// Sign signs a new certificate based on the PEM-encoded client
// certificate or certificate request with the signing profile,
// specified by profileName.
func (s *Signer) Sign(req signer.SignRequest) (cert []byte, err error) {
profile, err := signer.Profile(s, req.Profile)
if err != nil {
return
}
serialSeq := ""
if profile.UseSerialSeq {
serialSeq = req.SerialSeq
}
block, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(req.Request))
if block == nil {
return nil, cferr.New(cferr.CSRError, cferr.DecodeFailed)
}
if block.Type != "CERTIFICATE REQUEST" {
return nil, cferr.Wrap(cferr.CSRError,
cferr.BadRequest, errors.New("not a certificate or csr"))
}
csrTemplate, err := signer.ParseCertificateRequest(s, block.Bytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Copy out only the fields from the CSR authorized by policy.
safeTemplate := x509.Certificate{}
// If the profile contains no explicit whitelist, assume that all fields
// should be copied from the CSR.
if profile.CSRWhitelist == nil {
safeTemplate = *csrTemplate
} else {
if profile.CSRWhitelist.Subject {
safeTemplate.Subject = csrTemplate.Subject
}
if profile.CSRWhitelist.PublicKeyAlgorithm {
safeTemplate.PublicKeyAlgorithm = csrTemplate.PublicKeyAlgorithm
}
if profile.CSRWhitelist.PublicKey {
safeTemplate.PublicKey = csrTemplate.PublicKey
}
if profile.CSRWhitelist.SignatureAlgorithm {
safeTemplate.SignatureAlgorithm = csrTemplate.SignatureAlgorithm
}
if profile.CSRWhitelist.DNSNames {
safeTemplate.DNSNames = csrTemplate.DNSNames
}
if profile.CSRWhitelist.IPAddresses {
safeTemplate.IPAddresses = csrTemplate.IPAddresses
}
}
OverrideHosts(&safeTemplate, req.Hosts)
safeTemplate.Subject = PopulateSubjectFromCSR(req.Subject, safeTemplate.Subject)
return s.sign(&safeTemplate, profile, serialSeq)
}
// Sign signs a new certificate based on the PEM-encoded client
// certificate or certificate request with the signing profile,
// specified by profileName.
func (s *Signer) Sign(req signer.SignRequest) (cert []byte, err error) {
profile, err := signer.Profile(s, req.Profile)
if err != nil {
return
}
block, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(req.Request))
if block == nil {
return nil, cferr.New(cferr.CSRError, cferr.DecodeFailed)
}
if block.Type != "CERTIFICATE REQUEST" {
return nil, cferr.Wrap(cferr.CSRError,
cferr.BadRequest, errors.New("not a certificate or csr"))
}
csrTemplate, err := signer.ParseCertificateRequest(s, block.Bytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Copy out only the fields from the CSR authorized by policy.
safeTemplate := x509.Certificate{}
// If the profile contains no explicit whitelist, assume that all fields
// should be copied from the CSR.
if profile.CSRWhitelist == nil {
safeTemplate = *csrTemplate
} else {
if profile.CSRWhitelist.Subject {
safeTemplate.Subject = csrTemplate.Subject
}
if profile.CSRWhitelist.PublicKeyAlgorithm {
safeTemplate.PublicKeyAlgorithm = csrTemplate.PublicKeyAlgorithm
}
if profile.CSRWhitelist.PublicKey {
safeTemplate.PublicKey = csrTemplate.PublicKey
}
if profile.CSRWhitelist.SignatureAlgorithm {
safeTemplate.SignatureAlgorithm = csrTemplate.SignatureAlgorithm
}
if profile.CSRWhitelist.DNSNames {
safeTemplate.DNSNames = csrTemplate.DNSNames
}
if profile.CSRWhitelist.IPAddresses {
safeTemplate.IPAddresses = csrTemplate.IPAddresses
}
}
OverrideHosts(&safeTemplate, req.Hosts)
safeTemplate.Subject = PopulateSubjectFromCSR(req.Subject, safeTemplate.Subject)
// If there is a whitelist, ensure that both the Common Name and SAN DNSNames match
if profile.NameWhitelist != nil {
if safeTemplate.Subject.CommonName != "" {
if profile.NameWhitelist.Find([]byte(safeTemplate.Subject.CommonName)) == nil {
return nil, cferr.New(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy)
}
}
for _, name := range safeTemplate.DNSNames {
if profile.NameWhitelist.Find([]byte(name)) == nil {
return nil, cferr.New(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy)
}
}
}
if profile.ClientProvidesSerialNumbers {
if req.Serial == nil {
fmt.Printf("xx %#v\n", profile)
return nil, cferr.New(cferr.CertificateError, cferr.MissingSerial)
}
safeTemplate.SerialNumber = req.Serial
} else {
// RFC 5280 4.1.2.2:
// Certificate users MUST be able to handle serialNumber
// values up to 20 octets. Conforming CAs MUST NOT use
// serialNumber values longer than 20 octets.
//
// If CFSSL is providing the serial numbers, it makes
// sense to use the max supported size.
serialNumber := make([]byte, 20)
_, err = io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, serialNumber)
if err != nil {
return nil, cferr.Wrap(cferr.CertificateError, cferr.Unknown, err)
}
// SetBytes interprets buf as the bytes of a big-endian
// unsigned integer. The leading byte should be masked
// off to ensure it isn't negative.
serialNumber[0] &= 0x7F
safeTemplate.SerialNumber = new(big.Int).SetBytes(serialNumber)
}
if len(req.Extensions) > 0 {
for _, ext := range req.Extensions {
oid := asn1.ObjectIdentifier(ext.ID)
if !profile.ExtensionWhitelist[oid.String()] {
return nil, cferr.New(cferr.CertificateError, cferr.InvalidRequest)
}
rawValue, err := hex.DecodeString(ext.Value)
if err != nil {
return nil, cferr.Wrap(cferr.CertificateError, cferr.InvalidRequest, err)
}
safeTemplate.ExtraExtensions = append(safeTemplate.ExtraExtensions, pkix.Extension{
Id: oid,
Critical: ext.Critical,
Value: rawValue,
})
}
}
var certTBS = safeTemplate
if len(profile.CTLogServers) > 0 {
// Add a poison extension which prevents validation
var poisonExtension = pkix.Extension{Id: signer.CTPoisonOID, Critical: true, Value: []byte{0x05, 0x00}}
var poisonedPreCert = certTBS
poisonedPreCert.ExtraExtensions = append(safeTemplate.ExtraExtensions, poisonExtension)
cert, err = s.sign(&poisonedPreCert, profile)
if err != nil {
return
}
derCert, _ := pem.Decode(cert)
prechain := []ct.ASN1Cert{derCert.Bytes, s.ca.Raw}
var sctList []ct.SignedCertificateTimestamp
for _, server := range profile.CTLogServers {
log.Infof("submitting poisoned precertificate to %s", server)
var ctclient = client.New(server)
var resp *ct.SignedCertificateTimestamp
resp, err = ctclient.AddPreChain(prechain)
if err != nil {
return nil, cferr.Wrap(cferr.CTError, cferr.PrecertSubmissionFailed, err)
}
sctList = append(sctList, *resp)
}
var serializedSCTList []byte
serializedSCTList, err = serializeSCTList(sctList)
if err != nil {
return nil, cferr.Wrap(cferr.CTError, cferr.Unknown, err)
}
// Serialize again as an octet string before embedding
serializedSCTList, err = asn1.Marshal(serializedSCTList)
if err != nil {
return nil, cferr.Wrap(cferr.CTError, cferr.Unknown, err)
}
var SCTListExtension = pkix.Extension{Id: signer.SCTListOID, Critical: false, Value: serializedSCTList}
certTBS.ExtraExtensions = append(certTBS.ExtraExtensions, SCTListExtension)
}
var signedCert []byte
signedCert, err = s.sign(&certTBS, profile)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if s.db != nil {
var certRecord = &certdb.CertificateRecord{
Serial: certTBS.SerialNumber.String(),
CALabel: req.Label,
Status: "good",
Expiry: certTBS.NotAfter,
PEM: string(signedCert),
}
err = certdb.InsertCertificate(s.db, certRecord)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
log.Debug("saved certificate with serial number ", certTBS.SerialNumber)
}
return signedCert, nil
}
// Sign signs a new certificate based on the PEM-encoded client
// certificate or certificate request with the signing profile,
// specified by profileName.
func (s *Signer) Sign(req signer.SignRequest) (cert []byte, err error) {
profile, err := signer.Profile(s, req.Profile)
if err != nil {
return
}
block, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(req.Request))
if block == nil {
return nil, cferr.New(cferr.CSRError, cferr.DecodeFailed)
}
if block.Type != "CERTIFICATE REQUEST" {
return nil, cferr.Wrap(cferr.CSRError,
cferr.BadRequest, errors.New("not a certificate or csr"))
}
csrTemplate, err := signer.ParseCertificateRequest(s, block.Bytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Copy out only the fields from the CSR authorized by policy.
safeTemplate := x509.Certificate{}
// If the profile contains no explicit whitelist, assume that all fields
// should be copied from the CSR.
if profile.CSRWhitelist == nil {
safeTemplate = *csrTemplate
} else {
if profile.CSRWhitelist.Subject {
safeTemplate.Subject = csrTemplate.Subject
}
if profile.CSRWhitelist.PublicKeyAlgorithm {
safeTemplate.PublicKeyAlgorithm = csrTemplate.PublicKeyAlgorithm
}
if profile.CSRWhitelist.PublicKey {
safeTemplate.PublicKey = csrTemplate.PublicKey
}
if profile.CSRWhitelist.SignatureAlgorithm {
safeTemplate.SignatureAlgorithm = csrTemplate.SignatureAlgorithm
}
if profile.CSRWhitelist.DNSNames {
safeTemplate.DNSNames = csrTemplate.DNSNames
}
if profile.CSRWhitelist.IPAddresses {
safeTemplate.IPAddresses = csrTemplate.IPAddresses
}
}
OverrideHosts(&safeTemplate, req.Hosts)
safeTemplate.Subject = PopulateSubjectFromCSR(req.Subject, safeTemplate.Subject)
// If there is a whitelist, ensure that both the Common Name and SAN DNSNames match
if profile.NameWhitelist != nil {
if safeTemplate.Subject.CommonName != "" {
if profile.NameWhitelist.Find([]byte(safeTemplate.Subject.CommonName)) == nil {
return nil, cferr.New(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy)
}
}
for _, name := range safeTemplate.DNSNames {
if profile.NameWhitelist.Find([]byte(name)) == nil {
return nil, cferr.New(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy)
}
}
}
if profile.ClientProvidesSerialNumbers {
if req.Serial == nil {
fmt.Printf("xx %#v\n", profile)
return nil, cferr.New(cferr.CertificateError, cferr.MissingSerial)
}
safeTemplate.SerialNumber = req.Serial
} else {
serialNumber, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, new(big.Int).SetInt64(math.MaxInt64))
if err != nil {
return nil, cferr.Wrap(cferr.CertificateError, cferr.Unknown, err)
}
safeTemplate.SerialNumber = serialNumber
}
var certTBS = safeTemplate
if len(profile.CTLogServers) > 0 {
// Add a poison extension which prevents validation
var poisonExtension = pkix.Extension{Id: signer.CTPoisonOID, Critical: true, Value: []byte{0x05, 0x00}}
var poisonedPreCert = certTBS
poisonedPreCert.ExtraExtensions = append(safeTemplate.ExtraExtensions, poisonExtension)
cert, err = s.sign(&poisonedPreCert, profile)
if err != nil {
return
}
derCert, _ := pem.Decode(cert)
prechain := []ct.ASN1Cert{derCert.Bytes, s.ca.Raw}
var sctList []ct.SignedCertificateTimestamp
for _, server := range profile.CTLogServers {
log.Infof("submitting poisoned precertificate to %s", server)
var ctclient = client.New(server)
var resp *ct.SignedCertificateTimestamp
resp, err = ctclient.AddPreChain(prechain)
if err != nil {
return nil, cferr.Wrap(cferr.CTError, cferr.PrecertSubmissionFailed, err)
}
sctList = append(sctList, *resp)
}
var serializedSCTList []byte
serializedSCTList, err = serializeSCTList(sctList)
if err != nil {
return nil, cferr.Wrap(cferr.CTError, cferr.Unknown, err)
}
// Serialize again as an octet string before embedding
serializedSCTList, err = asn1.Marshal(serializedSCTList)
if err != nil {
return nil, cferr.Wrap(cferr.CTError, cferr.Unknown, err)
}
var SCTListExtension = pkix.Extension{Id: signer.SCTListOID, Critical: false, Value: serializedSCTList}
certTBS.ExtraExtensions = append(certTBS.ExtraExtensions, SCTListExtension)
}
return s.sign(&certTBS, profile)
}
// Sign signs a new certificate based on the PEM-encoded client
// certificate or certificate request with the signing profile,
// specified by profileName.
func (s *Signer) Sign(req signer.SignRequest) (cert []byte, err error) {
profile, err := signer.Profile(s, req.Profile)
if err != nil {
return
}
block, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(req.Request))
if block == nil {
return nil, cferr.New(cferr.CSRError, cferr.DecodeFailed)
}
if block.Type != "CERTIFICATE REQUEST" {
return nil, cferr.Wrap(cferr.CSRError,
cferr.BadRequest, errors.New("not a certificate or csr"))
}
csrTemplate, err := signer.ParseCertificateRequest(s, block.Bytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Copy out only the fields from the CSR authorized by policy.
safeTemplate := x509.Certificate{}
// If the profile contains no explicit whitelist, assume that all fields
// should be copied from the CSR.
if profile.CSRWhitelist == nil {
safeTemplate = *csrTemplate
} else {
if profile.CSRWhitelist.Subject {
safeTemplate.Subject = csrTemplate.Subject
}
if profile.CSRWhitelist.PublicKeyAlgorithm {
safeTemplate.PublicKeyAlgorithm = csrTemplate.PublicKeyAlgorithm
}
if profile.CSRWhitelist.PublicKey {
safeTemplate.PublicKey = csrTemplate.PublicKey
}
if profile.CSRWhitelist.SignatureAlgorithm {
safeTemplate.SignatureAlgorithm = csrTemplate.SignatureAlgorithm
}
if profile.CSRWhitelist.DNSNames {
safeTemplate.DNSNames = csrTemplate.DNSNames
}
if profile.CSRWhitelist.IPAddresses {
safeTemplate.IPAddresses = csrTemplate.IPAddresses
}
}
OverrideHosts(&safeTemplate, req.Hosts)
safeTemplate.Subject = PopulateSubjectFromCSR(req.Subject, safeTemplate.Subject)
// If there is a whitelist, ensure that both the Common Name and SAN DNSNames match
if profile.NameWhitelist != nil {
if safeTemplate.Subject.CommonName != "" {
if profile.NameWhitelist.Find([]byte(safeTemplate.Subject.CommonName)) == nil {
return nil, cferr.New(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy)
}
}
for _, name := range safeTemplate.DNSNames {
if profile.NameWhitelist.Find([]byte(name)) == nil {
return nil, cferr.New(cferr.PolicyError, cferr.InvalidPolicy)
}
}
}
if profile.ClientProvidesSerialNumbers {
if req.Serial == nil {
fmt.Printf("xx %#v\n", profile)
return nil, cferr.New(cferr.CertificateError, cferr.MissingSerial)
}
safeTemplate.SerialNumber = req.Serial
} else {
serialNumber, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, new(big.Int).SetInt64(math.MaxInt64))
if err != nil {
return nil, cferr.Wrap(cferr.CertificateError, cferr.Unknown, err)
}
safeTemplate.SerialNumber = serialNumber
}
return s.sign(&safeTemplate, profile)
}