func eciesEncrypt(rand io.Reader, pub *ecdsa.PublicKey, s1, s2 []byte, plain []byte) ([]byte, error) {
params := pub.Curve
// Select an ephemeral elliptic curve key pair associated with
// elliptic curve domain parameters params
priv, Rx, Ry, err := elliptic.GenerateKey(pub.Curve, rand)
//fmt.Printf("Rx %s\n", utils.EncodeBase64(Rx.Bytes()))
//fmt.Printf("Ry %s\n", utils.EncodeBase64(Ry.Bytes()))
// Convert R=(Rx,Ry) to an octed string R bar
// This is uncompressed
Rb := elliptic.Marshal(pub.Curve, Rx, Ry)
// Derive a shared secret field element z from the ephemeral secret key k
// and convert z to an octet string Z
z, _ := params.ScalarMult(pub.X, pub.Y, priv)
Z := z.Bytes()
//fmt.Printf("Z %s\n", utils.EncodeBase64(Z))
// generate keying data K of length ecnKeyLen + macKeyLen octects from Z
// ans s1
kE := make([]byte, 32)
kM := make([]byte, 32)
hkdf := hkdf.New(conf.GetDefaultHash(), Z, s1, nil)
_, err = hkdf.Read(kE)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
_, err = hkdf.Read(kM)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Use the encryption operation of the symmetric encryption scheme
// to encrypt m under EK as ciphertext EM
EM, err := aesEncrypt(kE, plain)
// Use the tagging operation of the MAC scheme to compute
// the tag D on EM || s2
mac := hmac.New(conf.GetDefaultHash(), kM)
mac.Write(EM)
if len(s2) > 0 {
mac.Write(s2)
}
D := mac.Sum(nil)
// Output R,EM,D
ciphertext := make([]byte, len(Rb)+len(EM)+len(D))
//fmt.Printf("Rb %s\n", utils.EncodeBase64(Rb))
//fmt.Printf("EM %s\n", utils.EncodeBase64(EM))
//fmt.Printf("D %s\n", utils.EncodeBase64(D))
copy(ciphertext, Rb)
copy(ciphertext[len(Rb):], EM)
copy(ciphertext[len(Rb)+len(EM):], D)
return ciphertext, nil
}
// CreateCertificateSet requests the creation of a new transaction certificate set by the TCA.
//
func (tcap *TCAP) CreateCertificateSet(ctx context.Context, in *pb.TCertCreateSetReq) (*pb.TCertCreateSetResp, error) {
Trace.Println("grpc TCAP:CreateCertificateSet")
id := in.Id.Id
raw, err := tcap.tca.eca.readCertificate(id, x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(raw)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
pub := cert.PublicKey.(*ecdsa.PublicKey)
sig := in.Sig
in.Sig = nil
r, s := big.NewInt(0), big.NewInt(0)
r.UnmarshalText(sig.R)
s.UnmarshalText(sig.S)
hash := utils.NewHash()
raw, _ = proto.Marshal(in)
hash.Write(raw)
if ecdsa.Verify(pub, hash.Sum(nil), r, s) == false {
return nil, errors.New("signature does not verify")
}
nonce := make([]byte, 16) // 8 bytes rand, 8 bytes timestamp
rand.Reader.Read(nonce[:8])
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(nonce[8:], uint64(in.Ts.Seconds))
mac := hmac.New(conf.GetDefaultHash(), tcap.tca.hmacKey)
raw, _ = x509.MarshalPKIXPublicKey(pub)
mac.Write(raw)
kdfKey := mac.Sum(nil)
num := int(in.Num)
if num == 0 {
num = 1
}
var set [][]byte
for i := 0; i < num; i++ {
tidx := []byte(strconv.Itoa(i))
tidx = append(tidx[:], nonce[:]...)
mac = hmac.New(conf.GetDefaultHash(), kdfKey)
mac.Write([]byte{1})
extKey := mac.Sum(nil)[:32]
mac = hmac.New(conf.GetDefaultHash(), kdfKey)
mac.Write([]byte{2})
mac = hmac.New(conf.GetDefaultHash(), mac.Sum(nil))
mac.Write(tidx)
one := new(big.Int).SetInt64(1)
k := new(big.Int).SetBytes(mac.Sum(nil))
k.Mod(k, new(big.Int).Sub(pub.Curve.Params().N, one))
k.Add(k, one)
tmpX, tmpY := pub.ScalarBaseMult(k.Bytes())
txX, txY := pub.Curve.Add(pub.X, pub.Y, tmpX, tmpY)
txPub := ecdsa.PublicKey{Curve: pub.Curve, X: txX, Y: txY}
ext, err := CBCEncrypt(extKey, tidx)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if raw, err = tcap.tca.createCertificate(id, &txPub, x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature, in.Ts.Seconds, kdfKey, pkix.Extension{Id: TCertEncTCertIndex, Critical: true, Value: ext}); err != nil {
Error.Println(err)
return nil, err
}
set = append(set, raw)
}
return &pb.TCertCreateSetResp{&pb.CertSet{in.Ts, in.Id, kdfKey, set}}, nil
}
func eciesDecrypt(priv *ecdsa.PrivateKey, s1, s2 []byte, ciphertext []byte) ([]byte, error) {
params := priv.Curve
var (
rLen int
hLen int = conf.GetDefaultHash()().Size()
mStart int
mEnd int
)
//fmt.Printf("Decrypt\n")
switch ciphertext[0] {
case 2, 3:
rLen = ((priv.PublicKey.Curve.Params().BitSize + 7) / 8) + 1
if len(ciphertext) < (rLen + hLen + 1) {
return nil, errors.New("Invalid ciphertext")
}
break
case 4:
rLen = 2*((priv.PublicKey.Curve.Params().BitSize+7)/8) + 1
if len(ciphertext) < (rLen + hLen + 1) {
return nil, errors.New("Invalid ciphertext")
}
break
default:
return nil, errors.New("Invalid ciphertext")
}
mStart = rLen
mEnd = len(ciphertext) - hLen
//fmt.Printf("Rb %s\n", utils.EncodeBase64(ciphertext[:rLen]))
Rx, Ry := elliptic.Unmarshal(priv.Curve, ciphertext[:rLen])
if Rx == nil {
return nil, errors.New("Invalid ephemeral PK")
}
if !priv.Curve.IsOnCurve(Rx, Ry) {
return nil, errors.New("Invalid point on curve")
}
//fmt.Printf("Rx %s\n", utils.EncodeBase64(Rx.Bytes()))
//fmt.Printf("Ry %s\n", utils.EncodeBase64(Ry.Bytes()))
// Derive a shared secret field element z from the ephemeral secret key k
// and convert z to an octet string Z
z, _ := params.ScalarMult(Rx, Ry, priv.D.Bytes())
Z := z.Bytes()
//fmt.Printf("Z %s\n", utils.EncodeBase64(Z))
// generate keying data K of length ecnKeyLen + macKeyLen octects from Z
// ans s1
kE := make([]byte, 32)
kM := make([]byte, 32)
hkdf := hkdf.New(conf.GetDefaultHash(), Z, s1, nil)
_, err := hkdf.Read(kE)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
_, err = hkdf.Read(kM)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Use the tagging operation of the MAC scheme to compute
// the tag D on EM || s2 and then compare
mac := hmac.New(conf.GetDefaultHash(), kM)
mac.Write(ciphertext[mStart:mEnd])
if len(s2) > 0 {
mac.Write(s2)
}
D := mac.Sum(nil)
//fmt.Printf("EM %s\n", utils.EncodeBase64(ciphertext[mStart:mEnd]))
//fmt.Printf("D' %s\n", utils.EncodeBase64(D))
//fmt.Printf("D %s\n", utils.EncodeBase64(ciphertext[mEnd:]))
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(ciphertext[mEnd:], D) != 1 {
return nil, errors.New("Tag check failed")
}
// Use the decryption operation of the symmetric encryption scheme
// to decryptr EM under EK as plaintext
plaintext, err := aesDecrypt(kE, ciphertext[mStart:mEnd])
return plaintext, err
}
// HMACTruncated hmacs x using key key and truncate to truncation
func HMACTruncated(key, x []byte, truncation int) []byte {
mac := hmac.New(conf.GetDefaultHash(), key)
mac.Write(x)
return mac.Sum(nil)[:truncation]
}
// HMAC hmacs x using key key
func HMAC(key, x []byte) []byte {
mac := hmac.New(conf.GetDefaultHash(), key)
mac.Write(x)
return mac.Sum(nil)
}
// NewHash returns a new hash function
func NewHash() hash.Hash {
return conf.GetDefaultHash()()
}