Exemple #1
0
//CreateKey returns a PublicKey created using KeyManagementServer's SigningService
func (s *KeyManagementServer) CreateKey(ctx context.Context, req *pb.CreateKeyRequest) (*pb.PublicKey, error) {
	service := s.CryptoServices[req.Algorithm]

	logger := ctxu.GetLogger(ctx)

	if service == nil {
		logger.Error("CreateKey: unsupported algorithm: ", req.Algorithm)
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("algorithm %s not supported for create key", req.Algorithm)
	}

	var tufKey data.PublicKey
	var err error

	tufKey, err = service.Create(req.Role, req.Gun, req.Algorithm)
	if err != nil {
		logger.Error("CreateKey: failed to create key: ", err)
		return nil, grpc.Errorf(codes.Internal, "Key creation failed")
	}
	logger.Info("CreateKey: Created KeyID ", tufKey.ID())

	return &pb.PublicKey{
		KeyInfo: &pb.KeyInfo{
			KeyID:     &pb.KeyID{ID: tufKey.ID()},
			Algorithm: &pb.Algorithm{Algorithm: tufKey.Algorithm()},
		},
		PublicKey: tufKey.Public(),
	}, nil
}
Exemple #2
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// CertsToKeys transforms each of the input certificate chains into its corresponding
// PublicKey
func CertsToKeys(leafCerts []*x509.Certificate, intCerts map[string][]*x509.Certificate) map[string]data.PublicKey {
	keys := make(map[string]data.PublicKey)
	for _, leafCert := range leafCerts {
		certBundle := []*x509.Certificate{leafCert}
		certID, err := FingerprintCert(leafCert)
		if err != nil {
			continue
		}
		if intCertsForLeafs, ok := intCerts[certID]; ok {
			certBundle = append(certBundle, intCertsForLeafs...)
		}
		certChainPEM, err := CertChainToPEM(certBundle)
		if err != nil {
			continue
		}
		var newKey data.PublicKey
		// Use the leaf cert's public key algorithm for typing
		switch leafCert.PublicKeyAlgorithm {
		case x509.RSA:
			newKey = data.NewRSAx509PublicKey(certChainPEM)
		case x509.ECDSA:
			newKey = data.NewECDSAx509PublicKey(certChainPEM)
		default:
			logrus.Debugf("Unknown key type parsed from certificate: %v", leafCert.PublicKeyAlgorithm)
			continue
		}
		keys[newKey.ID()] = newKey
	}
	return keys
}
Exemple #3
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func (r *NotaryRepository) initializeRoles(rootKeys []data.PublicKey, localRoles, remoteRoles []string) (
	root, targets, snapshot, timestamp data.BaseRole, err error) {

	root = data.NewBaseRole(
		data.CanonicalRootRole,
		notary.MinThreshold,
		rootKeys...,
	)

	// we want to create all the local keys first so we don't have to
	// make unnecessary network calls
	for _, role := range localRoles {
		// This is currently hardcoding the keys to ECDSA.
		var key data.PublicKey
		key, err = r.CryptoService.Create(role, r.gun, data.ECDSAKey)
		if err != nil {
			return
		}
		switch role {
		case data.CanonicalSnapshotRole:
			snapshot = data.NewBaseRole(
				role,
				notary.MinThreshold,
				key,
			)
		case data.CanonicalTargetsRole:
			targets = data.NewBaseRole(
				role,
				notary.MinThreshold,
				key,
			)
		}
	}
	for _, role := range remoteRoles {
		// This key is generated by the remote server.
		var key data.PublicKey
		key, err = getRemoteKey(r.baseURL, r.gun, role, r.roundTrip)
		if err != nil {
			return
		}
		logrus.Debugf("got remote %s %s key with keyID: %s",
			role, key.Algorithm(), key.ID())
		switch role {
		case data.CanonicalSnapshotRole:
			snapshot = data.NewBaseRole(
				role,
				notary.MinThreshold,
				key,
			)
		case data.CanonicalTimestampRole:
			timestamp = data.NewBaseRole(
				role,
				notary.MinThreshold,
				key,
			)
		}
	}
	return root, targets, snapshot, timestamp, nil
}
Exemple #4
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// CanonicalKeyID returns the ID of the public bytes version of a TUF key.
// On regular RSA/ECDSA TUF keys, this is just the key ID.  On X509 RSA/ECDSA
// TUF keys, this is the key ID of the public key part of the key.
func CanonicalKeyID(k data.PublicKey) (string, error) {
	switch k.Algorithm() {
	case data.ECDSAx509Key, data.RSAx509Key:
		return trustmanager.X509PublicKeyID(k)
	default:
		return k.ID(), nil
	}
}
Exemple #5
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// Verify does the actual check.
func (v ECDSAVerifier) Verify(key data.PublicKey, sig []byte, msg []byte) error {
	algorithm := key.Algorithm()
	var pubKey crypto.PublicKey

	switch algorithm {
	case data.ECDSAx509Key:
		pemCert, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(key.Public()))
		if pemCert == nil {
			logrus.Debugf("failed to decode PEM-encoded x509 certificate for keyID: %s", key.ID())
			logrus.Debugf("certificate bytes: %s", string(key.Public()))
			return ErrInvalid
		}
		cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(pemCert.Bytes)
		if err != nil {
			logrus.Debugf("failed to parse x509 certificate: %s\n", err)
			return ErrInvalid
		}
		pubKey = cert.PublicKey
	case data.ECDSAKey:
		var err error
		pubKey, err = x509.ParsePKIXPublicKey(key.Public())
		if err != nil {
			logrus.Debugf("Failed to parse private key for keyID: %s, %s\n", key.ID(), err)
			return ErrInvalid
		}
	default:
		// only accept ECDSA keys.
		logrus.Debugf("invalid key type for ECDSA verifier: %s", algorithm)
		return ErrInvalidKeyType{}
	}

	ecdsaPubKey, ok := pubKey.(*ecdsa.PublicKey)
	if !ok {
		logrus.Debugf("value isn't an ECDSA public key")
		return ErrInvalid
	}

	sigLength := len(sig)
	expectedOctetLength := 2 * ((ecdsaPubKey.Params().BitSize + 7) >> 3)
	if sigLength != expectedOctetLength {
		logrus.Debugf("signature had an unexpected length")
		return ErrInvalid
	}

	rBytes, sBytes := sig[:sigLength/2], sig[sigLength/2:]
	r := new(big.Int).SetBytes(rBytes)
	s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sBytes)

	digest := sha256.Sum256(msg)

	if !ecdsa.Verify(ecdsaPubKey, digest[:], r, s) {
		logrus.Debugf("failed ECDSA signature validation")
		return ErrInvalid
	}

	return nil
}
Exemple #6
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// add a key to a KeyDB, and create a role for the key and add it.
func addKeyForRole(kdb *keys.KeyDB, role string, key data.PublicKey) error {
	theRole, err := data.NewRole(role, 1, []string{key.ID()}, nil, nil)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	kdb.AddKey(key)
	if err := kdb.AddRole(theRole); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	return nil
}
Exemple #7
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// RotateKey removes all existing keys associated with the role, and either
// creates and adds one new key or delegates managing the key to the server.
// These changes are staged in a changelist until publish is called.
func (r *NotaryRepository) RotateKey(role string, serverManagesKey bool) error {
	// We currently support remotely managing timestamp and snapshot keys
	canBeRemoteKey := role == data.CanonicalTimestampRole || role == data.CanonicalSnapshotRole
	// And locally managing root, targets, and snapshot keys
	canBeLocalKey := (role == data.CanonicalSnapshotRole || role == data.CanonicalTargetsRole ||
		role == data.CanonicalRootRole)

	switch {
	case !data.ValidRole(role) || data.IsDelegation(role):
		return fmt.Errorf("notary does not currently permit rotating the %s key", role)
	case serverManagesKey && !canBeRemoteKey:
		return ErrInvalidRemoteRole{Role: role}
	case !serverManagesKey && !canBeLocalKey:
		return ErrInvalidLocalRole{Role: role}
	}

	var (
		pubKey    data.PublicKey
		err       error
		errFmtMsg string
	)
	switch serverManagesKey {
	case true:
		pubKey, err = getRemoteKey(r.baseURL, r.gun, role, r.roundTrip)
		errFmtMsg = "unable to rotate remote key: %s"
	default:
		pubKey, err = r.CryptoService.Create(role, r.gun, data.ECDSAKey)
		errFmtMsg = "unable to generate key: %s"
	}

	if err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf(errFmtMsg, err)
	}

	// if this is a root role, generate a root cert for the public key
	if role == data.CanonicalRootRole {
		privKey, _, err := r.CryptoService.GetPrivateKey(pubKey.ID())
		if err != nil {
			return err
		}
		pubKey, err = rootCertKey(r.gun, privKey)
		if err != nil {
			return err
		}
	}

	cl := changelist.NewMemChangelist()
	if err := r.rootFileKeyChange(cl, role, changelist.ActionCreate, pubKey); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	return r.publish(cl)
}
Exemple #8
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func initRoles(kdb *keys.KeyDB, rootKey, targetsKey, snapshotKey, timestampKey data.PublicKey) error {
	rootRole, err := data.NewRole("root", 1, []string{rootKey.ID()}, nil, nil)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	targetsRole, err := data.NewRole("targets", 1, []string{targetsKey.ID()}, nil, nil)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	snapshotRole, err := data.NewRole("snapshot", 1, []string{snapshotKey.ID()}, nil, nil)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	timestampRole, err := data.NewRole("timestamp", 1, []string{timestampKey.ID()}, nil, nil)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}

	if err := kdb.AddRole(rootRole); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if err := kdb.AddRole(targetsRole); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if err := kdb.AddRole(snapshotRole); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if err := kdb.AddRole(timestampRole); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	return nil
}
Exemple #9
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func fingerprintCert(cert *x509.Certificate) (CertID, error) {
	block := pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: cert.Raw}
	pemdata := pem.EncodeToMemory(&block)

	var tufKey data.PublicKey
	switch cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm {
	case x509.RSA:
		tufKey = data.NewRSAx509PublicKey(pemdata)
	case x509.ECDSA:
		tufKey = data.NewECDSAx509PublicKey(pemdata)
	default:
		return "", fmt.Errorf("got Unknown key type while fingerprinting certificate")
	}

	return CertID(tufKey.ID()), nil
}
Exemple #10
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// RotateKey rotates the key for a role - this can invalidate that role's metadata
// if it is not signed by that key.  Particularly if the key being rotated is the
// root key, because it is not signed by the new key, only the old key.
func (m *MetadataSwizzler) RotateKey(role string, key data.PublicKey) error {
	roleSpecifier := data.CanonicalRootRole
	if data.IsDelegation(role) {
		roleSpecifier = path.Dir(role)
	}

	b, err := m.MetadataCache.GetSized(roleSpecifier, store.NoSizeLimit)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}

	signedThing := &data.Signed{}
	if err := json.Unmarshal(b, signedThing); err != nil {
		return err
	}

	// get keys before the keys are rotated
	pubKeys, err := getPubKeys(m.CryptoService, signedThing, roleSpecifier)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}

	if roleSpecifier == data.CanonicalRootRole {
		signedRoot, err := data.RootFromSigned(signedThing)
		if err != nil {
			return err
		}
		signedRoot.Signed.Roles[role].KeyIDs = []string{key.ID()}
		signedRoot.Signed.Keys[key.ID()] = key
		if signedThing, err = signedRoot.ToSigned(); err != nil {
			return err
		}
	} else {
		signedTargets, err := data.TargetsFromSigned(signedThing, roleSpecifier)
		if err != nil {
			return err
		}
		for _, roleObject := range signedTargets.Signed.Delegations.Roles {
			if roleObject.Name == role {
				roleObject.KeyIDs = []string{key.ID()}
				break
			}
		}
		signedTargets.Signed.Delegations.Keys[key.ID()] = key
		if signedThing, err = signedTargets.ToSigned(); err != nil {
			return err
		}
	}

	metaBytes, err := serializeMetadata(m.CryptoService, signedThing, roleSpecifier, pubKeys...)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	return m.MetadataCache.Set(roleSpecifier, metaBytes)
}
Exemple #11
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// X509PublicKeyID returns a public key ID as a string, given a
// data.PublicKey that contains an X509 Certificate
func X509PublicKeyID(certPubKey data.PublicKey) (string, error) {
	cert, err := LoadCertFromPEM(certPubKey.Public())
	if err != nil {
		return "", err
	}
	pubKeyBytes, err := x509.MarshalPKIXPublicKey(cert.PublicKey)
	if err != nil {
		return "", err
	}

	var key data.PublicKey
	switch certPubKey.Algorithm() {
	case data.ECDSAx509Key:
		key = data.NewECDSAPublicKey(pubKeyBytes)
	case data.RSAx509Key:
		key = data.NewRSAPublicKey(pubKeyBytes)
	}

	return key.ID(), nil
}
Exemple #12
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// X509PublicKeyID returns a public key ID as a string, given a
// data.PublicKey that contains an X509 Certificate
func X509PublicKeyID(certPubKey data.PublicKey) (string, error) {
	// Note that this only loads the first certificate from the public key
	cert, err := LoadCertFromPEM(certPubKey.Public())
	if err != nil {
		return "", err
	}
	pubKeyBytes, err := x509.MarshalPKIXPublicKey(cert.PublicKey)
	if err != nil {
		return "", err
	}

	var key data.PublicKey
	switch certPubKey.Algorithm() {
	case data.ECDSAx509Key:
		key = data.NewECDSAPublicKey(pubKeyBytes)
	case data.RSAx509Key:
		key = data.NewRSAPublicKey(pubKeyBytes)
	}

	return key.ID(), nil
}
Exemple #13
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// RotateKey removes all existing keys associated with the role, and either
// creates and adds one new key or delegates managing the key to the server.
// These changes are staged in a changelist until publish is called.
func (r *NotaryRepository) RotateKey(role string, serverManagesKey bool) error {
	if err := checkRotationInput(role, serverManagesKey); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	var (
		pubKey    data.PublicKey
		err       error
		errFmtMsg string
	)
	switch serverManagesKey {
	case true:
		pubKey, err = rotateRemoteKey(r.baseURL, r.gun, role, r.roundTrip)
		errFmtMsg = "unable to rotate remote key: %s"
	default:
		pubKey, err = r.CryptoService.Create(role, r.gun, data.ECDSAKey)
		errFmtMsg = "unable to generate key: %s"
	}

	if err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf(errFmtMsg, err)
	}

	// if this is a root role, generate a root cert for the public key
	if role == data.CanonicalRootRole {
		privKey, _, err := r.CryptoService.GetPrivateKey(pubKey.ID())
		if err != nil {
			return err
		}
		pubKey, err = rootCertKey(r.gun, privKey)
		if err != nil {
			return err
		}
	}

	cl := changelist.NewMemChangelist()
	if err := r.rootFileKeyChange(cl, role, changelist.ActionCreate, pubKey); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	return r.publish(cl)
}
Exemple #14
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// AddKey adds a public key to the database
func (db *KeyDB) AddKey(k data.PublicKey) {
	db.keys[k.ID()] = k
}
Exemple #15
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// checkRoot errors if an invalid rotation has taken place, if the
// threshold number of signatures is invalid, if there are an invalid
// number of roles and keys, or if the timestamp keys are invalid
func checkRoot(oldRoot, newRoot *data.SignedRoot, timestampKey data.PublicKey) error {
	rootRole := data.CanonicalRootRole
	targetsRole := data.CanonicalTargetsRole
	snapshotRole := data.CanonicalSnapshotRole
	timestampRole := data.CanonicalTimestampRole

	var oldRootRole *data.RootRole
	newRootRole, ok := newRoot.Signed.Roles[rootRole]
	if !ok {
		return errors.New("new root is missing role entry for root role")
	}

	oldThreshold := 1
	rotation := false
	oldKeys := map[string]data.PublicKey{}
	newKeys := map[string]data.PublicKey{}
	if oldRoot != nil {
		// check for matching root key IDs
		oldRootRole = oldRoot.Signed.Roles[rootRole]
		oldThreshold = oldRootRole.Threshold

		for _, kid := range oldRootRole.KeyIDs {
			k, ok := oldRoot.Signed.Keys[kid]
			if !ok {
				// if the key itself wasn't contained in the root
				// we're skipping it because it could never have
				// been used to validate this root.
				continue
			}
			oldKeys[kid] = data.NewPublicKey(k.Algorithm(), k.Public())
		}

		// super simple check for possible rotation
		rotation = len(oldKeys) != len(newRootRole.KeyIDs)
	}
	// if old and new had the same number of keys, iterate
	// to see if there's a difference.
	for _, kid := range newRootRole.KeyIDs {
		k, ok := newRoot.Signed.Keys[kid]
		if !ok {
			// if the key itself wasn't contained in the root
			// we're skipping it because it could never have
			// been used to validate this root.
			continue
		}
		newKeys[kid] = data.NewPublicKey(k.Algorithm(), k.Public())

		if oldRoot != nil {
			if _, ok := oldKeys[kid]; !ok {
				// if there is any difference in keys, a key rotation may have
				// occurred.
				rotation = true
			}
		}
	}
	newSigned, err := newRoot.ToSigned()
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if rotation {
		err = signed.VerifyRoot(newSigned, oldThreshold, oldKeys)
		if err != nil {
			return fmt.Errorf("rotation detected and new root was not signed with at least %d old keys", oldThreshold)
		}
	}
	err = signed.VerifyRoot(newSigned, newRootRole.Threshold, newKeys)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	root, err := data.RootFromSigned(newSigned)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}

	var timestampKeyIDs []string

	// at a minimum, check the 4 required roles are present
	for _, r := range []string{rootRole, targetsRole, snapshotRole, timestampRole} {
		role, ok := root.Signed.Roles[r]
		if !ok {
			return fmt.Errorf("missing required %s role from root", r)
		}
		// According to the TUF spec, any role may have more than one signing
		// key and require a threshold signature.  However, notary-server
		// creates the timestamp, and there is only ever one, so a threshold
		// greater than one would just always fail validation
		if (r == timestampRole && role.Threshold != 1) || role.Threshold < 1 {
			return fmt.Errorf("%s role has invalid threshold", r)
		}
		if len(role.KeyIDs) < role.Threshold {
			return fmt.Errorf("%s role has insufficient number of keys", r)
		}

		if r == timestampRole {
			timestampKeyIDs = role.KeyIDs
		}
	}

	// ensure that at least one of the timestamp keys specified in the role
	// actually exists

	for _, keyID := range timestampKeyIDs {
		if timestampKey.ID() == keyID {
			return nil
		}
	}
	return fmt.Errorf("none of the following timestamp keys exist: %s",
		strings.Join(timestampKeyIDs, ", "))
}
Exemple #16
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func verifyRootSignatureAgainstKey(t *testing.T, signedRoot *data.Signed, key data.PublicKey) error {
	roleWithKeys := data.BaseRole{Name: data.CanonicalRootRole, Keys: data.Keys{key.ID(): key}, Threshold: 1}
	return signed.VerifySignatures(signedRoot, roleWithKeys)
}