// WithMetadataForwardTLSInfo reads certificate from context and returns context where
// ForwardCert is set based on original certificate.
func WithMetadataForwardTLSInfo(ctx context.Context) (context.Context, error) {
md, ok := metadata.FromContext(ctx)
if !ok {
md = metadata.MD{}
}
ous := []string{}
org := ""
cn := ""
certSubj, err := certSubjectFromContext(ctx)
if err == nil {
cn = certSubj.CommonName
ous = certSubj.OrganizationalUnit
if len(certSubj.Organization) > 0 {
org = certSubj.Organization[0]
}
}
// If there's no TLS cert, forward with blank TLS metadata.
// Note that the presence of this blank metadata is extremely
// important. Without it, it would look like manager is making
// the request directly.
md[certForwardedKey] = []string{"true"}
md[certCNKey] = []string{cn}
md[certOrgKey] = []string{org}
md[certOUKey] = ous
peer, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx)
if ok {
md[remoteAddrKey] = []string{peer.Addr.String()}
}
return metadata.NewContext(ctx, md), nil
}
// RevokeAddrFS ...
func (s *FileSystemAPIServer) RevokeAddrFS(ctx context.Context, r *pb.RevokeAddrFSRequest) (*pb.RevokeAddrFSResponse, error) {
var err error
srcAddr := ""
// Get incomming ip
pr, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx)
if ok {
srcAddr = pr.Addr.String()
}
// Validate Token
_, err = s.validateToken(r.Token)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("%s REVOKE FAILED %s\n", srcAddr, "PermissionDenied")
return nil, errf(codes.PermissionDenied, "%v", "Invalid Token")
}
// REVOKE an file system entry for the addr
// delete /fs/FSID/addr addr AddrRef
pKey := fmt.Sprintf("/fs/%s/addr", r.FSid)
pKeyA, pKeyB := murmur3.Sum128([]byte(pKey))
cKeyA, cKeyB := murmur3.Sum128([]byte(r.Addr))
timestampMicro := brimtime.TimeToUnixMicro(time.Now())
_, err = s.gstore.Delete(context.Background(), pKeyA, pKeyB, cKeyA, cKeyB, timestampMicro)
if store.IsNotFound(err) {
log.Printf("%s REVOKE FAILED %s %s\n", srcAddr, r.FSid, r.Addr)
return nil, errf(codes.NotFound, "%v", "Not Found")
}
// return Addr was revoked
// Log Operation
log.Printf("%s REVOKE SUCCESS %s %s\n", srcAddr, r.FSid, r.Addr)
return &pb.RevokeAddrFSResponse{Data: r.FSid}, nil
}
// ListFS ...
func (s *FileSystemAPIServer) ListFS(ctx context.Context, r *fb.ListFSRequest) (*fb.ListFSResponse, error) {
var status string
var acctData AcctPayLoad
var err error
var data string
// Get incomming ip
pr, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx)
if ok {
fmt.Println(pr.Addr)
}
// getAcct data
acctData, err = s.getAcct("/acct", r.Acctnum)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("Error %v on lookup for account %s", err, r.Acctnum)
return nil, err
}
// validate token
if acctData.Token != r.Token {
return nil, errf(codes.PermissionDenied, "%s", "Invalid Token")
}
// Setup Account read for list of file systems
parentKey := fmt.Sprintf("/acct/%s/fs", r.Acctnum)
data, err = s.fsws.readGroupGStore(parentKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, errf(codes.Internal, "%v", err)
}
// Prep things to return
status = "OK"
return &fb.ListFSResponse{Payload: data, Status: status}, nil
}
// RevokeAddrFS ...
func (s *FileSystemAPIServer) RevokeAddrFS(ctx context.Context, r *pb.RevokeAddrFSRequest) (*pb.RevokeAddrFSResponse, error) {
var err error
var acctID string
var value []byte
var fsRef FileSysRef
srcAddr := ""
// Get incomming ip
pr, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx)
if ok {
srcAddr = pr.Addr.String()
}
// Validate Token
acctID, err = s.validateToken(r.Token)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("%s REVOKE FAILED %s\n", srcAddr, "PermissionDenied")
return nil, errf(codes.PermissionDenied, "%v", "Invalid Token")
}
// Validate Token/Account owns this file system
// Read FileSysRef entry to determine if it exists
pKey := fmt.Sprintf("/fs")
pKeyA, pKeyB := murmur3.Sum128([]byte(pKey))
cKeyA, cKeyB := murmur3.Sum128([]byte(r.FSid))
_, value, err = s.gstore.Read(context.Background(), pKeyA, pKeyB, cKeyA, cKeyB, nil)
if store.IsNotFound(err) {
log.Printf("%s REVOKE FAILED %s NOTFOUND", srcAddr, r.FSid)
return nil, errf(codes.NotFound, "%v", "Not Found")
}
if err != nil {
log.Printf("%s REVOKE FAILED %v\n", srcAddr, err)
return nil, errf(codes.Internal, "%v", err)
}
err = json.Unmarshal(value, &fsRef)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("%s REVOKE FAILED %v\n", srcAddr, err)
return nil, errf(codes.Internal, "%v", err)
}
if fsRef.AcctID != acctID {
log.Printf("$s REVOKE FAILED %v ACCOUNT MISMATCH", r.FSid)
return nil, errf(codes.FailedPrecondition, "%v", "Account Mismatch")
}
// REVOKE an file system entry for the addr
// delete /fs/FSID/addr addr AddrRef
pKey = fmt.Sprintf("/fs/%s/addr", r.FSid)
pKeyA, pKeyB = murmur3.Sum128([]byte(pKey))
cKeyA, cKeyB = murmur3.Sum128([]byte(r.Addr))
timestampMicro := brimtime.TimeToUnixMicro(time.Now())
_, err = s.gstore.Delete(context.Background(), pKeyA, pKeyB, cKeyA, cKeyB, timestampMicro)
if store.IsNotFound(err) {
log.Printf("%s REVOKE FAILED %s %s\n", srcAddr, r.FSid, r.Addr)
return nil, errf(codes.NotFound, "%v", "Not Found")
}
// return Addr was revoked
// Log Operation
log.Printf("%s REVOKE SUCCESS %s %s\n", srcAddr, r.FSid, r.Addr)
return &pb.RevokeAddrFSResponse{Data: r.FSid}, nil
}
// ProcessRaftMessage calls 'Step' which advances the
// raft state machine with the provided message on the
// receiving node
func (n *Node) ProcessRaftMessage(ctx context.Context, msg *api.ProcessRaftMessageRequest) (*api.ProcessRaftMessageResponse, error) {
if msg == nil || msg.Message == nil {
return nil, grpc.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "no message provided")
}
// Don't process the message if this comes from
// a node in the remove set
if n.cluster.IsIDRemoved(msg.Message.From) {
return nil, ErrMemberRemoved
}
var sourceHost string
peer, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx)
if ok {
sourceHost, _, _ = net.SplitHostPort(peer.Addr.String())
}
n.cluster.ReportActive(msg.Message.From, sourceHost)
// Reject vote requests from unreachable peers
if msg.Message.Type == raftpb.MsgVote {
member := n.cluster.GetMember(msg.Message.From)
if member == nil || member.Conn == nil {
n.Config.Logger.Errorf("received vote request from unknown member %x", msg.Message.From)
return nil, ErrMemberUnknown
}
healthCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, time.Duration(n.Config.ElectionTick)*n.opts.TickInterval)
defer cancel()
if err := member.HealthCheck(healthCtx); err != nil {
n.Config.Logger.Warningf("member %x which sent vote request failed health check: %v", msg.Message.From, err)
return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "member unreachable")
}
}
if msg.Message.Type == raftpb.MsgProp {
// We don't accepted forwarded proposals. Our
// current architecture depends on only the leader
// making proposals, so in-flight proposals can be
// guaranteed not to conflict.
return nil, grpc.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "proposals not accepted")
}
// can't stop the raft node while an async RPC is in progress
n.stopMu.RLock()
defer n.stopMu.RUnlock()
if !n.IsMember() {
return nil, ErrNoRaftMember
}
if err := n.Step(n.Ctx, *msg.Message); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &api.ProcessRaftMessageResponse{}, nil
}
// Batch implements the roachpb.KVServer interface.
func (s *DBServer) Batch(
ctx context.Context, args *roachpb.BatchRequest,
) (br *roachpb.BatchResponse, err error) {
// TODO(marc,bdarnell): this code is duplicated in server/node.go,
// which should be fixed.
defer func() {
// We always return errors via BatchResponse.Error so structure is
// preserved; plain errors are presumed to be from the RPC
// framework and not from cockroach.
if err != nil {
if br == nil {
br = &roachpb.BatchResponse{}
}
if br.Error != nil {
panic(fmt.Sprintf(
"attempting to return both a plain error (%s) and roachpb.Error (%s)", err, br.Error))
}
br.Error = roachpb.NewError(err)
err = nil
}
}()
// TODO(marc): grpc's authentication model (which gives credential access in
// the request handler) doesn't really fit with the current design of the
// security package (which assumes that TLS state is only given at connection
// time) - that should be fixed.
if peer, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx); ok {
if tlsInfo, ok := peer.AuthInfo.(credentials.TLSInfo); ok {
certUser, err := security.GetCertificateUser(&tlsInfo.State)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if certUser != security.NodeUser {
return nil, errors.Errorf("user %s is not allowed", certUser)
}
}
}
if err = verifyRequest(args); err != nil {
return br, err
}
err = s.stopper.RunTask(func() {
var pErr *roachpb.Error
// TODO(wiz): This is required to be a different context from the one
// provided by grpc since it has to last for the entire transaction and not
// just this one RPC call. See comment for (*TxnCoordSender).hearbeatLoop.
br, pErr = s.sender.Send(context.TODO(), *args)
if pErr != nil {
br = &roachpb.BatchResponse{}
}
if br.Error != nil {
panic(roachpb.ErrorUnexpectedlySet(s.sender, br))
}
br.Error = pErr
})
return br, err
}
// DeleteFS ...
func (s *FileSystemAPIServer) DeleteFS(ctx context.Context, r *fb.DeleteFSRequest) (*fb.DeleteFSResponse, error) {
var status string
var result string
var dataS string
var dataB []byte
var acctData AcctPayLoad
var fsdata FileSysPayLoad
var err error
// Get incomming ip
pr, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx)
if ok {
fmt.Println(pr.Addr)
}
// getAcct data
acctData, err = s.getAcct("/acct", r.Acctnum)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("Error %v on lookup for account %s", err, r.Acctnum)
return nil, err
}
// validate token
if acctData.Token != r.Token {
return nil, errf(codes.PermissionDenied, "%s", "Invalid Token")
}
// Setup keys and get filesystem data
parentKey := fmt.Sprintf("/acct/%s/fs", r.Acctnum)
childKey := r.FSid
dataS, err = s.fsws.getGStore(parentKey, childKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, errf(codes.Internal, "%v", err)
}
err = json.Unmarshal([]byte(dataS), &fsdata)
if err != nil {
return nil, errf(codes.Internal, "%v", err)
}
// only active accounts can be marked as deleted
if fsdata.Status != "active" || fsdata.DeleteDate != 0 {
return nil, errf(codes.InvalidArgument, "%s", "Passing File System Status")
}
// send delete to the group store
fsdata.Status = "deleted"
fsdata.DeleteDate = time.Now().Unix()
dataB, err = json.Marshal(fsdata)
if err != nil {
return nil, errf(codes.Internal, "%v", err)
}
// write updated information into the group store
_, err = s.fsws.writeGStore(parentKey, childKey, dataB)
if err != nil {
return nil, errf(codes.Internal, "%v", err)
}
// Prep things to return
status = "OK"
result = fmt.Sprintf("filesystem %s in account %s was deleted", r.FSid, r.Acctnum)
return &fb.DeleteFSResponse{Payload: result, Status: status}, nil
}
func extractRemoteAddress(stream stream) string {
var remoteAddress string
p, ok := peer.FromContext(stream.Context())
if ok {
if address := p.Addr; address != nil {
remoteAddress = address.String()
}
}
return remoteAddress
}
// GrantAddrFS ...
func (s *FileSystemAPIServer) GrantAddrFS(ctx context.Context, r *fb.GrantAddrFSRequest) (*fb.GrantAddrFSResponse, error) {
var status string
var err error
var acctData AcctPayLoad
var fsData FileSysPayLoad
var addrData AddrPayLoad
var dataB []byte
// Get incomming ip
pr, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx)
if ok {
fmt.Println(pr.Addr)
}
// getAcct data
acctData, err = s.getAcct("/acct", r.Acctnum)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("Error %v on lookup for account %s", err, r.Acctnum)
return nil, err
}
// validate token
if acctData.Token != r.Token {
return nil, errf(codes.PermissionDenied, "%s", "Invalid Token")
}
// getFS data
fs := fmt.Sprintf("/acct/%s/fs", r.Acctnum)
fsData, err = s.getFS(fs, r.FSid)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("Error %v on lookup for File system %s", err, r.Acctnum)
return nil, err
}
if fsData.Status == "active" {
log.Println("FileSystem is active")
}
// write out the ip address
parentKey := fmt.Sprintf("/fs/%s/addr", r.FSid)
childKey := r.Addr
parentKeyA, parentKeyB := murmur3.Sum128([]byte(parentKey))
childKeyA, childKeyB := murmur3.Sum128([]byte(childKey))
timestampMicro := brimtime.TimeToUnixMicro(time.Now())
addrData.Addr = r.Addr
dataB, err = json.Marshal(addrData)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("Marshal Error: %v\n...", err)
return nil, errf(codes.Internal, "%v", err)
}
_, err = s.fsws.gstore.Write(context.Background(), parentKeyA, parentKeyB, childKeyA, childKeyB, timestampMicro, dataB)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("Write Error: %v", err)
return nil, errf(codes.Internal, "%v", err)
}
// DO stuff
status = fmt.Sprintf("addr %s for filesystem %s with account id %s was granted", r.Addr, r.FSid, r.Acctnum)
return &fb.GrantAddrFSResponse{Status: status}, nil
}
func tlsConnStateFromContext(ctx context.Context) (*tls.ConnectionState, error) {
peer, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx)
if !ok {
return nil, grpc.Errorf(codes.PermissionDenied, "Permission denied: no peer info")
}
tlsInfo, ok := peer.AuthInfo.(credentials.TLSInfo)
if !ok {
return nil, grpc.Errorf(codes.PermissionDenied, "Permission denied: peer didn't not present valid peer certificate")
}
return &tlsInfo.State, nil
}
// RemoteNode returns the node ID and role from the client's TLS certificate.
// If the RPC was forwarded, the original client's ID and role is returned, as
// well as the forwarder's ID. This function does not do authorization checks -
// it only looks up the node ID.
func RemoteNode(ctx context.Context) (RemoteNodeInfo, error) {
// If we have a value on the context that marks this as a local
// request, we return the node info from the context.
localNodeInfo := ctx.Value(LocalRequestKey)
if localNodeInfo != nil {
nodeInfo, ok := localNodeInfo.(RemoteNodeInfo)
if ok {
return nodeInfo, nil
}
}
certSubj, err := certSubjectFromContext(ctx)
if err != nil {
return RemoteNodeInfo{}, err
}
org := ""
if len(certSubj.Organization) > 0 {
org = certSubj.Organization[0]
}
peer, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx)
if !ok {
return RemoteNodeInfo{}, grpc.Errorf(codes.PermissionDenied, "Permission denied: no peer info")
}
directInfo := RemoteNodeInfo{
Roles: certSubj.OrganizationalUnit,
NodeID: certSubj.CommonName,
Organization: org,
RemoteAddr: peer.Addr.String(),
}
if isForwardedRequest(ctx) {
remoteAddr, cn, org, ous := forwardedTLSInfoFromContext(ctx)
if len(ous) == 0 || cn == "" || org == "" {
return RemoteNodeInfo{}, grpc.Errorf(codes.PermissionDenied, "Permission denied: missing information in forwarded request")
}
return RemoteNodeInfo{
Roles: ous,
NodeID: cn,
Organization: org,
ForwardedBy: &directInfo,
RemoteAddr: remoteAddr,
}, nil
}
return directInfo, nil
}
// ShowFS ...
func (s *FileSystemAPIServer) ShowFS(ctx context.Context, r *fb.ShowFSRequest) (*fb.ShowFSResponse, error) {
var status string
var acctData AcctPayLoad
var fsData FileSysPayLoad
var fsDataB []byte
var err error
// Get incomming ip
pr, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx)
if ok {
fmt.Println(pr.Addr)
}
// getAcct data
acctData, err = s.getAcct("/acct", r.Acctnum)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("Error %v on lookup for account %s", err, r.Acctnum)
return nil, err
}
// validate token
if acctData.Token != r.Token {
return nil, errf(codes.PermissionDenied, "%s", "Invalid Token")
}
pKey := fmt.Sprintf("/acct/%s/fs", r.Acctnum)
pKeyA, pKeyB := murmur3.Sum128([]byte(pKey))
cKeyA, cKeyB := murmur3.Sum128([]byte(r.FSid))
_, fsDataB, err = s.fsws.gstore.Read(context.Background(), pKeyA, pKeyB, cKeyA, cKeyB, nil)
if store.IsNotFound(err) {
return nil, errf(codes.NotFound, "%v", "File System Not Found")
}
if err != nil {
return nil, errf(codes.Internal, "%s", err)
}
err = json.Unmarshal(fsDataB, &fsData)
if err != nil {
return nil, errf(codes.Internal, "%s", err)
}
// Get list of Addr
fsData.Addr, err = s.addrList(fsData.ID)
if err != nil {
return nil, errf(codes.Internal, "%s", err)
}
fsDataB, err = json.Marshal(&fsData)
if err != nil {
return nil, errf(codes.Internal, "%s", err)
}
// Prep things to return
status = "OK"
return &fb.ShowFSResponse{Payload: string(fsDataB), Status: status}, nil
}
// ExtractTLSUnique extracts the TLS-Unique from the stream
func ExtractTLSUnique(ctx context.Context) []byte {
pr, extracted := peer.FromContext(ctx)
if !extracted {
return nil
}
authInfo := pr.AuthInfo
if authInfo == nil {
return nil
}
tlsInfo, isTLSConn := authInfo.(credentials.TLSInfo)
if !isTLSConn {
return nil
}
return tlsInfo.State.TLSUnique
}
func (s *testServer) UnaryCall(ctx context.Context, in *testpb.SimpleRequest) (*testpb.SimpleResponse, error) {
md, ok := metadata.FromContext(ctx)
if ok {
if err := grpc.SendHeader(ctx, md); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("grpc.SendHeader(%v, %v) = %v, want %v", ctx, md, err, nil)
}
grpc.SetTrailer(ctx, md)
}
pr, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx)
if !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get peer from ctx")
}
if pr.Addr == net.Addr(nil) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get peer address")
}
if s.security != "" {
// Check Auth info
var authType, serverName string
switch info := pr.AuthInfo.(type) {
case credentials.TLSInfo:
authType = info.AuthType()
serverName = info.State.ServerName
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("Unknown AuthInfo type")
}
if authType != s.security {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("Wrong auth type: got %q, want %q", authType, s.security)
}
if serverName != "x.test.youtube.com" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("Unknown server name %q", serverName)
}
}
// Simulate some service delay.
time.Sleep(time.Second)
payload, err := newPayload(in.GetResponseType(), in.GetResponseSize())
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &testpb.SimpleResponse{
Payload: payload,
}, nil
}
// peerFromContext extracts host from the context and port the from local address.
// Returns an address based on extracted host:port
func peerFromContext(ctx context.Context, laddr string) (string, error) {
p, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx)
if !ok {
return "", errors.New("peer information in context does not exist")
}
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(p.Addr.String())
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
_, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(laddr)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
return net.JoinHostPort(host, port), nil
}
// GrantAddrFS ...
func (s *FileSystemAPIServer) GrantAddrFS(ctx context.Context, r *pb.GrantAddrFSRequest) (*pb.GrantAddrFSResponse, error) {
var err error
var addrData AddrRef
var addrByte []byte
srcAddr := ""
// Get incomming ip
pr, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx)
if ok {
srcAddr = pr.Addr.String()
}
// validate token
_, err = s.validateToken(r.Token)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("%s GRANT FAILED %s\n", srcAddr, "PermissionDenied")
return nil, errf(codes.PermissionDenied, "%v", "Invalid Token")
}
// GRANT an file system entry for the addr
// write /fs/FSID/addr addr AddrRef
pKey := fmt.Sprintf("/fs/%s/addr", r.FSid)
pKeyA, pKeyB := murmur3.Sum128([]byte(pKey))
cKeyA, cKeyB := murmur3.Sum128([]byte(r.Addr))
timestampMicro := brimtime.TimeToUnixMicro(time.Now())
addrData.Addr = r.Addr
addrData.FSID = r.FSid
addrByte, err = json.Marshal(addrData)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("%s GRANT FAILED %v\n", srcAddr, err)
return nil, errf(codes.Internal, "%v", err)
}
_, err = s.gstore.Write(context.Background(), pKeyA, pKeyB, cKeyA, cKeyB, timestampMicro, addrByte)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("%s GRANT FAILED %v\n", srcAddr, err)
return nil, errf(codes.Internal, "%v", err)
}
// return Addr was Granted
// Log Operation
log.Printf("%s GRANT SUCCESS %s %s\n", srcAddr, r.FSid, r.Addr)
return &pb.GrantAddrFSResponse{Data: r.FSid}, nil
}
func (s *apiServer) validateIP(ctx context.Context) error {
if s.comms == nil {
// TODO: Fix abstraction so that we don't have to do this for tests
// Assume that it is a unit test
return nil
}
p, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx)
if !ok {
return errors.New("Couldn't get client IP")
}
ip, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(p.Addr.String())
if err != nil {
return err
}
fsidUUID, err := GetFsId(ctx)
fsid := fsidUUID.String()
if err != nil {
return err
}
// First check the cache
ips, ok := s.validIPs[fsid]
if !ok {
ips = make(map[string]bool)
s.validIPs[fsid] = ips
}
valid, ok := ips[ip]
if ok && valid {
return nil
}
_, err = s.comms.ReadGroupItem(ctx, []byte(fmt.Sprintf("/fs/%s/addr", fsid)), []byte(ip))
if store.IsNotFound(err) {
log.Println("Invalid IP: ", ip)
// No access
return ErrUnauthorized
}
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Cache the valid ip
s.validIPs[fsid][ip] = true
return nil
}
func GetPeerInfo(s grpc.Stream) PeerInfo {
var pi PeerInfo
ctx := s.Context()
trs, ok := transport.StreamFromContext(ctx)
if ok {
pi.addr = trs.ServerTransport().RemoteAddr().String()
}
p, _ := peer.FromContext(ctx)
switch creds := p.AuthInfo.(type) {
case credentials.TLSInfo:
state := creds.State
if len(state.PeerCertificates) > 0 {
pi.cert = state.PeerCertificates[0]
}
}
return pi
}
func (s *server) Send(ctx context.Context, in *pb.Request) (*pb.Reply, error) {
pr, _ := peer.FromContext(ctx)
re := &pb.Reply{}
logData := []string{
fmt.Sprintf("logid=%s", in.Logid),
fmt.Sprintf("remote=%s", pr.Addr.String()),
fmt.Sprintf("topic=%s", in.Topic),
fmt.Sprintf("key=%s", string(in.Key)),
fmt.Sprintf("value_len=%d", len(in.Value)),
}
defer (func() {
logData = append(logData, fmt.Sprintf("errno=%d", re.Errno))
logData = append(logData, fmt.Sprintf("offset=%d", re.Offset))
log.Println(logData)
})()
producer, err := s.getProducer(in.Topic)
if err != nil {
re.Errno = 502404
re.Error = "get producer failed:" + err.Error()
return re, nil
}
log.Println("input:", in, in.Partition)
message := &sarama.ProducerMessage{
Topic: in.Topic,
Key: sarama.ByteEncoder(in.Key),
Value: sarama.ByteEncoder(in.Value),
}
partition, offset, err := producer.SendMessage(message)
if err != nil {
re.Errno = 500
re.Error = err.Error()
} else {
re.Offset = offset
re.Partition = partition
}
return re, nil
}
// Batch implements the roachpb.KVServer interface.
func (s *DBServer) Batch(ctx context.Context, args *roachpb.BatchRequest) (*roachpb.BatchResponse, error) {
// TODO(marc): this code is duplicated in server/node.go, which should be
// fixed. Also, grpc's authentication model (which gives credential access in
// the request handler) doesn't really fit with the current design of the
// security package (which assumes that TLS state is only given at connection
// time) - that should be fixed.
if peer, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx); ok {
if tlsInfo, ok := peer.AuthInfo.(credentials.TLSInfo); ok {
certUser, err := security.GetCertificateUser(&tlsInfo.State)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if certUser != security.NodeUser {
return nil, util.Errorf("user %s is not allowed", certUser)
}
}
}
var br *roachpb.BatchResponse
var err error
f := func() {
if err = verifyRequest(args); err != nil {
return
}
var pErr *roachpb.Error
br, pErr = s.sender.Send(context.TODO(), *args)
if pErr != nil {
br = &roachpb.BatchResponse{}
}
if br.Error != nil {
panic(roachpb.ErrorUnexpectedlySet(s.sender, br))
}
br.Error = pErr
}
if !s.stopper.RunTask(f) {
err = util.Errorf("node stopped")
}
return br, err
}
// UpdateFS ...
func (s *FileSystemAPIServer) UpdateFS(ctx context.Context, r *pb.UpdateFSRequest) (*pb.UpdateFSResponse, error) {
var err error
srcAddr := ""
// Get incomming ip
pr, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx)
if ok {
srcAddr = pr.Addr.String()
}
// validate Token
_, err = s.validateToken(r.Token)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("%s UPDATE FAILED %s\n", srcAddr, "PermissionDenied")
return nil, errf(codes.PermissionDenied, "%v", "Invalid Token")
}
// return message
// Log Operation
log.Printf("%s UPDATE NOTIMPLEMENTED %s\n", srcAddr, r.FSid)
return &pb.UpdateFSResponse{Data: "UPDATE operation is not supported in EA"}, nil
}
// DeleteFS ...
func (s *FileSystemAPIServer) DeleteFS(ctx context.Context, r *pb.DeleteFSRequest) (*pb.DeleteFSResponse, error) {
var err error
srcAddr := ""
// Get incomming ip
pr, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx)
if ok {
srcAddr = pr.Addr.String()
}
// validate Token
_, err = s.validateToken(r.Token)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("%s DELETE FAILED %s\n", srcAddr, "PermissionDenied")
return nil, errf(codes.PermissionDenied, "%v", "Invalid Token")
}
// Prep things to return
// Log Operation
log.Printf("%s DELETE NOTIMPLEMENTED %s\n", srcAddr, r.FSid)
return &pb.DeleteFSResponse{Data: "Delete Operation not supported at this time"}, nil
}
// immediateCallerID tries to extract the common name of the certificate
// that was used to connect to vtgate. If it fails for any reason,
// it will return "". That immediate caller id is then inserted
// into a Context, and will be used when talking to vttablet.
// vttablet in turn can use table ACLs to validate access is authorized.
func immediateCallerID(ctx context.Context) string {
p, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx)
if !ok {
return ""
}
if p.AuthInfo == nil {
return ""
}
tlsInfo, ok := p.AuthInfo.(credentials.TLSInfo)
if !ok {
return ""
}
if len(tlsInfo.State.VerifiedChains) < 1 {
return ""
}
if len(tlsInfo.State.VerifiedChains[0]) < 1 {
return ""
}
cert := tlsInfo.State.VerifiedChains[0][0]
return cert.Subject.CommonName
}
func authenticateVerifier(ctx context.Context) (uint64, error) {
pr, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx)
if !ok {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to authenticate verifier: peer.FromContext returned false")
}
certChains := pr.AuthInfo.(credentials.TLSInfo).State.VerifiedChains
if len(certChains) != 1 {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to authenticate verifier: expected exactly one valid certificate chain")
}
chain := certChains[0]
leaf := chain[0]
verifierIDString := leaf.Subject.CommonName
if !strings.HasPrefix(verifierIDString, verifierCommonNamePrefix) {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to authenticate verifier: invalid common name: missing prefix %q (got %q)", verifierCommonNamePrefix, verifierIDString)
}
verifierID, err := strconv.ParseUint(verifierIDString[len(verifierCommonNamePrefix):], 16, 64)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to authenticate verifier: invalid common name: id not an integer: %s", err)
}
return verifierID, nil
}
func (r *RpcCacheServer) authenticateClient(certs map[string]*x509.Certificate, ctx context.Context) error {
if len(certs) == 0 {
return nil // Open to anyone.
}
p, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("Missing client certificate")
}
info, ok := p.AuthInfo.(credentials.TLSInfo)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("Could not extract auth info")
}
if len(info.State.PeerCertificates) == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("No peer certificate available")
}
cert := info.State.PeerCertificates[0]
if okCert := certs[string(cert.RawSubject)]; okCert != nil && okCert.Equal(cert) {
return nil
}
return fmt.Errorf("Invalid or unknown certificate")
}
// RemoteNode returns the node ID and role from the client's TLS certificate.
// If the RPC was forwarded, the original client's ID and role is returned, as
// well as the forwarder's ID. This function does not do authorization checks -
// it only looks up the node ID.
func RemoteNode(ctx context.Context) (RemoteNodeInfo, error) {
certSubj, err := certSubjectFromContext(ctx)
if err != nil {
return RemoteNodeInfo{}, err
}
org := ""
if len(certSubj.Organization) > 0 {
org = certSubj.Organization[0]
}
peer, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx)
if !ok {
return RemoteNodeInfo{}, grpc.Errorf(codes.PermissionDenied, "Permission denied: no peer info")
}
directInfo := RemoteNodeInfo{
Roles: certSubj.OrganizationalUnit,
NodeID: certSubj.CommonName,
Organization: org,
RemoteAddr: peer.Addr.String(),
}
if isForwardedRequest(ctx) {
remoteAddr, cn, org, ous := forwardedTLSInfoFromContext(ctx)
if len(ous) == 0 || cn == "" || org == "" {
return RemoteNodeInfo{}, grpc.Errorf(codes.PermissionDenied, "Permission denied: missing information in forwarded request")
}
return RemoteNodeInfo{
Roles: ous,
NodeID: cn,
Organization: org,
ForwardedBy: &directInfo,
RemoteAddr: remoteAddr,
}, nil
}
return directInfo, nil
}
func (o *OortFS) validateIP(ctx context.Context) (bool, error) {
// TODO: Add caching of validation
p, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx)
if !ok {
return false, errors.New("Couldn't get client IP")
}
if p.Addr.String() == "internal" {
// This is an internal call, so we can skip
return true, nil
}
ip, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(p.Addr.String())
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
// First check the cache
valid, ok := o.validIps[ip]
if ok && valid {
return true, nil
}
fsid, err := GetFsId(ctx)
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
_, err = o.comms.ReadGroupItem(ctx, []byte(fmt.Sprintf("/fs/%s/addr", fsid.String())), []byte(ip))
if store.IsNotFound(err) {
log.Println("Invalid IP: ", ip)
// No access
return false, nil
}
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
// Cache the valid ip
o.validIps[ip] = true
return true, nil
}
// RevokeAddrFS ...
func (s *FileSystemAPIServer) RevokeAddrFS(ctx context.Context, r *fb.RevokeAddrFSRequest) (*fb.RevokeAddrFSResponse, error) {
var status string
var err error
var acctData AcctPayLoad
// Get incomming ip
pr, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx)
if ok {
fmt.Println(pr.Addr)
}
// getAcct data
acctData, err = s.getAcct("/acct", r.Acctnum)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("Error %v on lookup for account %s", err, r.Acctnum)
return nil, errf(codes.NotFound, "%v", err)
}
// validate token
if acctData.Token != r.Token {
return nil, errf(codes.PermissionDenied, "%s", "Invalid Token")
}
parentKey := fmt.Sprintf("/fs/%s/addr", r.FSid)
childKey := r.Addr
parentKeyA, parentKeyB := murmur3.Sum128([]byte(parentKey))
childKeyA, childKeyB := murmur3.Sum128([]byte(childKey))
timestampMicro := brimtime.TimeToUnixMicro(time.Now())
// Delete addr
_, err = s.fsws.gstore.Delete(context.Background(), parentKeyA, parentKeyB, childKeyA, childKeyB, timestampMicro)
if store.IsNotFound(err) {
log.Printf("/fs/%s/addr/%s did not exist to delete", r.FSid, r.Addr)
return nil, errf(codes.NotFound, "%s", "Addr not found")
} else if err != nil {
return nil, errf(codes.Internal, "%s", err)
}
// DO stuff
status = fmt.Sprintf("addr %s for filesystem %s with account id %s was revoked", r.Addr, r.FSid, r.Acctnum)
return &fb.RevokeAddrFSResponse{Status: status}, nil
}
// Batch implements the roachpb.KVServer interface.
func (n *Node) Batch(ctx context.Context, args *roachpb.BatchRequest) (*roachpb.BatchResponse, error) {
// TODO(marc): this code is duplicated in kv/db.go, which should be fixed.
// Also, grpc's authentication model (which gives credential access in the
// request handler) doesn't really fit with the current design of the
// security package (which assumes that TLS state is only given at connection
// time) - that should be fixed.
if peer, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx); ok {
if tlsInfo, ok := peer.AuthInfo.(credentials.TLSInfo); ok {
certUser, err := security.GetCertificateUser(&tlsInfo.State)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if certUser != security.NodeUser {
return nil, util.Errorf("user %s is not allowed", certUser)
}
}
}
var br *roachpb.BatchResponse
opName := "node " + strconv.Itoa(int(n.Descriptor.NodeID)) // could save allocs here
fail := func(err error) {
br = &roachpb.BatchResponse{}
br.Error = roachpb.NewError(err)
}
f := func() {
sp, err := tracing.JoinOrNew(n.ctx.Tracer, args.Trace, opName)
if err != nil {
fail(err)
return
}
// If this is a snowball span, it gets special treatment: It skips the
// regular tracing machinery, and we instead send the collected spans
// back with the response. This is more expensive, but then again,
// those are individual requests traced by users, so they can be.
if sp.BaggageItem(tracing.Snowball) != "" {
sp.LogEvent("delegating to snowball tracing")
sp.Finish()
if sp, err = tracing.JoinOrNewSnowball(opName, args.Trace, func(rawSpan basictracer.RawSpan) {
encSp, err := tracing.EncodeRawSpan(&rawSpan, nil)
if err != nil {
log.Warning(err)
}
br.CollectedSpans = append(br.CollectedSpans, encSp)
}); err != nil {
fail(err)
return
}
}
defer sp.Finish()
traceCtx := opentracing.ContextWithSpan(n.context(ctx), sp)
tStart := timeutil.Now()
var pErr *roachpb.Error
br, pErr = n.stores.Send(traceCtx, *args)
if pErr != nil {
br = &roachpb.BatchResponse{}
log.Trace(traceCtx, fmt.Sprintf("error: %T", pErr.GetDetail()))
}
if br.Error != nil {
panic(roachpb.ErrorUnexpectedlySet(n.stores, br))
}
n.metrics.callComplete(timeutil.Since(tStart), pErr)
br.Error = pErr
}
if !n.stopper.RunTask(f) {
return nil, util.Errorf("node %d stopped", n.Descriptor.NodeID)
}
return br, nil
}
// CreateFS ...
func (s *FileSystemAPIServer) CreateFS(ctx context.Context, r *pb.CreateFSRequest) (*pb.CreateFSResponse, error) {
var err error
var acctID string
srcAddr := ""
var fsRef FileSysRef
var fsRefByte []byte
var fsSysAttr FileSysAttr
var fsSysAttrByte []byte
// Get incomming ip
pr, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx)
if ok {
srcAddr = pr.Addr.String()
}
// Validate Token
acctID, err = s.validateToken(r.Token)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("%s CREATE FAILED %s\n", srcAddr, "PermissionDenied")
return nil, errf(codes.PermissionDenied, "%v", "Invalid Token")
}
fsID := uuid.NewV4().String()
timestampMicro := brimtime.TimeToUnixMicro(time.Now())
// Write file system reference entries.
// write /fs FSID FileSysRef
pKey := "/fs"
pKeyA, pKeyB := murmur3.Sum128([]byte(pKey))
cKeyA, cKeyB := murmur3.Sum128([]byte(fsID))
fsRef.AcctID = acctID
fsRef.FSID = fsID
fsRefByte, err = json.Marshal(fsRef)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("%s CREATE FAILED %v\n", srcAddr, err)
return nil, errf(codes.Internal, "%v", err)
}
_, err = s.gstore.Write(context.Background(), pKeyA, pKeyB, cKeyA, cKeyB, timestampMicro, fsRefByte)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("%s CREATE FAILED %v\n", srcAddr, err)
return nil, errf(codes.Internal, "%v", err)
}
// write /acct/acctID FSID FileSysRef
pKey = fmt.Sprintf("/acct/%s", acctID)
pKeyA, pKeyB = murmur3.Sum128([]byte(pKey))
_, err = s.gstore.Write(context.Background(), pKeyA, pKeyB, cKeyA, cKeyB, timestampMicro, fsRefByte)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("%s CREATE FAILED %v\n", srcAddr, err)
return nil, errf(codes.Internal, "%v", err)
}
// Write file system attributes
// write /fs/FSID name FileSysAttr
pKey = fmt.Sprintf("/fs/%s", fsID)
pKeyA, pKeyB = murmur3.Sum128([]byte(pKey))
cKeyA, cKeyB = murmur3.Sum128([]byte("name"))
fsSysAttr.Attr = "name"
fsSysAttr.Value = r.FSName
fsSysAttr.FSID = fsID
fsSysAttrByte, err = json.Marshal(fsSysAttr)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("%s CREATE FAILED %v\n", srcAddr, err)
return nil, errf(codes.Internal, "%v", err)
}
_, err = s.gstore.Write(context.Background(), pKeyA, pKeyB, cKeyA, cKeyB, timestampMicro, fsSysAttrByte)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("%s CREATE FAILED %v\n", srcAddr, err)
return nil, errf(codes.Internal, "%v", err)
}
// Return File System UUID
// Log Operation
log.Printf("%s CREATE SUCCESS %s\n", srcAddr, fsID)
return &pb.CreateFSResponse{Data: fsID}, nil
}
