func (ks *Keyserver) updateSignatureProposer() {
// invariant: do not access the db if ThisReplicaNeedsToSignLastEpoch = false
want := ks.rs.ThisReplicaNeedsToSignLastEpoch
have := ks.signatureProposer != nil
if have == want {
return
}
switch want {
case true:
tehBytes, err := ks.db.Get(tableEpochHeads(ks.rs.LastEpochDelimiter.EpochNumber))
if err != nil {
log.Panicf("ThisReplicaNeedsToSignLastEpoch but no TEH for last epoch in db: %s", err)
}
var teh proto.EncodedTimestampedEpochHead
if err := teh.Unmarshal(tehBytes); err != nil {
log.Panicf("tableEpochHeads(%d) invalid: %s", ks.rs.LastEpochDelimiter.EpochNumber, err)
}
seh := &proto.SignedEpochHead{
Head: teh,
Signatures: map[uint64][]byte{ks.replicaID: ed25519.Sign(ks.sehKey, tehBytes)[:]},
}
ks.signatureProposer = StartProposer(ks.log, ks.clk, ks.retryProposalInterval,
replication.LogEntry{Data: proto.MustMarshal(&proto.KeyserverStep{Type: &proto.KeyserverStep_ReplicaSigned{ReplicaSigned: seh}})})
case false:
ks.signatureProposer.Stop()
ks.signatureProposer = nil
}
}
// PushRatification implements the interfaceE2EKSVerification interface from proto/verifier.proto
func (ks *Keyserver) PushRatification(ctx context.Context, r *proto.SignedEpochHead) (*proto.Nothing, error) {
verifierCertID, err := authenticateVerifier(ctx)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("PushRatification: %s", err)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("PushRatification: %s", err)
}
for signerID := range r.Signatures {
if signerID != verifierCertID {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("PushRatification: not authorized: authenticated as %x but tried to write %x's signature", verifierCertID, signerID)
}
}
uid := genUID()
ch := ks.wr.Wait(uid)
ks.log.Propose(ctx, replication.LogEntry{Data: proto.MustMarshal(&proto.KeyserverStep{
UID: uid,
Type: &proto.KeyserverStep_VerifierSigned{VerifierSigned: r},
})})
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
ks.wr.Notify(uid, nil)
return nil, ctx.Err()
case <-ch:
return nil, nil
}
}
// verifierLogAppend censors an entry and prepares the commands to:
// 1) store it to local persistent storage
// 2) mark the log entry as used
// 3) share the new log entry with verifiers
// called from step: no io
func (ks *Keyserver) verifierLogAppend(m *proto.VerifierStep, rs *proto.ReplicaState, wb kv.Batch) func() {
// m : *mut // RECURSIVE transfer of ownership
// ks : &const // read-only
// rs, wb : &mut
wb.Put(tableVerifierLog(rs.NextIndexVerifier), proto.MustMarshal(m))
rs.NextIndexVerifier++
return func() {
ks.sb.Send(m)
}
}
// run is the CSP-style main loop of the verifier. All code critical for safe
// persistence should be directly in run. All functions called from run should
// either interpret data and modify their mutable arguments OR interact with the
// network and disk, but not both.
func (vr *Verifier) run() {
keyserverConnection, err := grpc.Dial(vr.keyserverAddr, grpc.WithTransportCredentials(vr.auth))
if err != nil {
log.Panicf("dial %s: %s", vr.keyserverAddr, err)
}
vr.keyserver = proto.NewE2EKSVerificationClient(keyserverConnection)
stream, err := vr.keyserver.VerifierStream(vr.ctx, &proto.VerifierStreamRequest{
Start: vr.vs.NextIndex,
PageSize: math.MaxUint64,
})
if err != nil {
keyserverConnection.Close()
log.Panicf("VerifierStream: %s", err)
}
wb := vr.db.NewBatch()
for !vr.shuttingDown() {
var step *proto.VerifierStep
step, err = stream.Recv()
if err != nil {
log.Printf("VerifierStream.Recv: %s", err)
break
}
wb.Put(tableVerifierLog(vr.vs.NextIndex), proto.MustMarshal(step))
deferredIO := vr.step(step, &vr.vs, wb)
vr.vs.NextIndex++
wb.Put(tableVerifierState, proto.MustMarshal(&vr.vs))
if err := vr.db.Write(wb); err != nil {
log.Panicf("sync step to db: %s", err)
}
wb.Reset()
if deferredIO != nil {
deferredIO()
}
}
}
// PushRatification implements the interfaceE2EKSVerification interface from proto/verifier.proto
func (ks *Keyserver) PushRatification(ctx context.Context, r *proto.SignedEpochHead) (*proto.Nothing, error) {
// FIXME: verify the ratifier signature (tricky: where do we keep verifier pk-s?)
uid := genUID()
ch := ks.wr.Wait(uid)
ks.log.Propose(ctx, replication.LogEntry{Data: proto.MustMarshal(&proto.KeyserverStep{
UID: uid,
VerifierSigned: r,
})})
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
ks.wr.Notify(uid, nil)
return nil, ctx.Err()
case <-ch:
return nil, nil
}
}
func TestKeyserverRejectsMissignedUpdate(t *testing.T) {
dieOnCtrlC()
kss, caPool, clks, _, ck, clientConfig, teardown := setupRealm(t, 3, 3)
defer teardown()
stop := stoppableSyncedClocks(clks)
defer close(stop)
waitForFirstEpoch(kss[0], clientConfig.Realms[0].VerificationPolicy.GetQuorum())
clientTLS, err := clientConfig.Realms[0].ClientTLS.Config(ck)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
_, alicePk, aliceEntry, aliceProfile := doRegister(t, kss[0], clientConfig, clientTLS, caPool, clks[0].Now(), alice, 0, proto.Profile{
Nonce: []byte("noncenoncenonceNONCE"),
Keys: map[string][]byte{"abc": []byte{1, 2, 3}, "xyz": []byte("TEST 456")},
})
var aliceKeyIdBytes [8]byte
sha3.ShakeSum256(aliceKeyIdBytes[:], proto.MustMarshal(alicePk))
aliceKeyid := binary.BigEndian.Uint64(aliceKeyIdBytes[:8])
_, badSk, _ := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
conn, err := grpc.Dial(kss[1].publicListen.Addr().String(), grpc.WithTransportCredentials(credentials.NewTLS(clientTLS)))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
updateC := proto.NewE2EKSPublicClient(conn)
_, err = updateC.Update(context.Background(), &proto.UpdateRequest{
Update: &proto.SignedEntryUpdate{
NewEntry: *aliceEntry,
Signatures: map[uint64][]byte{aliceKeyid: ed25519.Sign(badSk, aliceEntry.Encoding)[:]},
},
Profile: *aliceProfile,
LookupParameters: &proto.LookupRequest{
UserId: alice,
QuorumRequirement: clientConfig.Realms[0].VerificationPolicy.GetQuorum(),
},
})
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("update went through even though it was signed with the wrong key")
}
}
// run is the CSP-style main loop of the keyserver. All code critical for safe
// persistence should be directly in run. All functions called from run should
// either interpret data and modify their mutable arguments OR interact with the
// network and disk, but not both.
func (ks *Keyserver) run() {
defer close(ks.stopped)
var step proto.KeyserverStep
wb := ks.db.NewBatch()
for {
select {
case <-ks.stop:
return
case stepEntry := <-ks.log.WaitCommitted():
if stepEntry.ConfChange != nil {
ks.log.ApplyConfChange(stepEntry.ConfChange)
}
stepBytes := stepEntry.Data
if stepBytes == nil {
continue // allow logs to skip slots for indexing purposes
}
if err := step.Unmarshal(stepBytes); err != nil {
log.Panicf("invalid step pb in replicated log: %s", err)
}
// TODO: (for throughput) allow multiple steps per log entry
// (pipelining). Maybe this would be better implemented at the log level?
deferredIO := ks.step(&step, &ks.rs, wb)
ks.rs.NextIndexLog++
wb.Put(tableReplicaState, proto.MustMarshal(&ks.rs))
if err := ks.db.Write(wb); err != nil {
log.Panicf("sync step to db: %s", err)
}
wb.Reset()
step.Reset()
if deferredIO != nil {
deferredIO()
}
case ks.leaderHint = <-ks.log.LeaderHintSet():
ks.updateEpochProposer()
case <-ks.minEpochIntervalTimer.C:
ks.minEpochIntervalPassed = true
ks.updateEpochProposer()
case <-ks.maxEpochIntervalTimer.C:
ks.maxEpochIntervalPassed = true
ks.updateEpochProposer()
}
}
}
// Update implements proto.E2EKS.UpdateServer
func (ks *Keyserver) Update(ctx context.Context, req *proto.UpdateRequest) (*proto.LookupProof, error) {
ctx, _ = context.WithTimeout(ctx, ks.clientTimeout)
if err := ks.verifyUpdateEdge(req); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
uid := genUID()
ch := ks.wr.Wait(uid)
ks.log.Propose(ctx, replication.LogEntry{Data: proto.MustMarshal(&proto.KeyserverStep{
UID: uid,
Update: req,
})})
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
ks.wr.Notify(uid, nil)
return nil, ctx.Err()
case v := <-ch:
out := v.(updateOutput)
if out.Error != nil {
return nil, out.Error
}
return ks.blockingLookup(ctx, req.LookupParameters, out.Epoch)
}
}
// updateEpochProposer either starts or stops the epoch delimiter proposer as necessary.
func (ks *Keyserver) updateEpochProposer() {
want := ks.wantEpochProposer()
have := ks.epochProposer != nil
if have == want {
return
}
switch want {
case true:
ks.epochProposer = StartProposer(ks.log, ks.clk, ks.retryProposalInterval,
replication.LogEntry{
Data: proto.MustMarshal(&proto.KeyserverStep{Type: &proto.KeyserverStep_EpochDelimiter{EpochDelimiter: &proto.EpochDelimiter{
EpochNumber: ks.rs.LastEpochDelimiter.EpochNumber + 1,
Timestamp: proto.Time(ks.clk.Now()),
}}}),
ConfChange: &replication.ConfChange{
Operation: replication.ConfChangeNOP,
},
})
case false:
ks.epochProposer.Stop()
ks.epochProposer = nil
}
}
func doUpdate(
t *testing.T, ks *Keyserver, clientConfig *proto.Config, clientTLS *tls.Config, caPool *x509.CertPool, now time.Time,
name string, sk *[ed25519.PrivateKeySize]byte, pk *proto.PublicKey, version uint64, profileContents proto.Profile,
) (*proto.EncodedEntry, *proto.EncodedProfile) {
conn, err := grpc.Dial(ks.publicListen.Addr().String(), grpc.WithTransportCredentials(credentials.NewTLS(clientTLS)))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
publicC := proto.NewE2EKSPublicClient(conn)
// First, do a lookup to retrieve the index
lookup, err := publicC.Lookup(context.Background(), &proto.LookupRequest{
UserId: name,
// We don't care about any signatures here; the server just needs to tell us the index.
QuorumRequirement: &proto.QuorumExpr{
Threshold: 0,
Candidates: []uint64{},
Subexpressions: []*proto.QuorumExpr{},
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
index := lookup.Index
// Do the update
var keyidBytes [8]byte
sha3.ShakeSum256(keyidBytes[:], proto.MustMarshal(pk))
keyid := binary.BigEndian.Uint64(keyidBytes[:8])
profile := proto.EncodedProfile{
Profile: profileContents,
}
profile.UpdateEncoding()
var commitment [64]byte
sha3.ShakeSum256(commitment[:], profile.Encoding)
entry := proto.EncodedEntry{
Entry: proto.Entry{
Index: index,
Version: version,
UpdatePolicy: &proto.AuthorizationPolicy{
PublicKeys: map[uint64]*proto.PublicKey{keyid: pk},
PolicyType: &proto.AuthorizationPolicy_Quorum{Quorum: &proto.QuorumExpr{
Threshold: 1,
Candidates: []uint64{keyid},
Subexpressions: []*proto.QuorumExpr{},
},
}},
ProfileCommitment: commitment[:],
},
}
entry.UpdateEncoding()
proof, err := publicC.Update(context.Background(), &proto.UpdateRequest{
Update: &proto.SignedEntryUpdate{
NewEntry: entry,
Signatures: map[uint64][]byte{keyid: ed25519.Sign(sk, entry.Encoding)[:]},
},
Profile: profile,
LookupParameters: &proto.LookupRequest{
UserId: name,
QuorumRequirement: clientConfig.Realms[0].VerificationPolicy.GetQuorum(),
},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if got, want := proof.Profile.Encoding, profile.Encoding; !bytes.Equal(got, want) {
t.Errorf("updated profile didn't roundtrip: %x != %x", got, want)
}
_, err = coname.VerifyLookup(clientConfig, name, proof, now)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return &entry, &profile
}
// step is called by run and changes the in-memory state. No i/o allowed.
func (vr *Verifier) step(step *proto.VerifierStep, vs *proto.VerifierState, wb kv.Batch) (deferredIO func()) {
// vr: &const
// step, vs, wb: &mut
switch step.Type.(type) {
case *proto.VerifierStep_Update:
index := step.GetUpdate().NewEntry.Index
prevEntry, err := vr.getEntry(index, vs.NextEpoch)
if err := coname.VerifyUpdate(prevEntry, step.GetUpdate()); err != nil {
// the keyserver should filter all bad updates
log.Panicf("%d: bad update %v: %s", vs.NextIndex, *step, err)
}
var entryHash [32]byte
sha3.ShakeSum256(entryHash[:], step.GetUpdate().NewEntry.Encoding)
latestTree := vr.merkletree.GetSnapshot(vs.LatestTreeSnapshot)
newTree, err := latestTree.BeginModification()
if err != nil {
log.Panicf("%d: BeginModification(): %s", vs.NextIndex, err)
}
if err := newTree.Set(index, entryHash[:]); err != nil {
log.Panicf("%d: Set(%x,%x): %s", vs.NextIndex, index, entryHash[:], err)
}
vs.LatestTreeSnapshot = newTree.Flush(wb).Nr
wb.Put(tableEntries(index, vs.NextEpoch), step.GetUpdate().NewEntry.Encoding)
case *proto.VerifierStep_Epoch:
ok := coname.VerifyPolicy(vr.vs.KeyserverAuth, step.GetEpoch().Head.Encoding, step.GetEpoch().Signatures)
// the bad steps here will not get persisted to disk right now. do we want them to?
if !ok {
log.Panicf("%d: keyserver signature verification failed: %#v", vs.NextIndex, *step)
}
r := step.GetEpoch().Head
if r.Head.Realm != vr.realm {
log.Panicf("%d: seh for realm %q, expected %q: %#v", vs.NextEpoch, r.Head.Realm, vr.realm, *step)
}
if r.Head.Epoch != vs.NextEpoch {
log.Panicf("%d: got epoch %d instead: %#v", vs.NextEpoch, r.Head.Epoch, *step)
}
s := r.Head
if !bytes.Equal(s.PreviousSummaryHash, vs.PreviousSummaryHash) {
log.Panicf("%d: seh with previous summary hash %q, expected %q: %#v", vs.NextEpoch, s.PreviousSummaryHash, vs.PreviousSummaryHash, *step)
}
latestTree := vr.merkletree.GetSnapshot(vs.LatestTreeSnapshot)
rootHash, err := latestTree.GetRootHash()
if err != nil {
log.Panicf("GetRootHash() failed: %s", err)
}
if !bytes.Equal(s.RootHash, rootHash) {
log.Panicf("%d: seh with root hash %q, expected %q: %#v", vs.NextEpoch, s.RootHash, rootHash, *step)
}
seh := &proto.SignedEpochHead{
Head: proto.EncodedTimestampedEpochHead{TimestampedEpochHead: proto.TimestampedEpochHead{
Head: s,
Timestamp: proto.Time(time.Now()),
}, Encoding: nil},
Signatures: make(map[uint64][]byte, 1),
}
if vs.PreviousSummaryHash == nil {
vs.PreviousSummaryHash = make([]byte, 64)
}
sha3.ShakeSum256(vs.PreviousSummaryHash[:], seh.Head.Head.Encoding)
seh.Head.UpdateEncoding()
seh.Signatures[vr.id] = ed25519.Sign(vr.signingKey, proto.MustMarshal(&seh.Head))[:]
wb.Put(tableRatifications(vs.NextEpoch, vr.id), proto.MustMarshal(seh))
vs.NextEpoch++
return func() {
_, err := vr.keyserver.PushRatification(vr.ctx, seh)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("PushRatification: %s", err)
}
}
default:
log.Panicf("%d: unknown step: %#v", vs.NextIndex, *step)
}
return
}
// step is called by run and changes the in-memory state. No i/o allowed.
func (ks *Keyserver) step(step *proto.KeyserverStep, rs *proto.ReplicaState, wb kv.Batch) (deferredIO func()) {
// ks: &const
// step, rs, wb: &mut
switch step.Type.(type) {
case *proto.KeyserverStep_Update:
index := step.GetUpdate().Update.NewEntry.Index
prevUpdate, err := ks.getUpdate(index, math.MaxUint64)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("getUpdate: %s", err)
ks.wr.Notify(step.UID, updateOutput{Error: fmt.Errorf("internal error")})
return
}
if err := ks.verifyUpdateDeterministic(prevUpdate, step.GetUpdate()); err != nil {
ks.wr.Notify(step.UID, updateOutput{Error: err})
return
}
latestTree := ks.merkletree.GetSnapshot(rs.LatestTreeSnapshot)
// sanity check: compare previous version in Merkle tree vs in updates table
prevEntryHashTree, _, err := latestTree.Lookup(index)
if err != nil {
ks.wr.Notify(step.UID, updateOutput{Error: fmt.Errorf("internal error")})
return
}
var prevEntryHash []byte
if prevUpdate != nil {
prevEntryHash = make([]byte, 32)
sha3.ShakeSum256(prevEntryHash, prevUpdate.Update.NewEntry.Encoding)
}
if !bytes.Equal(prevEntryHashTree, prevEntryHash) {
log.Fatalf("ERROR: merkle tree and DB inconsistent for index %x: %x vs %x", index, prevEntryHashTree, prevEntryHash)
}
var entryHash [32]byte
sha3.ShakeSum256(entryHash[:], step.GetUpdate().Update.NewEntry.Encoding)
newTree, err := latestTree.BeginModification()
if err != nil {
ks.wr.Notify(step.UID, updateOutput{Error: fmt.Errorf("internal error")})
return
}
if err := newTree.Set(index, entryHash[:]); err != nil {
log.Printf("setting index '%x' gave error: %s", index, err)
ks.wr.Notify(step.UID, updateOutput{Error: fmt.Errorf("internal error")})
return
}
rs.LatestTreeSnapshot = newTree.Flush(wb).Nr
epochNr := rs.LastEpochDelimiter.EpochNumber + 1
wb.Put(tableUpdateRequests(index, epochNr), proto.MustMarshal(step.GetUpdate()))
ks.wr.Notify(step.UID, updateOutput{Epoch: epochNr})
rs.PendingUpdates = true
ks.updateEpochProposer()
if rs.LastEpochNeedsRatification {
// We need to wait for the last epoch to appear in the verifier log before
// inserting this update.
wb.Put(tableUpdatesPendingRatification(rs.NextIndexLog), proto.MustMarshal(step.GetUpdate().Update))
} else {
// We can deliver the update to verifiers right away.
return ks.verifierLogAppend(&proto.VerifierStep{Type: &proto.VerifierStep_Update{Update: step.GetUpdate().Update}}, rs, wb)
}
case *proto.KeyserverStep_EpochDelimiter:
if step.GetEpochDelimiter().EpochNumber <= rs.LastEpochDelimiter.EpochNumber {
return // a duplicate of this step has already been handled
}
rs.LastEpochDelimiter = *step.GetEpochDelimiter()
log.Printf("epoch %d", step.GetEpochDelimiter().EpochNumber)
rs.PendingUpdates = false
ks.resetEpochTimers(rs.LastEpochDelimiter.Timestamp.Time())
// rs.ThisReplicaNeedsToSignLastEpoch might already be true, if a majority
// signed that did not include us. This will make us skip signing the last
// epoch, but that's fine.
rs.ThisReplicaNeedsToSignLastEpoch = true
// However, it's not okay to see a new epoch delimiter before the previous
// epoch has been ratified.
if rs.LastEpochNeedsRatification {
log.Panicf("new epoch delimiter but last epoch not ratified")
}
rs.LastEpochNeedsRatification = true
ks.updateEpochProposer()
deferredIO = ks.updateSignatureProposer
snapshotNumberBytes := make([]byte, 8)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(snapshotNumberBytes, rs.LatestTreeSnapshot)
wb.Put(tableMerkleTreeSnapshot(step.GetEpochDelimiter().EpochNumber), snapshotNumberBytes)
latestTree := ks.merkletree.GetSnapshot(rs.LatestTreeSnapshot)
rootHash, err := latestTree.GetRootHash()
if err != nil {
log.Panicf("ks.latestTree.GetRootHash() failed: %s", err)
}
teh := &proto.EncodedTimestampedEpochHead{TimestampedEpochHead: proto.TimestampedEpochHead{
Head: proto.EncodedEpochHead{EpochHead: proto.EpochHead{
RootHash: rootHash,
PreviousSummaryHash: rs.PreviousSummaryHash,
Realm: ks.realm,
Epoch: step.GetEpochDelimiter().EpochNumber,
IssueTime: step.GetEpochDelimiter().Timestamp,
}, Encoding: nil},
Timestamp: step.GetEpochDelimiter().Timestamp,
}, Encoding: nil}
teh.Head.UpdateEncoding()
teh.UpdateEncoding()
if rs.PreviousSummaryHash == nil {
rs.PreviousSummaryHash = make([]byte, 64)
}
sha3.ShakeSum256(rs.PreviousSummaryHash[:], teh.Head.Encoding)
wb.Put(tableEpochHeads(step.GetEpochDelimiter().EpochNumber), proto.MustMarshal(teh))
case *proto.KeyserverStep_ReplicaSigned:
newSEH := step.GetReplicaSigned()
epochNr := newSEH.Head.Head.Epoch
// get epoch head
tehBytes, err := ks.db.Get(tableEpochHeads(epochNr))
if err != nil {
log.Panicf("get tableEpochHeads(%d): %s", epochNr, err)
}
// compare epoch head to signed epoch head
if got, want := tehBytes, newSEH.Head.Encoding; !bytes.Equal(got, want) {
log.Panicf("replica signed different head: wanted %x, got %x", want, got)
}
// insert all the new signatures into the ratifications table (there should
// actually only be one)
newSehBytes := proto.MustMarshal(newSEH)
for id := range newSEH.Signatures {
// the entry might already exist in the DB (if the proposals got
// duplicated), but it doesn't matter
wb.Put(tableRatifications(epochNr, id), newSehBytes)
}
deferredIO = func() {
// First write to DB, *then* notify subscribers. That way, if subscribers
// start listening before searching the DB, they're guaranteed to see the
// signature: either it's already in the DB, or they'll get notified. If
// the order was reversed, they could miss the notification but still not
// see anything in the DB.
ks.signatureBroadcast.Publish(epochNr, newSEH)
}
if epochNr != rs.LastEpochDelimiter.EpochNumber {
break
}
if rs.ThisReplicaNeedsToSignLastEpoch && newSEH.Signatures[ks.replicaID] != nil {
rs.ThisReplicaNeedsToSignLastEpoch = false
ks.updateEpochProposer()
// updateSignatureProposer should in general be called after writes
// have been flushed to db, but given ThisReplicaNeedsToSignLast =
// false we know that updateSignatureProposer will not access the db.
ks.updateSignatureProposer()
}
// get all existing ratifications for this epoch
allSignatures := make(map[uint64][]byte)
existingRatifications, err := ks.allRatificationsForEpoch(epochNr)
if err != nil {
log.Panicf("allRatificationsForEpoch(%d): %s", epochNr, err)
}
for _, seh := range existingRatifications {
for id, sig := range seh.Signatures {
allSignatures[id] = sig
}
}
// check whether the epoch was already ratified
wasRatified := coname.VerifyPolicy(ks.serverAuthorized, tehBytes, allSignatures)
if wasRatified {
break
}
for id, sig := range newSEH.Signatures {
allSignatures[id] = sig
}
// check whether the epoch has now become ratified
nowRatified := coname.VerifyPolicy(ks.serverAuthorized, tehBytes, allSignatures)
if !nowRatified {
break
}
if !rs.LastEpochNeedsRatification {
log.Panicf("%x: thought last epoch was not already ratified, but it was", ks.replicaID)
}
rs.LastEpochNeedsRatification = false
ks.updateEpochProposer()
var teh proto.EncodedTimestampedEpochHead
err = teh.Unmarshal(tehBytes)
if err != nil {
log.Panicf("invalid epoch head %d (%x): %s", epochNr, tehBytes, err)
}
allSignaturesSEH := &proto.SignedEpochHead{
Head: teh,
Signatures: allSignatures,
}
oldDeferredIO := deferredIO
deferredSendEpoch := ks.verifierLogAppend(&proto.VerifierStep{Type: &proto.VerifierStep_Epoch{Epoch: allSignaturesSEH}}, rs, wb)
deferredSendUpdates := []func(){}
iter := ks.db.NewIterator(kv.BytesPrefix([]byte{tableUpdatesPendingRatificationPrefix}))
defer iter.Release()
for iter.Next() {
update := &proto.SignedEntryUpdate{}
err := update.Unmarshal(iter.Value())
if err != nil {
log.Panicf("invalid pending update %x: %s", iter.Value(), err)
}
deferredSendUpdates = append(deferredSendUpdates, ks.verifierLogAppend(&proto.VerifierStep{Type: &proto.VerifierStep_Update{Update: update}}, rs, wb))
wb.Delete(iter.Key())
}
deferredIO = func() {
oldDeferredIO()
// First, send the ratified epoch to verifiers
deferredSendEpoch()
// Then send updates that were waiting for that epoch to go out
for _, f := range deferredSendUpdates {
f()
}
}
case *proto.KeyserverStep_VerifierSigned:
rNew := step.GetVerifierSigned()
for id := range rNew.Signatures {
// Note: The signature *must* have been authenticated before being inserted
// into the log, or else verifiers could just trample over everyone else's
// signatures, including our own.
dbkey := tableRatifications(rNew.Head.Head.Epoch, id)
wb.Put(dbkey, proto.MustMarshal(rNew))
}
ks.wr.Notify(step.UID, nil)
return func() {
// As above, first write to DB, *then* notify subscribers.
ks.signatureBroadcast.Publish(rNew.Head.Head.Epoch, rNew)
}
default:
log.Panicf("unknown step pb in replicated log: %#v", step)
}
return
}
