// Tests whether a message can be signed, and wrapped in plain-text.
func TestMessageCleartextSignRecover(t *testing.T) {
key, err := crypto.GenerateKey()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create crypto key: %v", err)
}
payload := []byte("hello world")
msg := NewMessage(payload)
if _, err := msg.Wrap(DefaultPoW, Options{
From: key,
}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to sign message: %v", err)
}
if msg.Flags&signatureFlag != signatureFlag {
t.Fatalf("signature flag mismatch: have %d, want %d", msg.Flags&signatureFlag, signatureFlag)
}
if bytes.Compare(msg.Payload, payload) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("payload mismatch after signing: have 0x%x, want 0x%x", msg.Payload, payload)
}
pubKey := msg.Recover()
if pubKey == nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to recover public key")
}
p1 := elliptic.Marshal(crypto.S256(), key.PublicKey.X, key.PublicKey.Y)
p2 := elliptic.Marshal(crypto.S256(), pubKey.X, pubKey.Y)
if !bytes.Equal(p1, p2) {
t.Fatalf("public key mismatch: have 0x%x, want 0x%x", p2, p1)
}
}
func main() {
logger.AddLogSystem(logger.NewStdLogSystem(os.Stdout, log.LstdFlags, logger.InfoLevel))
// Generate the peer identity
key, err := crypto.GenerateKey()
if err != nil {
fmt.Printf("Failed to generate peer key: %v.\n", err)
os.Exit(-1)
}
name := common.MakeName("whisper-go", "1.0")
shh := whisper.New()
// Create an Shift peer to communicate through
server := p2p.Server{
PrivateKey: key,
MaxPeers: 10,
Name: name,
Protocols: []p2p.Protocol{shh.Protocol()},
ListenAddr: ":30300",
NAT: nat.Any(),
}
fmt.Println("Starting Shift peer...")
if err := server.Start(); err != nil {
fmt.Printf("Failed to start Shift peer: %v.\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
// Send a message to self to check that something works
payload := fmt.Sprintf("Hello world, this is %v. In case you're wondering, the time is %v", name, time.Now())
if err := selfSend(shh, []byte(payload)); err != nil {
fmt.Printf("Failed to self message: %v.\n", err)
os.Exit(-1)
}
}
func newkey() *ecdsa.PrivateKey {
key, err := crypto.GenerateKey()
if err != nil {
panic("couldn't generate key: " + err.Error())
}
return key
}
func TestEnvelopeIdentifiedOpenUntargeted(t *testing.T) {
key, err := crypto.GenerateKey()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to generate test identity: %v", err)
}
payload := []byte("hello envelope")
envelope, err := NewMessage(payload).Wrap(DefaultPoW, Options{})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to wrap message: %v", err)
}
opened, err := envelope.Open(key)
switch err {
case nil:
t.Fatalf("envelope opened with bad key: %v", opened)
case ecies.ErrInvalidPublicKey:
// Ok, key mismatch but opened
default:
t.Fatalf("failed to open envelope: %v", err)
}
if opened.To != nil {
t.Fatalf("recipient mismatch: have 0x%x, want nil", opened.To)
}
if bytes.Compare(opened.Payload, payload) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("payload mismatch: have 0x%x, want 0x%x", opened.Payload, payload)
}
}
// Tests whether a message can be encrypted and decrypted using an anonymous
// sender (i.e. no signature).
func TestMessageAnonymousEncryptDecrypt(t *testing.T) {
key, err := crypto.GenerateKey()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create recipient crypto key: %v", err)
}
payload := []byte("hello world")
msg := NewMessage(payload)
envelope, err := msg.Wrap(DefaultPoW, Options{
To: &key.PublicKey,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to encrypt message: %v", err)
}
if msg.Flags&signatureFlag != 0 {
t.Fatalf("signature flag mismatch: have %d, want %d", msg.Flags&signatureFlag, 0)
}
if len(msg.Signature) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("signature found for anonymous message: 0x%x", msg.Signature)
}
out, err := envelope.Open(key)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to open encrypted message: %v", err)
}
if !bytes.Equal(out.Payload, payload) {
t.Error("payload mismatch: have 0x%x, want 0x%x", out.Payload, payload)
}
}
func setupTxPool() (*TxPool, *ecdsa.PrivateKey) {
db, _ := ethdb.NewMemDatabase()
statedb := state.New(common.Hash{}, db)
var m event.TypeMux
key, _ := crypto.GenerateKey()
return NewTxPool(&m, func() *state.StateDB { return statedb }, func() *big.Int { return big.NewInt(1000000) }), key
}
func init() {
ringKeys[0] = benchRootKey
ringAddrs[0] = benchRootAddr
for i := 1; i < len(ringKeys); i++ {
ringKeys[i], _ = crypto.GenerateKey()
ringAddrs[i] = crypto.PubkeyToAddress(ringKeys[i].PublicKey)
}
}
// NewIdentity generates a new cryptographic identity for the client, and injects
// it into the known identities for message decryption.
func (self *Whisper) NewIdentity() *ecdsa.PrivateKey {
key, err := crypto.GenerateKey()
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
self.keys[string(crypto.FromECDSAPub(&key.PublicKey))] = key
return key
}
// Tests whether a message can be properly signed and encrypted.
func TestMessageFullCrypto(t *testing.T) {
fromKey, err := crypto.GenerateKey()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create sender crypto key: %v", err)
}
toKey, err := crypto.GenerateKey()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create recipient crypto key: %v", err)
}
payload := []byte("hello world")
msg := NewMessage(payload)
envelope, err := msg.Wrap(DefaultPoW, Options{
From: fromKey,
To: &toKey.PublicKey,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to encrypt message: %v", err)
}
if msg.Flags&signatureFlag != signatureFlag {
t.Fatalf("signature flag mismatch: have %d, want %d", msg.Flags&signatureFlag, signatureFlag)
}
if len(msg.Signature) == 0 {
t.Fatalf("no signature found for signed message")
}
out, err := envelope.Open(toKey)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to open encrypted message: %v", err)
}
if !bytes.Equal(out.Payload, payload) {
t.Error("payload mismatch: have 0x%x, want 0x%x", out.Payload, payload)
}
pubKey := out.Recover()
if pubKey == nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to recover public key")
}
p1 := elliptic.Marshal(crypto.S256(), fromKey.PublicKey.X, fromKey.PublicKey.Y)
p2 := elliptic.Marshal(crypto.S256(), pubKey.X, pubKey.Y)
if !bytes.Equal(p1, p2) {
t.Fatalf("public key mismatch: have 0x%x, want 0x%x", p2, p1)
}
}
func TestSharedSecret(t *testing.T) {
prv0, _ := crypto.GenerateKey() // = ecdsa.GenerateKey(crypto.S256(), rand.Reader)
pub0 := &prv0.PublicKey
prv1, _ := crypto.GenerateKey()
pub1 := &prv1.PublicKey
ss0, err := ecies.ImportECDSA(prv0).GenerateShared(ecies.ImportECDSAPublic(pub1), sskLen, sskLen)
if err != nil {
return
}
ss1, err := ecies.ImportECDSA(prv1).GenerateShared(ecies.ImportECDSAPublic(pub0), sskLen, sskLen)
if err != nil {
return
}
t.Logf("Secret:\n%v %x\n%v %x", len(ss0), ss0, len(ss0), ss1)
if !bytes.Equal(ss0, ss1) {
t.Errorf("dont match :(")
}
}
func writeKey(target string) {
key, err := crypto.GenerateKey()
if err != nil {
log.Fatal("could not generate key: %v", err)
}
b := crypto.FromECDSA(key)
if target == "-" {
fmt.Println(hex.EncodeToString(b))
} else {
if err := ioutil.WriteFile(target, b, 0600); err != nil {
log.Fatal("write error: ", err)
}
}
}
func (cfg *Config) nodeKey() (*ecdsa.PrivateKey, error) {
// use explicit key from command line args if set
if cfg.NodeKey != nil {
return cfg.NodeKey, nil
}
// use persistent key if present
keyfile := filepath.Join(cfg.DataDir, "nodekey")
key, err := crypto.LoadECDSA(keyfile)
if err == nil {
return key, nil
}
// no persistent key, generate and store a new one
if key, err = crypto.GenerateKey(); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("could not generate server key: %v", err)
}
if err := crypto.SaveECDSA(keyfile, key); err != nil {
glog.V(logger.Error).Infoln("could not persist nodekey: ", err)
}
return key, nil
}
func TestEnvelopeAnonymousOpenTargeted(t *testing.T) {
key, err := crypto.GenerateKey()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to generate test identity: %v", err)
}
payload := []byte("hello envelope")
envelope, err := NewMessage(payload).Wrap(DefaultPoW, Options{
To: &key.PublicKey,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to wrap message: %v", err)
}
opened, err := envelope.Open(nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to open envelope: %v", err)
}
if opened.To != nil {
t.Fatalf("recipient mismatch: have 0x%x, want nil", opened.To)
}
if bytes.Compare(opened.Payload, payload) == 0 {
t.Fatalf("payload match, should have been encrypted: 0x%x", opened.Payload)
}
}
func testEncHandshake(token []byte) error {
type result struct {
side string
id discover.NodeID
err error
}
var (
prv0, _ = crypto.GenerateKey()
prv1, _ = crypto.GenerateKey()
fd0, fd1 = net.Pipe()
c0, c1 = newRLPX(fd0).(*rlpx), newRLPX(fd1).(*rlpx)
output = make(chan result)
)
go func() {
r := result{side: "initiator"}
defer func() { output <- r }()
dest := &discover.Node{ID: discover.PubkeyID(&prv1.PublicKey)}
r.id, r.err = c0.doEncHandshake(prv0, dest)
if r.err != nil {
return
}
id1 := discover.PubkeyID(&prv1.PublicKey)
if r.id != id1 {
r.err = fmt.Errorf("remote ID mismatch: got %v, want: %v", r.id, id1)
}
}()
go func() {
r := result{side: "receiver"}
defer func() { output <- r }()
r.id, r.err = c1.doEncHandshake(prv1, nil)
if r.err != nil {
return
}
id0 := discover.PubkeyID(&prv0.PublicKey)
if r.id != id0 {
r.err = fmt.Errorf("remote ID mismatch: got %v, want: %v", r.id, id0)
}
}()
// wait for results from both sides
r1, r2 := <-output, <-output
if r1.err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("%s side error: %v", r1.side, r1.err)
}
if r2.err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("%s side error: %v", r2.side, r2.err)
}
// compare derived secrets
if !reflect.DeepEqual(c0.rw.egressMAC, c1.rw.ingressMAC) {
return fmt.Errorf("egress mac mismatch:\n c0.rw: %#v\n c1.rw: %#v", c0.rw.egressMAC, c1.rw.ingressMAC)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(c0.rw.ingressMAC, c1.rw.egressMAC) {
return fmt.Errorf("ingress mac mismatch:\n c0.rw: %#v\n c1.rw: %#v", c0.rw.ingressMAC, c1.rw.egressMAC)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(c0.rw.enc, c1.rw.enc) {
return fmt.Errorf("enc cipher mismatch:\n c0.rw: %#v\n c1.rw: %#v", c0.rw.enc, c1.rw.enc)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(c0.rw.dec, c1.rw.dec) {
return fmt.Errorf("dec cipher mismatch:\n c0.rw: %#v\n c1.rw: %#v", c0.rw.dec, c1.rw.dec)
}
return nil
}
func TestProtocolHandshake(t *testing.T) {
var (
prv0, _ = crypto.GenerateKey()
node0 = &discover.Node{ID: discover.PubkeyID(&prv0.PublicKey), IP: net.IP{1, 2, 3, 4}, TCP: 33}
hs0 = &protoHandshake{Version: 3, ID: node0.ID, Caps: []Cap{{"a", 0}, {"b", 2}}}
prv1, _ = crypto.GenerateKey()
node1 = &discover.Node{ID: discover.PubkeyID(&prv1.PublicKey), IP: net.IP{5, 6, 7, 8}, TCP: 44}
hs1 = &protoHandshake{Version: 3, ID: node1.ID, Caps: []Cap{{"c", 1}, {"d", 3}}}
fd0, fd1 = net.Pipe()
wg sync.WaitGroup
)
wg.Add(2)
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
rlpx := newRLPX(fd0)
remid, err := rlpx.doEncHandshake(prv0, node1)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("dial side enc handshake failed: %v", err)
return
}
if remid != node1.ID {
t.Errorf("dial side remote id mismatch: got %v, want %v", remid, node1.ID)
return
}
phs, err := rlpx.doProtoHandshake(hs0)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("dial side proto handshake error: %v", err)
return
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(phs, hs1) {
t.Errorf("dial side proto handshake mismatch:\ngot: %s\nwant: %s\n", spew.Sdump(phs), spew.Sdump(hs1))
return
}
rlpx.close(DiscQuitting)
}()
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
rlpx := newRLPX(fd1)
remid, err := rlpx.doEncHandshake(prv1, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("listen side enc handshake failed: %v", err)
return
}
if remid != node0.ID {
t.Errorf("listen side remote id mismatch: got %v, want %v", remid, node0.ID)
return
}
phs, err := rlpx.doProtoHandshake(hs1)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("listen side proto handshake error: %v", err)
return
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(phs, hs0) {
t.Errorf("listen side proto handshake mismatch:\ngot: %s\nwant: %s\n", spew.Sdump(phs), spew.Sdump(hs0))
return
}
if err := ExpectMsg(rlpx, discMsg, []DiscReason{DiscQuitting}); err != nil {
t.Errorf("error receiving disconnect: %v", err)
}
}()
wg.Wait()
}