// NewHandlerFromSigner generates a new Handler directly from
// an existing signer.
func NewHandlerFromSigner(signer signer.Signer) (h *api.HTTPHandler, err error) {
policy := signer.Policy()
if policy == nil {
err = errors.New(errors.PolicyError, errors.InvalidPolicy)
return
}
// Sign will only respond for profiles that have no auth provider.
// So if all of the profiles require authentication, we return an error.
haveUnauth := (policy.Default.Provider == nil)
for _, profile := range policy.Profiles {
haveUnauth = haveUnauth || (profile.Provider == nil)
}
if !haveUnauth {
err = errors.New(errors.PolicyError, errors.InvalidPolicy)
return
}
return &api.HTTPHandler{
Handler: &Handler{
signer: signer,
},
Methods: []string{"POST"},
}, nil
}
// NewAuthHandlerFromSigner creates a new AuthHandler from the signer
// that is passed in.
func NewAuthHandlerFromSigner(signer signer.Signer) (http.Handler, error) {
policy := signer.Policy()
if policy == nil {
return nil, errors.New(errors.PolicyError, errors.InvalidPolicy)
}
if policy.Default == nil && policy.Profiles == nil {
return nil, errors.New(errors.PolicyError, errors.InvalidPolicy)
}
// AuthSign will not respond for profiles that have no auth provider.
// So if there are no profiles with auth providers in this policy,
// we return an error.
haveAuth := (policy.Default.Provider != nil)
for _, profile := range policy.Profiles {
if haveAuth {
break
}
haveAuth = (profile.Provider != nil)
}
if !haveAuth {
return nil, errors.New(errors.PolicyError, errors.InvalidPolicy)
}
return &api.HTTPHandler{
Handler: &AuthHandler{
signer: signer,
},
Methods: []string{"POST"},
}, nil
}
// ParsePrivateKeyDER parses a PKCS #1, PKCS #8, or elliptic curve
// DER-encoded private key. The key must not be in PEM format.
func ParsePrivateKeyDER(keyDER []byte) (key crypto.Signer, err error) {
generalKey, err := x509.ParsePKCS8PrivateKey(keyDER)
if err != nil {
generalKey, err = x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(keyDER)
if err != nil {
generalKey, err = x509.ParseECPrivateKey(keyDER)
if err != nil {
// We don't include the actual error into
// the final error. The reason might be
// we don't want to leak any info about
// the private key.
return nil, cferr.New(cferr.PrivateKeyError,
cferr.ParseFailed)
}
}
}
switch generalKey.(type) {
case *rsa.PrivateKey:
return generalKey.(*rsa.PrivateKey), nil
case *ecdsa.PrivateKey:
return generalKey.(*ecdsa.PrivateKey), nil
}
// should never reach here
return nil, cferr.New(cferr.PrivateKeyError, cferr.ParseFailed)
}
// ParseCertificatesDER parses a DER encoding of a certificate object and possibly private key,
// either PKCS #7, PKCS #12, or raw x509.
func ParseCertificatesDER(certsDER []byte, password string) ([]*x509.Certificate, crypto.Signer, error) {
var certs []*x509.Certificate
var key crypto.Signer
certsDER = bytes.TrimSpace(certsDER)
pkcs7data, err := pkcs7.ParsePKCS7(certsDER)
if err != nil {
pkcs12data, err := pkcs12.ParsePKCS12(certsDER, []byte(password))
if err != nil {
certs, err = x509.ParseCertificates(certsDER)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, cferr.New(cferr.CertificateError, cferr.DecodeFailed)
}
} else {
key = pkcs12data.PrivateKey
certs = pkcs12data.Certificates
}
} else {
if pkcs7data.ContentInfo != "SignedData" {
return nil, nil, cferr.Wrap(cferr.CertificateError, cferr.DecodeFailed, errors.New("can only extract certificates from signed data content info"))
}
certs = pkcs7data.Content.SignedData.Certificates
}
if certs == nil {
return nil, key, cferr.New(cferr.CertificateError, cferr.DecodeFailed)
}
return certs, key, nil
}
// NewSigner generates a new certificate signer from a Root structure.
// This is one of two standard signers: local or remote. If the root
// structure specifies a force remote, then a remote signer is created,
// otherwise either a remote or local signer is generated based on the
// policy. For a local signer, the CertFile and KeyFile need to be
// defined in Root.
func NewSigner(root Root, policy *config.Signing) (signer.Signer, error) {
if policy == nil {
policy = &config.Signing{
Profiles: map[string]*config.SigningProfile{},
Default: config.DefaultConfig(),
}
}
if !policy.Valid() {
return nil, cferr.New(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy)
}
var s signer.Signer
var err error
if root.ForceRemote {
s, err = remote.NewSigner(policy)
} else {
if policy.NeedsLocalSigner() && policy.NeedsRemoteSigner() {
// Currently we don't support a hybrid signer
return nil, cferr.New(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy)
}
if policy.NeedsLocalSigner() {
// shouldProvide indicates whether the
// function *should* have produced a key. If
// it's true, we should use the signer and
// error returned. Otherwise, keep looking for
// signers.
var shouldProvide bool
// localSignerList is defined in the
// universal_signers*.go files. These activate
// and deactivate signers based on build
// flags; for example,
// universal_signers_pkcs11.go contains a list
// of valid signers when PKCS #11 is turned
// on.
for _, possibleSigner := range localSignerList {
s, shouldProvide, err = possibleSigner(&root, policy)
if shouldProvide {
break
}
}
if s == nil {
err = cferr.New(cferr.PrivateKeyError, cferr.Unknown)
}
}
if policy.NeedsRemoteSigner() {
s, err = remote.NewSigner(policy)
}
}
return s, err
}
// NewSigner creates a new remote Signer directly from a
// signing policy.
func NewSigner(policy *config.Signing) (*Signer, error) {
if policy != nil {
if !policy.Valid() {
return nil, cferr.New(cferr.PolicyError,
cferr.InvalidPolicy)
}
return &Signer{policy: policy}, nil
}
return nil, cferr.New(cferr.PolicyError,
cferr.InvalidPolicy)
}
// GetKeyDERFromPEM parses a PEM-encoded private key and returns DER-format key bytes.
func GetKeyDERFromPEM(in []byte) ([]byte, error) {
keyDER, _ := pem.Decode(in)
if keyDER != nil {
if procType, ok := keyDER.Headers["Proc-Type"]; ok {
if strings.Contains(procType, "ENCRYPTED") {
return nil, cferr.New(cferr.PrivateKeyError, cferr.Encrypted)
}
}
return keyDER.Bytes, nil
}
return nil, cferr.New(cferr.PrivateKeyError, cferr.DecodeFailed)
}
// ParseCertificatePEM parses and returns a PEM-encoded certificate,
// can handle PEM encoded PKCS #7 structures.
func ParseCertificatePEM(certPEM []byte) (*x509.Certificate, error) {
certPEM = bytes.TrimSpace(certPEM)
cert, rest, err := ParseOneCertificateFromPEM(certPEM)
if err != nil {
// Log the actual parsing error but throw a default parse error message.
log.Debugf("Certificate parsing error: %v", err)
return nil, cferr.New(cferr.CertificateError, cferr.ParseFailed)
} else if cert == nil {
return nil, cferr.New(cferr.CertificateError, cferr.DecodeFailed)
} else if len(rest) > 0 {
return nil, cferr.Wrap(cferr.CertificateError, cferr.ParseFailed, errors.New("the PEM file should contain only one object"))
} else if len(cert) > 1 {
return nil, cferr.Wrap(cferr.CertificateError, cferr.ParseFailed, errors.New("the PKCS7 object in the PEM file should contain only one certificate"))
}
return cert[0], nil
}
// post connects to the remote server and returns a Response struct
func (srv *server) post(url string, jsonData []byte) (*api.Response, error) {
buf := bytes.NewBuffer(jsonData)
resp, err := http.Post(url, "application/json", buf)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrap(errors.APIClientError, errors.ClientHTTPError, err)
}
body, err := ioutil.ReadAll(resp.Body)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrap(errors.APIClientError, errors.IOError, err)
}
resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
return nil, errors.Wrap(errors.APIClientError, errors.ClientHTTPError, stderr.New(string(body)))
}
var response api.Response
err = json.Unmarshal(body, &response)
if err != nil {
log.Debug("Unable to parse response body:", string(body))
return nil, errors.Wrap(errors.APIClientError, errors.JSONError, err)
}
if !response.Success || response.Result == nil {
if len(response.Errors) > 0 {
return nil, errors.Wrap(errors.APIClientError, errors.ServerRequestFailed, stderr.New(response.Errors[0].Message))
}
return nil, errors.New(errors.APIClientError, errors.ServerRequestFailed)
}
return &response, nil
}
// Generate creates a new CSR from a CertificateRequest structure and
// an existing key. The KeyRequest field is ignored.
func Generate(priv crypto.Signer, req *CertificateRequest) (csr []byte, err error) {
sigAlgo := helpers.SignerAlgo(priv, crypto.SHA256)
if sigAlgo == x509.UnknownSignatureAlgorithm {
return nil, cferr.New(cferr.PrivateKeyError, cferr.Unavailable)
}
var tpl = x509.CertificateRequest{
Subject: req.Name(),
SignatureAlgorithm: sigAlgo,
}
for i := range req.Hosts {
if ip := net.ParseIP(req.Hosts[i]); ip != nil {
tpl.IPAddresses = append(tpl.IPAddresses, ip)
} else {
tpl.DNSNames = append(tpl.DNSNames, req.Hosts[i])
}
}
csr, err = x509.CreateCertificateRequest(rand.Reader, &tpl, priv)
if err != nil {
log.Errorf("failed to generate a CSR: %v", err)
err = cferr.Wrap(cferr.CSRError, cferr.BadRequest, err)
return
}
block := pem.Block{
Type: "CERTIFICATE REQUEST",
Bytes: csr,
}
log.Info("encoded CSR")
csr = pem.EncodeToMemory(&block)
return
}
// Sign is used with an OCSP signer to request the issuance of
// an OCSP response.
func (s StandardSigner) Sign(req SignRequest) ([]byte, error) {
if req.Certificate == nil {
return nil, cferr.New(cferr.OCSPError, cferr.ReadFailed)
}
// Verify that req.Certificate is issued under s.issuer
if bytes.Compare(req.Certificate.RawIssuer, s.issuer.RawSubject) != 0 {
return nil, cferr.New(cferr.OCSPError, cferr.IssuerMismatch)
}
if req.Certificate.CheckSignatureFrom(s.issuer) != nil {
return nil, cferr.New(cferr.OCSPError, cferr.IssuerMismatch)
}
// Round thisUpdate times down to the nearest hour
thisUpdate := time.Now().Truncate(time.Hour)
nextUpdate := thisUpdate.Add(s.interval)
status, ok := StatusCode[req.Status]
if !ok {
return nil, cferr.New(cferr.OCSPError, cferr.InvalidStatus)
}
// If the OCSP responder is the same as the issuer, there is no need to
// include any certificate in the OCSP response, which decreases the byte size
// of OCSP responses dramatically.
certificate := s.responder
if s.issuer == s.responder || bytes.Equal(s.issuer.Raw, s.responder.Raw) {
certificate = nil
}
template := ocsp.Response{
Status: status,
SerialNumber: req.Certificate.SerialNumber,
ThisUpdate: thisUpdate,
NextUpdate: nextUpdate,
Certificate: certificate,
}
if status == ocsp.Revoked {
template.RevokedAt = req.RevokedAt
template.RevocationReason = req.Reason
}
return ocsp.CreateResponse(s.issuer, s.responder, template, s.key)
}
// NewBundlerFromPEM creates a new Bundler from PEM-encoded root certificates and
// intermediate certificates.
// If caBundlePEM is nil, the resulting Bundler can only do "Force" bundle.
func NewBundlerFromPEM(caBundlePEM, intBundlePEM []byte) (*Bundler, error) {
log.Debug("parsing root certificates from PEM")
roots, err := helpers.ParseCertificatesPEM(caBundlePEM)
if err != nil {
log.Errorf("failed to parse root bundle: %v", err)
return nil, errors.New(errors.RootError, errors.ParseFailed)
}
log.Debug("parse intermediate certificates from PEM")
intermediates, err := helpers.ParseCertificatesPEM(intBundlePEM)
if err != nil {
log.Errorf("failed to parse intermediate bundle: %v", err)
return nil, errors.New(errors.IntermediatesError, errors.ParseFailed)
}
b := &Bundler{
KnownIssuers: map[string]bool{},
IntermediatePool: x509.NewCertPool(),
}
log.Debug("building certificate pools")
// RootPool will be nil if caBundlePEM is nil, also
// that translates to caBundleFile is "".
// Systems root store will be used.
if caBundlePEM != nil {
b.RootPool = x509.NewCertPool()
}
for _, c := range roots {
b.RootPool.AddCert(c)
b.KnownIssuers[string(c.Signature)] = true
}
for _, c := range intermediates {
b.IntermediatePool.AddCert(c)
b.KnownIssuers[string(c.Signature)] = true
}
log.Debug("bundler set up")
return b, nil
}
// ParseCertificatesPEM parses a sequence of PEM-encoded certificate and returns them,
// can handle PEM encoded PKCS #7 structures.
func ParseCertificatesPEM(certsPEM []byte) ([]*x509.Certificate, error) {
var certs []*x509.Certificate
var err error
certsPEM = bytes.TrimSpace(certsPEM)
for len(certsPEM) > 0 {
var cert []*x509.Certificate
cert, certsPEM, err = ParseOneCertificateFromPEM(certsPEM)
if err != nil {
return nil, cferr.New(cferr.CertificateError, cferr.ParseFailed)
} else if cert == nil {
break
}
certs = append(certs, cert...)
}
if len(certsPEM) > 0 {
return nil, cferr.New(cferr.CertificateError, cferr.DecodeFailed)
}
return certs, nil
}
// authReq is the common logic for AuthSign and AuthInfo -- perform the given
// request, and return the resultant certificate.
// The target is either 'sign' or 'info'.
func (srv *server) authReq(req, ID []byte, provider auth.Provider, target string) ([]byte, error) {
url := srv.getURL("auth" + target)
token, err := provider.Token(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrap(errors.APIClientError, errors.AuthenticationFailure, err)
}
aReq := &auth.AuthenticatedRequest{
Timestamp: time.Now().Unix(),
RemoteAddress: ID,
Token: token,
Request: req,
}
jsonData, err := json.Marshal(aReq)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrap(errors.APIClientError, errors.JSONError, err)
}
response, err := srv.post(url, jsonData)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
result, ok := response.Result.(map[string]interface{})
if !ok {
return nil, errors.New(errors.APIClientError, errors.JSONError)
}
cert, ok := result["certificate"].(string)
if !ok {
return nil, errors.New(errors.APIClientError, errors.JSONError)
}
return []byte(cert), nil
}
// NewPKCS11Signer returns a new PKCS #11 signer.
func NewPKCS11Signer(cfg ocspConfig.Config) (ocsp.Signer, error) {
log.Debugf("Loading PKCS #11 module %s", cfg.PKCS11.Module)
certData, err := ioutil.ReadFile(cfg.CACertFile)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.New(errors.CertificateError, errors.ReadFailed)
}
cert, err := helpers.ParseCertificatePEM(certData)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
PKCS11 := cfg.PKCS11
priv, err := pkcs11key.New(
PKCS11.Module,
PKCS11.TokenLabel,
PKCS11.PIN,
PKCS11.PrivateKeyLabel)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.New(errors.PrivateKeyError, errors.ReadFailed)
}
return ocsp.NewSigner(cert, cert, priv, cfg.Interval)
}
// NewSigner creates a new Signer directly from a
// private key and certificate, with optional policy.
func NewSigner(priv crypto.Signer, cert *x509.Certificate, sigAlgo x509.SignatureAlgorithm, policy *config.Signing) (*Signer, error) {
if policy == nil {
policy = &config.Signing{
Profiles: map[string]*config.SigningProfile{},
Default: config.DefaultConfig()}
}
if !policy.Valid() {
return nil, cferr.New(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy)
}
return &Signer{
ca: cert,
priv: priv,
sigAlgo: sigAlgo,
policy: policy,
}, nil
}
// BundleFromPEMorDER builds a certificate bundle from the set of byte
// slices containing the PEM or DER-encoded certificate(s), private key.
func (b *Bundler) BundleFromPEMorDER(certsRaw, keyPEM []byte, flavor BundleFlavor, password string) (*Bundle, error) {
log.Debug("bundling from PEM files")
var key crypto.Signer
var err error
if len(keyPEM) != 0 {
key, err = helpers.ParsePrivateKeyPEM(keyPEM)
if err != nil {
log.Debugf("failed to parse private key: %v", err)
return nil, err
}
}
certs, err := helpers.ParseCertificatesPEM(certsRaw)
if err != nil {
// If PEM doesn't work try DER
var keyDER crypto.Signer
var errDER error
certs, keyDER, errDER = helpers.ParseCertificatesDER(certsRaw, password)
// Only use DER key if no key read from file
if key == nil && keyDER != nil {
key = keyDER
}
if errDER != nil {
log.Debugf("failed to parse certificates: %v", err)
// If neither parser works pass along PEM error
return nil, err
}
}
if len(certs) == 0 {
log.Debugf("no certificates found")
return nil, errors.New(errors.CertificateError, errors.DecodeFailed)
}
log.Debugf("bundle ready")
return b.Bundle(certs, key, flavor)
}
// ParseCSR parses a PEM- or DER-encoded PKCS #10 certificate signing request.
func ParseCSR(in []byte) (csr *x509.CertificateRequest, rest []byte, err error) {
in = bytes.TrimSpace(in)
p, rest := pem.Decode(in)
if p != nil {
if p.Type != "CERTIFICATE REQUEST" {
return nil, rest, cferr.New(cferr.CSRError, cferr.BadRequest)
}
csr, err = x509.ParseCertificateRequest(p.Bytes)
} else {
csr, err = x509.ParseCertificateRequest(in)
}
if err != nil {
return nil, rest, err
}
err = CheckSignature(csr, csr.SignatureAlgorithm, csr.RawTBSCertificateRequest, csr.Signature)
if err != nil {
return nil, rest, err
}
return csr, rest, nil
}
func (s *Signer) sign(template *x509.Certificate, profile *config.SigningProfile) (cert []byte, err error) {
err = signer.FillTemplate(template, s.policy.Default, profile)
if err != nil {
return
}
var initRoot bool
if s.ca == nil {
if !template.IsCA {
err = cferr.New(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidRequest)
return
}
template.DNSNames = nil
s.ca = template
initRoot = true
template.MaxPathLen = signer.MaxPathLen
} else if template.IsCA {
template.MaxPathLen = 1
template.DNSNames = nil
}
derBytes, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, template, s.ca, template.PublicKey, s.priv)
if err != nil {
return nil, cferr.Wrap(cferr.CertificateError, cferr.Unknown, err)
}
if initRoot {
s.ca, err = x509.ParseCertificate(derBytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, cferr.Wrap(cferr.CertificateError, cferr.ParseFailed, err)
}
}
cert = pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: derBytes})
log.Infof("signed certificate with serial number %d", template.SerialNumber)
return
}
// Sign creates a new self-signed certificate.
func Sign(priv crypto.Signer, csrPEM []byte, profile *config.SigningProfile) ([]byte, error) {
if profile == nil {
return nil, cferr.Wrap(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy, errors.New("no profile for self-signing"))
}
p, _ := pem.Decode(csrPEM)
if p == nil || p.Type != "CERTIFICATE REQUEST" {
return nil, cferr.New(cferr.CSRError, cferr.BadRequest)
}
template, err := parseCertificateRequest(priv, p.Bytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
pub := template.PublicKey
encodedpub, err := x509.MarshalPKIXPublicKey(pub)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var subPKI subjectPublicKeyInfo
_, err = asn1.Unmarshal(encodedpub, &subPKI)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
pubhash := sha1.New()
pubhash.Write(subPKI.SubjectPublicKey.Bytes)
var (
eku []x509.ExtKeyUsage
ku x509.KeyUsage
expiry time.Duration
crlURL, ocspURL string
)
// The third value returned from Usages is a list of unknown key usages.
// This should be used when validating the profile at load, and isn't used
// here.
ku, eku, _ = profile.Usages()
expiry = profile.Expiry
if ku == 0 && len(eku) == 0 {
err = cferr.New(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.NoKeyUsages)
return nil, err
}
if expiry == 0 {
expiry = threeMonths
}
now := time.Now()
serialNumber, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, new(big.Int).SetInt64(math.MaxInt64))
if err != nil {
err = cferr.Wrap(cferr.CSRError, cferr.Unknown, err)
return nil, err
}
template.SerialNumber = serialNumber
template.NotBefore = now.Add(-5 * time.Minute).UTC()
template.NotAfter = now.Add(expiry).UTC()
template.KeyUsage = ku
template.ExtKeyUsage = eku
template.BasicConstraintsValid = true
template.IsCA = profile.CA
template.SubjectKeyId = pubhash.Sum(nil)
if ocspURL != "" {
template.OCSPServer = []string{ocspURL}
}
if crlURL != "" {
template.CRLDistributionPoints = []string{crlURL}
}
if len(profile.IssuerURL) != 0 {
template.IssuingCertificateURL = profile.IssuerURL
}
cert, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, template, template, pub, priv)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
cert = pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: cert})
return cert, nil
}
// NewPKCS11Signer returns a new PKCS #11 signer.
func NewPKCS11Signer(cfg ocspConfig.Config) (ocsp.Signer, error) {
return nil, errors.New(errors.PrivateKeyError, errors.Unavailable)
}
// populate is used to fill in the fields that are not in JSON
//
// First, the ExpiryString parameter is needed to parse
// expiration timestamps from JSON. The JSON decoder is not able to
// decode a string time duration to a time.Duration, so this is called
// when loading the configuration to properly parse and fill out the
// Expiry parameter.
// This function is also used to create references to the auth key
// and default remote for the profile.
// It returns true if ExpiryString is a valid representation of a
// time.Duration, and the AuthKeyString and RemoteName point to
// valid objects. It returns false otherwise.
func (p *SigningProfile) populate(cfg *Config) error {
if p == nil {
return cferr.Wrap(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy, errors.New("can't parse nil profile"))
}
var err error
if p.RemoteName == "" && p.AuthRemote.RemoteName == "" {
log.Debugf("parse expiry in profile")
if p.ExpiryString == "" {
return cferr.Wrap(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy, errors.New("empty expiry string"))
}
dur, err := time.ParseDuration(p.ExpiryString)
if err != nil {
return cferr.Wrap(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy, err)
}
log.Debugf("expiry is valid")
p.Expiry = dur
if p.BackdateString != "" {
dur, err = time.ParseDuration(p.BackdateString)
if err != nil {
return cferr.Wrap(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy, err)
}
p.Backdate = dur
}
if !p.NotBefore.IsZero() && !p.NotAfter.IsZero() && p.NotAfter.Before(p.NotBefore) {
return cferr.Wrap(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy, err)
}
if len(p.Policies) > 0 {
for _, policy := range p.Policies {
for _, qualifier := range policy.Qualifiers {
if qualifier.Type != "" && qualifier.Type != "id-qt-unotice" && qualifier.Type != "id-qt-cps" {
return cferr.Wrap(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy,
errors.New("invalid policy qualifier type"))
}
}
}
}
} else if p.RemoteName != "" {
log.Debug("match remote in profile to remotes section")
if p.AuthRemote.RemoteName != "" {
log.Error("profile has both a remote and an auth remote specified")
return cferr.New(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy)
}
if remote := cfg.Remotes[p.RemoteName]; remote != "" {
if err := p.updateRemote(remote); err != nil {
return err
}
} else {
return cferr.Wrap(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy,
errors.New("failed to find remote in remotes section"))
}
} else {
log.Debug("match auth remote in profile to remotes section")
if remote := cfg.Remotes[p.AuthRemote.RemoteName]; remote != "" {
if err := p.updateRemote(remote); err != nil {
return err
}
} else {
return cferr.Wrap(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy,
errors.New("failed to find remote in remotes section"))
}
}
if p.AuthKeyName != "" {
log.Debug("match auth key in profile to auth_keys section")
if key, ok := cfg.AuthKeys[p.AuthKeyName]; ok == true {
if key.Type == "standard" {
p.Provider, err = auth.New(key.Key, nil)
if err != nil {
log.Debugf("failed to create new standard auth provider: %v", err)
return cferr.Wrap(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy,
errors.New("failed to create new standard auth provider"))
}
} else {
log.Debugf("unknown authentication type %v", key.Type)
return cferr.Wrap(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy,
errors.New("unknown authentication type"))
}
} else {
return cferr.Wrap(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy,
errors.New("failed to find auth_key in auth_keys section"))
}
}
if p.AuthRemote.AuthKeyName != "" {
log.Debug("match auth remote key in profile to auth_keys section")
if key, ok := cfg.AuthKeys[p.AuthRemote.AuthKeyName]; ok == true {
if key.Type == "standard" {
p.RemoteProvider, err = auth.New(key.Key, nil)
if err != nil {
log.Debugf("failed to create new standard auth provider: %v", err)
return cferr.Wrap(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy,
errors.New("failed to create new standard auth provider"))
}
} else {
log.Debugf("unknown authentication type %v", key.Type)
return cferr.Wrap(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy,
errors.New("unknown authentication type"))
}
} else {
return cferr.Wrap(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy,
errors.New("failed to find auth_remote's auth_key in auth_keys section"))
}
}
if p.NameWhitelistString != "" {
log.Debug("compiling whitelist regular expression")
rule, err := regexp.Compile(p.NameWhitelistString)
if err != nil {
return cferr.Wrap(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy,
errors.New("failed to compile name whitelist section"))
}
p.NameWhitelist = rule
}
return nil
}
// New always returns an error. If PKCS #11 support is needed, the
// program should be built with the `pkcs11` build tag.
func New(caCertFile string, policy *config.Signing, cfg *Config) (signer.Signer, error) {
return nil, errors.New(errors.PrivateKeyError, errors.Unknown)
}
// Sign signs a new certificate based on the PEM-encoded client
// certificate or certificate request with the signing profile,
// specified by profileName.
func (s *Signer) Sign(req signer.SignRequest) (cert []byte, err error) {
profile, err := signer.Profile(s, req.Profile)
if err != nil {
return
}
block, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(req.Request))
if block == nil {
return nil, cferr.New(cferr.CSRError, cferr.DecodeFailed)
}
if block.Type != "CERTIFICATE REQUEST" {
return nil, cferr.Wrap(cferr.CSRError,
cferr.BadRequest, errors.New("not a certificate or csr"))
}
csrTemplate, err := signer.ParseCertificateRequest(s, block.Bytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Copy out only the fields from the CSR authorized by policy.
safeTemplate := x509.Certificate{}
// If the profile contains no explicit whitelist, assume that all fields
// should be copied from the CSR.
if profile.CSRWhitelist == nil {
safeTemplate = *csrTemplate
} else {
if profile.CSRWhitelist.Subject {
safeTemplate.Subject = csrTemplate.Subject
}
if profile.CSRWhitelist.PublicKeyAlgorithm {
safeTemplate.PublicKeyAlgorithm = csrTemplate.PublicKeyAlgorithm
}
if profile.CSRWhitelist.PublicKey {
safeTemplate.PublicKey = csrTemplate.PublicKey
}
if profile.CSRWhitelist.SignatureAlgorithm {
safeTemplate.SignatureAlgorithm = csrTemplate.SignatureAlgorithm
}
if profile.CSRWhitelist.DNSNames {
safeTemplate.DNSNames = csrTemplate.DNSNames
}
if profile.CSRWhitelist.IPAddresses {
safeTemplate.IPAddresses = csrTemplate.IPAddresses
}
}
OverrideHosts(&safeTemplate, req.Hosts)
safeTemplate.Subject = PopulateSubjectFromCSR(req.Subject, safeTemplate.Subject)
// If there is a whitelist, ensure that both the Common Name and SAN DNSNames match
if profile.NameWhitelist != nil {
if safeTemplate.Subject.CommonName != "" {
if profile.NameWhitelist.Find([]byte(safeTemplate.Subject.CommonName)) == nil {
return nil, cferr.New(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy)
}
}
for _, name := range safeTemplate.DNSNames {
if profile.NameWhitelist.Find([]byte(name)) == nil {
return nil, cferr.New(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy)
}
}
}
if profile.ClientProvidesSerialNumbers {
if req.Serial == nil {
fmt.Printf("xx %#v\n", profile)
return nil, cferr.New(cferr.CertificateError, cferr.MissingSerial)
}
safeTemplate.SerialNumber = req.Serial
} else {
serialNumber, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, new(big.Int).SetInt64(math.MaxInt64))
if err != nil {
return nil, cferr.Wrap(cferr.CertificateError, cferr.Unknown, err)
}
safeTemplate.SerialNumber = serialNumber
}
return s.sign(&safeTemplate, profile)
}
// FillTemplate is a utility function that tries to load as much of
// the certificate template as possible from the profiles and current
// template. It fills in the key uses, expiration, revocation URLs
// and SKI.
func FillTemplate(template *x509.Certificate, defaultProfile, profile *config.SigningProfile) error {
ski, err := ComputeSKI(template)
var (
eku []x509.ExtKeyUsage
ku x509.KeyUsage
backdate time.Duration
expiry time.Duration
notBefore time.Time
notAfter time.Time
crlURL, ocspURL string
)
// The third value returned from Usages is a list of unknown key usages.
// This should be used when validating the profile at load, and isn't used
// here.
ku, eku, _ = profile.Usages()
if profile.IssuerURL == nil {
profile.IssuerURL = defaultProfile.IssuerURL
}
if ku == 0 && len(eku) == 0 {
return cferr.New(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.NoKeyUsages)
}
if expiry = profile.Expiry; expiry == 0 {
expiry = defaultProfile.Expiry
}
if crlURL = profile.CRL; crlURL == "" {
crlURL = defaultProfile.CRL
}
if ocspURL = profile.OCSP; ocspURL == "" {
ocspURL = defaultProfile.OCSP
}
if backdate = profile.Backdate; backdate == 0 {
backdate = -5 * time.Minute
} else {
backdate = -1 * profile.Backdate
}
if !profile.NotBefore.IsZero() {
notBefore = profile.NotBefore.UTC()
} else {
notBefore = time.Now().Round(time.Minute).Add(backdate).UTC()
}
if !profile.NotAfter.IsZero() {
notAfter = profile.NotAfter.UTC()
} else {
notAfter = notBefore.Add(expiry).UTC()
}
template.NotBefore = notBefore
template.NotAfter = notAfter
template.KeyUsage = ku
template.ExtKeyUsage = eku
template.BasicConstraintsValid = true
template.IsCA = profile.CA
template.SubjectKeyId = ski
if ocspURL != "" {
template.OCSPServer = []string{ocspURL}
}
if crlURL != "" {
template.CRLDistributionPoints = []string{crlURL}
}
if len(profile.IssuerURL) != 0 {
template.IssuingCertificateURL = profile.IssuerURL
}
if len(profile.Policies) != 0 {
err = addPolicies(template, profile.Policies)
if err != nil {
return cferr.Wrap(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy, err)
}
}
if profile.OCSPNoCheck {
ocspNoCheckExtension := pkix.Extension{
Id: asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 48, 1, 5},
Critical: false,
Value: []byte{0x05, 0x00},
}
template.ExtraExtensions = append(template.ExtraExtensions, ocspNoCheckExtension)
}
return nil
}
// Bundle takes an X509 certificate (already in the
// Certificate structure), a private key as crypto.Signer in one of the appropriate
// formats (i.e. *rsa.PrivateKey or *ecdsa.PrivateKey, or even a opaque key), using them to
// build a certificate bundle.
func (b *Bundler) Bundle(certs []*x509.Certificate, key crypto.Signer, flavor BundleFlavor) (*Bundle, error) {
log.Infof("bundling certificate for %+v", certs[0].Subject)
if len(certs) == 0 {
return nil, nil
}
// Detect reverse ordering of the cert chain.
if len(certs) > 1 && !partialVerify(certs) {
rcerts := reverse(certs)
if partialVerify(rcerts) {
certs = rcerts
}
}
var ok bool
cert := certs[0]
if key != nil {
switch {
case cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm == x509.RSA:
var rsaPublicKey *rsa.PublicKey
if rsaPublicKey, ok = key.Public().(*rsa.PublicKey); !ok {
return nil, errors.New(errors.PrivateKeyError, errors.KeyMismatch)
}
if cert.PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey).N.Cmp(rsaPublicKey.N) != 0 {
return nil, errors.New(errors.PrivateKeyError, errors.KeyMismatch)
}
case cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm == x509.ECDSA:
var ecdsaPublicKey *ecdsa.PublicKey
if ecdsaPublicKey, ok = key.Public().(*ecdsa.PublicKey); !ok {
return nil, errors.New(errors.PrivateKeyError, errors.KeyMismatch)
}
if cert.PublicKey.(*ecdsa.PublicKey).X.Cmp(ecdsaPublicKey.X) != 0 {
return nil, errors.New(errors.PrivateKeyError, errors.KeyMismatch)
}
default:
return nil, errors.New(errors.PrivateKeyError, errors.NotRSAOrECC)
}
} else {
switch {
case cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm == x509.RSA:
case cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm == x509.ECDSA:
default:
return nil, errors.New(errors.PrivateKeyError, errors.NotRSAOrECC)
}
}
bundle := new(Bundle)
bundle.Cert = cert
bundle.Key = key
bundle.Issuer = &cert.Issuer
bundle.Subject = &cert.Subject
bundle.buildHostnames()
if flavor == Force {
// force bundle checks the certificates
// forms a verification chain.
if !partialVerify(certs) {
return nil,
errors.Wrap(errors.CertificateError, errors.VerifyFailed,
goerr.New("Unable to verify the certificate chain"))
}
bundle.Chain = certs
} else {
// disallow self-signed cert
if cert.CheckSignatureFrom(cert) == nil {
return nil, errors.New(errors.CertificateError, errors.SelfSigned)
}
// verify and store input intermediates to the intermediate pool.
// Ignore the returned error here, will treat it in the second call.
b.fetchIntermediates(certs)
chains, err := cert.Verify(b.VerifyOptions())
if err != nil {
log.Debugf("verification failed: %v", err)
// If the error was an unknown authority, try to fetch
// the intermediate specified in the AIA and add it to
// the intermediates bundle.
switch err := err.(type) {
case x509.UnknownAuthorityError:
// Do nothing -- have the default case return out.
default:
return nil, errors.Wrap(errors.CertificateError, errors.VerifyFailed, err)
}
log.Debugf("searching for intermediates via AIA issuer")
err = b.fetchIntermediates(certs)
if err != nil {
log.Debugf("search failed: %v", err)
return nil, errors.Wrap(errors.CertificateError, errors.VerifyFailed, err)
}
log.Debugf("verifying new chain")
chains, err = cert.Verify(b.VerifyOptions())
if err != nil {
log.Debugf("failed to verify chain: %v", err)
return nil, errors.Wrap(errors.CertificateError, errors.VerifyFailed, err)
}
log.Debugf("verify ok")
}
var matchingChains [][]*x509.Certificate
switch flavor {
case Optimal:
matchingChains = optimalChains(chains)
case Ubiquitous:
if len(ubiquity.Platforms) == 0 {
log.Warning("No metadata, Ubiquitous falls back to Optimal.")
}
matchingChains = ubiquitousChains(chains)
default:
matchingChains = ubiquitousChains(chains)
}
bundle.Chain = matchingChains[0]
}
statusCode := int(errors.Success)
var messages []string
// Check if bundle is expiring.
expiringCerts := checkExpiringCerts(bundle.Chain)
bundle.Expires = helpers.ExpiryTime(bundle.Chain)
if len(expiringCerts) > 0 {
statusCode |= errors.BundleExpiringBit
messages = append(messages, expirationWarning(expiringCerts))
}
// Check if bundle contains SHA2 certs.
if ubiquity.ChainHashUbiquity(bundle.Chain) <= ubiquity.SHA2Ubiquity {
statusCode |= errors.BundleNotUbiquitousBit
messages = append(messages, sha2Warning)
}
// Check if bundle contains ECDSA signatures.
if ubiquity.ChainKeyAlgoUbiquity(bundle.Chain) <= ubiquity.ECDSA256Ubiquity {
statusCode |= errors.BundleNotUbiquitousBit
messages = append(messages, ecdsaWarning)
}
// when forcing a bundle, bundle ubiquity doesn't matter
// also we don't retrieve the anchoring root of the bundle
var untrusted []string
if flavor != Force {
// Add root store presence info
root := bundle.Chain[len(bundle.Chain)-1]
bundle.Root = root
log.Infof("the anchoring root is %v", root.Subject)
// Check if there is any platform that doesn't trust the chain.
// Also, an warning will be generated if ubiquity.Platforms is nil,
untrusted = ubiquity.UntrustedPlatforms(root)
untrustedMsg := untrustedPlatformsWarning(untrusted)
if len(untrustedMsg) > 0 {
log.Debug("Populate untrusted platform warning.")
statusCode |= errors.BundleNotUbiquitousBit
messages = append(messages, untrustedMsg)
}
}
// Check if there is any platform that rejects the chain because of SHA1 deprecation.
sha1Msgs := ubiquity.SHA1DeprecationMessages(bundle.Chain)
if len(sha1Msgs) > 0 {
log.Debug("Populate SHA1 deprecation warning.")
statusCode |= errors.BundleNotUbiquitousBit
messages = append(messages, sha1Msgs...)
}
bundle.Status = &BundleStatus{ExpiringSKIs: getSKIs(bundle.Chain, expiringCerts), Code: statusCode, Messages: messages, Untrusted: untrusted}
// attempt to not to include the root certificate for optimization
if flavor != Force {
// Include at least one intermediate if the leaf has enabled OCSP and is not CA.
if bundle.Cert.OCSPServer != nil && !bundle.Cert.IsCA && len(bundle.Chain) <= 2 {
// No op. Return one intermediate if there is one.
} else {
// do not include the root.
bundle.Chain = bundle.Chain[:len(bundle.Chain)-1]
}
}
bundle.Status.IsRebundled = diff(bundle.Chain, certs)
log.Debugf("bundle complete")
return bundle, nil
}
"net/url"
"strings"
"github.com/bbandix/cfssl/crypto/pkcs11key"
"github.com/bbandix/cfssl/errors"
)
func setIfPresent(val url.Values, k string, target *string) {
sv := val.Get(k)
if sv != "" {
*target = sv
}
}
// ErrInvalidURI is returned if the PKCS #11 URI is invalid.
var ErrInvalidURI = errors.New(errors.PrivateKeyError, errors.ParseFailed)
// ParsePKCS11URI parses a PKCS #11 URI into a PKCS #11
// configuration. Note that the module path will override the module
// name if present.
func ParsePKCS11URI(uri string) (*pkcs11key.Config, error) {
u, err := url.Parse(uri)
if err != nil || u.Scheme != "pkcs11" {
return nil, ErrInvalidURI
}
c := new(pkcs11key.Config)
pk11PAttr, err := url.ParseQuery(u.Opaque)
if err != nil {
return nil, ErrInvalidURI
