func (ch *authHSChan) validatePacket(pkt *packet.AuthHSPacket) error {
nSet := 0
if msg := pkt.GetProof(); msg != nil {
nSet++
if pkDER := msg.GetPublicKey(); pkDER == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("missing public_key")
}
if sig := msg.GetSignature(); sig == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("missing signature")
}
}
if msg := pkt.GetResult(); msg != nil {
nSet++
}
if nSet != 1 {
return fmt.Errorf("has %d fields set", nSet)
}
return nil
}
func (ch *authHSChan) onPacketClient(authPkt *packet.AuthHSPacket) error {
log := ch.conn.endpoint.log
resultMsg := authPkt.GetResult()
if resultMsg == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("missing result")
}
if !resultMsg.GetAccepted() {
ch.conn.endpoint.onRemoteReject(ch.conn.hostname)
return fmt.Errorf("client: auth to '%s' rejected", ch.conn.hostname)
}
isKnown := resultMsg.GetIsKnownContact()
log.Printf("client: auth to server '%s' accepted isKnown: %v", ch.conn.hostname, isKnown)
ch.conn.getControlChan().isAuthenticated = true
ch.conn.getControlChan().isKnownToPeer = isKnown
ch.conn.authTimer.Stop() // Stop the f**k().
ch.conn.setEstablished()
// XXX: Send a channel close? This is something the server ought to be
// doing, so don't bother for now. This code will not use this channel
// past this point, apart from processing the server's close.
if isKnown {
ch.conn.endpoint.onConnectionEstablished(ch.conn)
return nil
}
// The peer doesn't immediately recognize us. If this is expected,
// dispatch a ContactRequest, otherwise, we got removed.
requestData := ch.conn.endpoint.requestData(ch.conn.hostname)
if requestData == nil {
ch.conn.endpoint.onRemoteReject(ch.conn.hostname)
return fmt.Errorf("client: remote peer remove us from contacts")
}
return newClientContactReqChan(ch.conn, requestData)
}
func (ch *authHSChan) onPacketServer(authPkt *packet.AuthHSPacket) error {
log := ch.conn.endpoint.log
proofMsg := authPkt.GetProof()
if proofMsg == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("missing proof")
}
// Decode and validate the public key.
pk, rest, err := pkcs1.DecodePublicKeyDER(proofMsg.GetPublicKey())
if err != nil {
return err
} else if rest != nil && len(rest) > 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("trailing garbage present after public key")
} else if pk.N.BitLen() != authHiddenServicePublicKeyBits {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid public modulus size: %d", pk.N.BitLen())
}
// Calculate the client hostname.
clientHostname, err := pkcs1.OnionAddr(pk)
if err != nil {
return err
}
sigOk, isKnown := false, false
// Note: The reference implementation checks against the hostname
// blacklist for rejected peers, and early rejects clients durring
// the authentication phase by closing the connection.
//
// This is a bit rude. Check the blacklist and send a rejected
// response, then close the connection (Done by virtue of returning
// an error).
if !ch.conn.endpoint.isBlacklisted(clientHostname) {
// Calculate the proof.
proof := ch.calculateProof(clientHostname, ch.conn.endpoint.hostname)
// Verify proof.
//
// The spec neglects to mention PKCS #1 v1.5/SHA256. Also, not
// SHA256 suming proof is deliberate because the ricochet code
// doesn't bother hashing the proof.
sig := proofMsg.GetSignature()
err = rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(pk, crypto.SHA256, proof, sig)
if err == nil {
sigOk = true
ch.conn.getControlChan().isAuthenticated = true
ch.conn.getControlChan().isKnownToPeer = true
ch.conn.hostname = clientHostname
isKnown = ch.conn.endpoint.isKnown(clientHostname)
}
} else {
err = fmt.Errorf("auth from blacklisted peer: '%v'", clientHostname)
}
log.Printf("server: auth from client '%s' accepted: %v", clientHostname, sigOk)
// Send the result to the client.
if wrErr := ch.sendResult(sigOk, isKnown); wrErr != nil {
return wrErr
}
if sigOk {
ch.conn.setEstablished()
if isKnown {
ch.conn.authTimer.Stop()
ch.conn.endpoint.onConnectionEstablished(ch.conn)
} else {
// Give them another interval to request contact.
ch.conn.authTimer.Reset(authenticationTimeout)
}
}
// Close the authentication channel.
if wrErr := ch.conn.sendChanClose(ch.chanID); wrErr != nil {
return wrErr
}
return err
}
