the nonce to defend against replay
// attacks.
b, err := pack([]interface{}{pk, n})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
s := sha1.Sum(b)
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(s[:], d[:]) != 1 {
return nil, errors.New("the ReadPubEK operation failed the replay check")
}
return pack([]interface{}{pk})
}
func (hs *clientHandshakeState) readFinished(out []byte) error {
c := hs.c
c.readRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec)
if err := c.in.error(); err != nil {
return err
}
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
serverFinished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(serverFinished, msg)
}
verify := hs.finishedHash.serverSum(hs.masterSecret)
if len(verify) != len(serverFinished.verifyData) ||
subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, serverFinished.verifyData) != 1 {
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return errors.New("tls: server's Finished message was incorrect")
}
hs.finishedHash.Write(serverFinished.marshal())
copy(out, verify)
return nil
}
// Determine if a token is valid.
func (r *HawkRequest) isValid(cfg config.ValkyrieConfig) error {
// Get credentials from config
secKey, algo, err := cfg.GetCredentials(r.Id, authScheme)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Get opts from config
host, port, offset, skew, err := cfg.GetOpts()
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Calc/verify MAC
normalized := r.normalizedString("header", r.Method, host, port)
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(r.Mac, macHash(algo, secKey, normalized)) != 1 {
return errors.New("Invalid MAC")
}
// Check nonce
ok, err := cfg.StoreNonce(r.Id, r.Nonce)
if !ok || err != nil {
if err == nil {
err = errors.New("Unable to store nonce; already exists")
}
return err
}
// Check timestamp
var tDiff int64
if tDiff = (time.Now().Unix() - offset) - r.Timestamp; tDiff < 0 {
tDiff *= -1
}
if tDiff > skew {
return errors.New("Stale timestamp")
}
// No errors
return nil
}
// VerifySessionKey authenticates a session key.
func (id *Identity) VerifySessionKey(sk *[SessionKeySize]byte) (*[64]byte, bool) {
peerID := new([ed25519.PublicKeySize]byte)
keyData := new([64]byte)
signature := new([ed25519.SignatureSize]byte)
copy(peerID[:], sk[:])
copy(keyData[:], sk[ed25519.PublicKeySize:])
copy(signature[:], sk[blobDataSize:])
var found bool
for i := range id.peers {
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(id.peers[i][:], peerID[:]) == 1 {
found = true
}
}
if !found {
if id.PeerLookup != nil {
if !id.PeerLookup(peerID) {
return nil, false
}
} else {
return nil, false
}
}
if !ed25519.Verify(peerID, sk[:blobDataSize], signature) {
return nil, false
}
return keyData, true
}
func (r *Runner) httpClusterHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
authKeyID := strings.SplitN(strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/cluster/"), "/", 2)
if len(authKeyID[0]) != len(r.authKey) || subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(authKeyID[0]), []byte(r.authKey)) != 1 {
w.WriteHeader(401)
return
}
c, ok := r.clusters[authKeyID[1]]
if !ok {
http.Error(w, "cluster not found", 404)
return
}
switch req.Method {
case "GET":
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(c)
case "POST":
if err := c.AddHost(); err != nil {
http.Error(w, err.Error(), 500)
return
}
w.Write([]byte("ok"))
case "DELETE":
hostID := req.FormValue("host")
if err := c.RemoveHost(hostID); err != nil {
http.Error(w, err.Error(), 500)
return
}
w.Write([]byte("ok"))
default:
http.Error(w, "unknown method", 405)
}
}
func (a *authReader) checkAuthentication(authcode []byte) bool {
expectedAuthCode := a.mac.Sum(nil)
// Truncate at the first 10 bytes
expectedAuthCode = expectedAuthCode[:10]
a.auth = subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(expectedAuthCode, authcode) > 0
return a.auth
}
// compare securely (constant-time) compares the unmasked token from the request
// against the real token from the session.
func compareTokens(a, b []byte) bool {
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(a, b) == 1 {
return true
}
return false
}
