func GetHMAC(hashType int, input, key []byte) []byte {
var hash func() hash.Hash
switch hashType {
case HASH_SHA1:
{
hash = sha1.New
}
case HASH_SHA256:
{
hash = sha256.New
}
case HASH_SHA512:
{
hash = sha512.New
}
case HASH_SHA512_384:
{
hash = sha512.New384
}
}
hmac := hmac.New(hash, []byte(key))
hmac.Write(input)
return hmac.Sum(nil)
}
// Creates a new master extended key from a seed
func NewMasterKey(seed []byte) (*Key, error) {
// Generate key and chaincode
hmac := hmac.New(sha512.New, []byte("Bitcoin seed"))
hmac.Write([]byte(seed))
intermediary := hmac.Sum(nil)
// Split it into our key and chain code
keyBytes := intermediary[:32]
chainCode := intermediary[32:]
// Validate key
err := validatePrivateKey(keyBytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Create the key struct
key := &Key{
Version: PrivateWalletVersion,
ChainCode: chainCode,
Key: keyBytes,
Depth: 0x0,
ChildNumber: []byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
FingerPrint: []byte{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
IsPrivate: true,
}
return key, nil
}
// Derives a child key from a given parent as outlined by bip32
func (key *Key) NewChildKey(childIdx uint32) (*Key, error) {
hardenedChild := childIdx >= FirstHardenedChild
childIndexBytes := uint32Bytes(childIdx)
// Fail early if trying to create hardned child from public key
if !key.IsPrivate && hardenedChild {
return nil, errors.New("Can't create hardened child for public key")
}
// Get intermediary to create key and chaincode from
// Hardened children are based on the private key
// NonHardened children are based on the public key
var data []byte
if hardenedChild {
data = append([]byte{0x0}, key.Key...)
} else {
data = publicKeyForPrivateKey(key.Key)
}
data = append(data, childIndexBytes...)
hmac := hmac.New(sha512.New, key.ChainCode)
hmac.Write(data)
intermediary := hmac.Sum(nil)
// Create child Key with data common to all both scenarios
childKey := &Key{
ChildNumber: childIndexBytes,
ChainCode: intermediary[32:],
Depth: key.Depth + 1,
IsPrivate: key.IsPrivate,
}
// Bip32 CKDpriv
if key.IsPrivate {
childKey.Version = PrivateWalletVersion
childKey.FingerPrint = hash160(publicKeyForPrivateKey(key.Key))[:4]
childKey.Key = addPrivateKeys(intermediary[:32], key.Key)
// Validate key
err := validatePrivateKey(childKey.Key)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Bip32 CKDpub
} else {
keyBytes := publicKeyForPrivateKey(intermediary[:32])
// Validate key
err := validateChildPublicKey(keyBytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
childKey.Version = PublicWalletVersion
childKey.FingerPrint = hash160(key.Key)[:4]
childKey.Key = addPublicKeys(keyBytes, key.Key)
}
return childKey, nil
}
func GetIronValue(name, value string, key []byte, timestamped bool) (val string, ok bool) {
split := strings.SplitN(value, ":", 2)
if len(split) != 2 {
return
}
expected, value := []byte(split[0]), split[1]
message := fmt.Sprintf("%s|%s", strings.Replace(name, "|", `\|`, -1), value)
hmac := ironHMAC(key)
hmac.Write([]byte(message))
digest := hmac.Sum()
mac := make([]byte, base64.URLEncoding.EncodedLen(len(digest)))
base64.URLEncoding.Encode(mac, digest)
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(mac, expected) != 1 {
return
}
if timestamped {
split = strings.SplitN(value, ":", 2)
if len(split) != 2 {
return
}
timestring, val := split[0], split[1]
timestamp, err := strconv.Atoi64(timestring)
if err != nil {
return
}
if time.Seconds() > timestamp {
return
}
return val, true
}
return value, true
}
// hkdfExpand implements HKDF-Expand from RFC 5869.
func hkdfExpand(hash func() hash.Hash, prk, info []byte, length int) []byte {
hashSize := hash().Size()
if length > 255*hashSize {
panic("hkdfExpand: length too long")
}
if len(prk) < hashSize {
panic("hkdfExpand: prk too short")
}
var lastBlock []byte
counter := byte(0)
okm := make([]byte, length)
hmac := hmac.New(hash, prk)
for length > 0 {
hmac.Reset()
counter++
hmac.Write(lastBlock)
hmac.Write(info)
hmac.Write([]byte{counter})
block := hmac.Sum(nil)
lastBlock = block
copy(okm[(int(counter)-1)*hashSize:], block)
length -= hashSize
}
return okm
}
// Generates an OAuth signature using signatureBase
// and secret keys
func (t *Twitter) generateOAuthSignature(signatureBase string) string {
signingKey := fmt.Sprintf("%s&%s", t.ConsumerSecret, t.OAuthTokenSecret)
hmac := hmac.New(sha1.New, []byte(signingKey))
hmac.Write([]byte(signatureBase))
return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(hmac.Sum(nil))
}
// Returns the signature to be used in the query string or Authorization header
func Signature(secret, toSign string) string {
// Signature = Base64( HMAC-SHA1( UTF-8-Encoding-Of( YourSecretAccessKeyID, StringToSign ) ) );
// Need to confirm what encoding go strings are when converted to []byte
hmac := hmac.NewSHA1([]byte(secret))
hmac.Write([]byte(toSign))
return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(hmac.Sum())
}
func signHMAC(key []byte, data string) ([]byte, error) {
hmac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(key))
_, err := hmac.Write([]byte(data))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return hmac.Sum(nil), nil
}
// hkdfExtract implements HKDF-Extract from RFC 5869.
func hkdfExtract(hash func() hash.Hash, salt, ikm []byte) []byte {
if salt == nil {
salt = make([]byte, hash().Size())
}
hmac := hmac.New(hash, salt)
hmac.Write(ikm)
return hmac.Sum(nil)
}
// MakePermSignature returns a string representing the signed permission
// hint for the blob identified by blob_hash, api_token and expiration timestamp.
func MakePermSignature(blob_hash string, api_token string, expiry string) string {
hmac := hmac.New(sha1.New, PermissionSecret)
hmac.Write([]byte(blob_hash))
hmac.Write([]byte("@"))
hmac.Write([]byte(api_token))
hmac.Write([]byte("@"))
hmac.Write([]byte(expiry))
digest := hmac.Sum(nil)
return fmt.Sprintf("%x", digest)
}
// calcMac calculates HMAC-SHA-256 over the message using the passed secret key as
// input to the HMAC.
func calcMac(key [keyLen]byte, msg []byte) [securityParameter]byte {
hmac := hmac.New(sha256.New, key[:])
hmac.Write(msg)
h := hmac.Sum(nil)
var mac [securityParameter]byte
copy(mac[:], h[:securityParameter])
return mac
}
func (t *Token) VerifySignature(key string) error {
sig_base := "rter_consumer=" + t.consumer + "&rter_resource=" + t.Resource + "&rter_valid_until=" + t.Valid_until
hmac := hmac.New(sha256.New, bytes.NewBufferString(key).Bytes())
checksig := url.QueryEscape(base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(hmac.Sum(bytes.NewBufferString(url.QueryEscape(sig_base)).Bytes())))
if t.Signature == checksig {
return nil
}
return errors.New("signature verification failed")
}
// makePermSignature generates a SHA-1 HMAC digest for the given blob,
// token, expiry, and site secret.
func makePermSignature(blobHash, apiToken, expiry string, permissionSecret []byte) string {
hmac := hmac.New(sha1.New, permissionSecret)
hmac.Write([]byte(blobHash))
hmac.Write([]byte("@"))
hmac.Write([]byte(apiToken))
hmac.Write([]byte("@"))
hmac.Write([]byte(expiry))
digest := hmac.Sum(nil)
return fmt.Sprintf("%x", digest)
}
func IronString(name, value string, key []byte, duration int64) string {
if duration > 0 {
value = fmt.Sprintf("%d:%s", time.Seconds()+duration, value)
}
message := fmt.Sprintf("%s|%s", strings.Replace(name, "|", `\|`, -1), value)
hmac := ironHMAC(key)
hmac.Write([]byte(message))
mac := base64.URLEncoding.EncodeToString(hmac.Sum())
return fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", mac, value)
}
func (sk *SKEME) mkmac(masterkey, Xb1, Xb2 []byte) (cipher.Stream, []byte) {
keylen := sk.ms.KeySize()
hmac := hmac.New(sk.suite.Hash, masterkey)
hmac.Write(Xb1)
hmac.Write(Xb2)
key := hmac.Sum(nil)[:keylen]
stream := sk.suite.Cipher(key)
mac := random.Bytes(keylen, stream)
return stream, mac
}
// Create hash_ref suitable for later invocation of Check()
func (s ScryptAuth) Hash(pw_cost uint, user_password, salt []byte) (hash_ref []byte, err error) {
scrypt_hash, err := scrypt.Key(user_password, salt, 1<<pw_cost, s.R, s.P, KEYLENGTH)
if err != nil {
return
}
hmac := hmac.New(sha256.New, s.HmacKey)
if _, err = hmac.Write(scrypt_hash); err != nil {
return
}
hash_ref = hmac.Sum(nil)
return
}
// WithHMAC derives key of length outlen from the provided password, salt,
// and the number of iterations using PKCS#5 PBKDF2 with the provided
// hash function in HMAC.
//
// Caller is responsible to make sure that outlen < (2^32-1) * hash.Size().
func WithHMAC(hash func() hash.Hash, password []byte, salt []byte, iterations int, outlen int) []byte {
out := make([]byte, outlen)
hashSize := hash().Size()
ibuf := make([]byte, 4)
block := 1
p := out
for outlen > 0 {
clen := outlen
if clen > hashSize {
clen = hashSize
}
ibuf[0] = byte((block >> 24) & 0xff)
ibuf[1] = byte((block >> 16) & 0xff)
ibuf[2] = byte((block >> 8) & 0xff)
ibuf[3] = byte((block) & 0xff)
hmac := hmac.New(hash, password)
hmac.Write(salt)
hmac.Write(ibuf)
tmp := hmac.Sum()
for i := 0; i < clen; i++ {
p[i] = tmp[i]
}
for j := 1; j < iterations; j++ {
hmac.Reset()
hmac.Write(tmp)
tmp = hmac.Sum()
for k := 0; k < clen; k++ {
p[k] ^= tmp[k]
}
}
outlen -= clen
block++
p = p[clen:]
}
return out
}
// Compute an authentication tag
func (ctx *cbcAEAD) computeAuthTag(aad, nonce, ciphertext []byte) []byte {
buffer := make([]byte, len(aad)+len(nonce)+len(ciphertext)+8)
n := 0
n += copy(buffer, aad)
n += copy(buffer[n:], nonce)
n += copy(buffer[n:], ciphertext)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(buffer[n:], uint64(len(aad)*8))
// According to documentation, Write() on hash.Hash never fails.
hmac := hmac.New(ctx.hash, ctx.integrityKey)
_, _ = hmac.Write(buffer)
return hmac.Sum(nil)[:ctx.authtagBytes]
}
func (mp *MerkleProof) calcRootHash(seed []byte, lastNode []byte) []byte {
hmac := hmac.New(sha256.New, seed)
for i := len(mp.Level) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
hmac.Reset()
if mp.Level[i].NodeHash != nil {
if mp.Level[i].IsLeft {
hmac.Write(mp.Level[i].NodeHash)
hmac.Write(lastNode)
} else {
hmac.Write(lastNode)
hmac.Write(mp.Level[i].NodeHash)
}
lastNode = hmac.Sum(nil)
}
}
return lastNode
}
// test signing function independent of others
func TestTokenSigning(t *testing.T) {
tok := FakeToken(TEST_TOKEN_URI, TEST_TOKEN_CONSUMER, TEST_TOKEN_LIFETIME_STR, "")
if err := tok.Sign(TEST_TOKEN_SECRET); err != nil {
t.Fatal("Sign() failed")
}
// verify signature manually
var sig_base string
sig_base = "rter_consumer=" + TEST_TOKEN_CONSUMER + "&rter_resource=" + TEST_TOKEN_URI + "&rter_valid_until=" + TEST_TOKEN_LIFETIME_STR
hmac := hmac.New(sha256.New, bytes.NewBufferString(TEST_TOKEN_SECRET).Bytes())
sig := url.QueryEscape(base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(hmac.Sum(bytes.NewBufferString(url.QueryEscape(sig_base)).Bytes())))
if sig != tok.Signature {
t.Error("signature mismatch")
}
}
func (bucket *Bucket) Sign(req *http.Request) {
// gather the string to be signed
// method
msg := req.Method + "\n"
// md5sum
if md5, present := req.Header["Content-MD5"]; present {
msg += md5
}
msg += "\n"
// content-type
if contentType, present := req.Header["Content-Type"]; present {
msg += contentType
}
msg += "\n"
// date
msg += req.Header["Date"] + "\n"
// add headers
for _, key := range AWS_HEADERS {
if value, present := req.Header[key]; present {
msg += key + ":" + value + "\n"
}
}
// resource: the path components should be URL-encoded, but not the slashes
resource := http.URLEscape("/" + bucket.bucket + req.URL.Path)
resource = strings.Replace(resource, "%2f", "/", -1)
msg += resource
// create the signature
hmac := hmac.NewSHA1([]byte(bucket.secret))
hmac.Write([]byte(msg))
// get a base64 encoding of the signature
encoded := new(bytes.Buffer)
encoder := base64.NewEncoder(base64.StdEncoding, encoded)
encoder.Write(hmac.Sum())
encoder.Close()
signature := encoded.String()
req.Header["Authorization"] = "AWS " + bucket.key + ":" + signature
}
func (bucket *Bucket) sign(req *http.Request) {
accessKeyId := bucket.Key
secretAccessKey := bucket.Secret
hmac := hmac.NewSHA1([]byte(secretAccessKey))
// method
msg := req.Method + "\n"
// md5sum
if md5, present := req.Header["Content-MD5"]; present {
msg += md5
}
msg += "\n"
// content-type
if contentType, present := req.Header["Content-Type"]; present {
msg += contentType
}
msg += "\n"
// date
msg += req.Header["Date"] + "\n"
// write out first four
hmac.Write([]byte(msg))
// add headers
rawpath := req.URL.Path
path := strings.TrimLeft(rawpath, "/")
// resource
resource := "/" + bucket.MainBucket + "/" + path
hmac.Write([]byte(resource))
// get a base64 encoding of the signature
encoded := new(bytes.Buffer)
encoder := base64.NewEncoder(base64.StdEncoding, encoded)
encoder.Write(hmac.Sum())
encoder.Close()
signature := encoded.String()
req.Header["Authorization"] = "AWS " + accessKeyId + ":" + signature
}
// Compute the HMAC based on the given alg value
func (ctx symmetricMac) hmac(payload []byte, alg SignatureAlgorithm) ([]byte, error) {
var hash func() hash.Hash
switch alg {
case HS256:
hash = sha256.New
case HS384:
hash = sha512.New384
case HS512:
hash = sha512.New
default:
return nil, ErrUnsupportedAlgorithm
}
hmac := hmac.New(hash, ctx.key)
// According to documentation, Write() on hash never fails
_, _ = hmac.Write(payload)
return hmac.Sum(nil), nil
}
func (p *Propolis) SignRequest(req *http.Request) {
// gather the string to be signed
// method
msg := req.Method + "\n"
// md5sum
msg += req.Header.Get("Content-MD5") + "\n"
// content-type
msg += req.Header.Get("Content-Type") + "\n"
// date
msg += req.Header.Get("Date") + "\n"
// add headers
for _, key := range AWS_HEADERS {
if value := req.Header.Get(key); value != "" {
msg += strings.ToLower(key) + ":" + value + "\n"
}
}
// resource: the path components should be URL-encoded, but not the slashes
u := new(url.URL)
u.Path = "/" + p.Bucket + req.URL.Path
msg += u.String()
// create the signature
hmac := hmac.NewSHA1([]byte(p.Secret))
hmac.Write([]byte(msg))
// get a base64 encoding of the signature
var encoded bytes.Buffer
encoder := base64.NewEncoder(base64.StdEncoding, &encoded)
encoder.Write(hmac.Sum())
encoder.Close()
signature := encoded.String()
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "AWS "+p.Key+":"+signature)
}
func (api Api) auth(request *Request) error {
// extract api version number
version, err := strconv.ParseInt(request.Path[0:1], 10, 8)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if version < 0 || version > 2 {
return InvalidVersion(version)
}
// add the nonce value to the request parameters
request.Parameters.Add("tonce", strconv.FormatInt(time.Now().UnixNano()/1000, 10))
// first decode secret
b64 := base64.StdEncoding
secret, err := b64.DecodeString(api.ApiSecret)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// the data we want to encode
encodedData := request.Parameters.Encode()
if version == 2 {
// version 2 add the pathname for more entropy
encodedData = request.Path[2:] + "\x00" + encodedData
}
// retrieve a sha512 hmac generator
hmac := hmac.New(sha512.New, secret)
// write our encoded data
hmac.Write([]byte(encodedData))
signature := b64.EncodeToString(hmac.Sum(nil))
// add headers to request
request.HttpRequest.Header.Add("Rest-Key", api.ApiKey)
request.HttpRequest.Header.Add("Rest-Sign", signature)
return nil
}
func TestTokenSignatureVerification(t *testing.T) {
// generate a valid token signature, ut do not use Token.Sign()
var sig_base string
sig_base = "rter_consumer=" + TEST_TOKEN_CONSUMER + "&rter_resource=" + TEST_TOKEN_URI + "&rter_valid_until=3600"
hmac := hmac.New(sha256.New, bytes.NewBufferString(TEST_TOKEN_SECRET).Bytes())
sig := url.QueryEscape(base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(hmac.Sum(bytes.NewBufferString(url.QueryEscape(sig_base)).Bytes())))
// fake and test a valid token for testing
tok := FakeToken(TEST_TOKEN_URI, TEST_TOKEN_CONSUMER, "3600", sig)
if tok.VerifySignature(TEST_TOKEN_SECRET) != nil {
t.Error("valid signature rejected")
}
// fake and test a token with invalid URI
tok = FakeToken("http://invalid.uri", TEST_TOKEN_CONSUMER, "3600", sig)
if tok.VerifySignature(TEST_TOKEN_SECRET) == nil {
t.Error("invalid uri validated")
}
// fake and test a token with invalid livetime
tok = FakeToken(TEST_TOKEN_URI, TEST_TOKEN_CONSUMER, "1", sig)
if tok.VerifySignature(TEST_TOKEN_SECRET) == nil {
t.Error("invalid lifetime validated")
}
// fake and test a token with invalid signature
tok = FakeToken(TEST_TOKEN_URI, TEST_TOKEN_CONSUMER, "3600", sig+"x")
if tok.VerifySignature(TEST_TOKEN_SECRET) == nil {
t.Error("invalid signature validated")
}
// fake and test a token with empty signature
tok = FakeToken(TEST_TOKEN_URI, TEST_TOKEN_CONSUMER, "3600", "")
if tok.VerifySignature(TEST_TOKEN_SECRET) == nil {
t.Error("empty signature validated")
}
}
func (app Application) ParseSignedRequest(r string) (parsed Map, err error) {
var malformed = errors.New("Malformed Signed Request")
parts := strings.Split(r, ".")
if len(parts) != 2 {
return nil, malformed
}
for _, part := range parts {
if part == "" {
return nil, malformed
}
}
payload, err := base64.URLEncoding.DecodeString(pad64(parts[1]))
if err != nil {
return nil, malformed
}
err = json.Unmarshal(payload, &parsed)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.New("Malformed Signed Request")
}
if parsed["algorithm"] != "HMAC-SHA256" {
return nil, errors.New("Unknown algorithm " + parsed["algorithm"].(string))
}
hmac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(app.Secret))
hmac.Write([]byte(parts[1]))
sig := base64.URLEncoding.EncodeToString(hmac.Sum(nil))
if pad64(parts[0]) != sig {
return nil, errors.New("Bad Signature")
}
return
}
func sign(auth Auth, method string, canonicalPath string, headers map[string][]string) {
var md5, ctype, date string
method = strings.ToLower(method)
for k, v := range headers {
k = strings.ToLower(k)
switch k {
case "content-md5":
md5 = v[0]
case "content-type":
ctype = v[0]
case "date":
date = v[0]
}
}
payload := method + "\n" + md5 + "\n" + ctype + "\n" + date + "\n" + canonicalPath
hmac := hmac.New(sha1.New, []byte(auth.SecretKey))
hmac.Write([]byte(payload))
signature := make([]byte, base64.StdEncoding.EncodedLen(hmac.Size()))
base64.StdEncoding.Encode(signature, hmac.Sum(nil))
headers["Authorization"] = []string{"AWS " + auth.AccessKey + ":" + string(signature)}
}
func (t *Token) Sign(key string) error {
sig_base := "rter_consumer=" + t.consumer + "&rter_resource=" + t.Resource + "&rter_valid_until=" + t.Valid_until
hmac := hmac.New(sha256.New, bytes.NewBufferString(key).Bytes())
t.Signature = url.QueryEscape(base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(hmac.Sum(bytes.NewBufferString(url.QueryEscape(sig_base)).Bytes())))
return nil
}
//HMAC
func HMACFunction(data string) string {
hmac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(data))
return string(hmac.Sum(nil))
}