func NewS3Session(auth *aws.Auth, region aws.Region) *s3.S3 {
var s3Session *s3.S3
cert := x509.Certificate{}
// go's systemVerify panics with no verify options set
// TODO: EVG-483
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
s3Session = s3.New(*auth, region)
s3Session.ReadTimeout = S3ReadTimeout
s3Session.WriteTimeout = S3WriteTimeout
s3Session.ConnectTimeout = S3ConnectTimeout
return s3Session
}
// no verify options so system root ca will be used
_, err := cert.Verify(x509.VerifyOptions{})
rootsError := x509.SystemRootsError{}
if err != nil && err.Error() == rootsError.Error() {
// create a Transport which includes our TLSConfig with InsecureSkipVerify
// and client timeouts.
tlsConfig := tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true}
tr := http.Transport{
TLSClientConfig: &tlsConfig}
// add the Transport to our http client
client := &http.Client{Transport: &tr}
s3Session = s3.New(*auth, region, client)
} else {
s3Session = s3.New(*auth, region)
}
s3Session.ReadTimeout = S3ReadTimeout
s3Session.WriteTimeout = S3WriteTimeout
s3Session.ConnectTimeout = S3ConnectTimeout
return s3Session
}
func Verify(options x509.VerifyOptions, cert *x509.Certificate) Result {
result := Result{Certificate: cert}
chains, err := cert.Verify(options)
result.Error = err
for _, chain := range chains {
result.Chains = append(result.Chains, CommonNamesFromChain(chain))
}
return result
}
func (CertificateValidator) validateCertAndChain(certificate *x509.Certificate, certPool *x509.CertPool) error {
opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
Roots: certPool,
}
if _, err := certificate.Verify(opts); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("certificate and chain mismatch: %s", err.Error())
}
return nil
}
// Verify operates on an X509Store and validates the existence of a chain of trust
// between a leafCertificate and a CA present inside of the X509 Store.
// It requires at least two certificates in certList, a leaf Certificate and an
// intermediate CA certificate.
func Verify(s X509Store, dnsName string, certList []*x509.Certificate) error {
// If we have no Certificates loaded return error (we don't want to revert to using
// system CAs).
if len(s.GetCertificates()) == 0 {
return errors.New("no root CAs available")
}
// At a minimum we should be provided a leaf cert and an intermediate.
if len(certList) < 2 {
return errors.New("certificate and at least one intermediate needed")
}
// Get the VerifyOptions from the keystore for a base dnsName
opts, err := s.GetVerifyOptions(dnsName)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Create a Certificate Pool for our intermediate certificates
intPool := x509.NewCertPool()
var leafCert *x509.Certificate
// Iterate through all the certificates
for _, c := range certList {
// If the cert is a CA, we add it to the intermediates pool. If not, we call
// it the leaf cert
if c.IsCA {
intPool.AddCert(c)
continue
}
// Certificate is not a CA, it must be our leaf certificate.
// If we already found one, bail with error
if leafCert != nil {
return errors.New("more than one leaf certificate found")
}
leafCert = c
}
// We exited the loop with no leaf certificates
if leafCert == nil {
return errors.New("no leaf certificates found")
}
// We have one leaf certificate and at least one intermediate. Lets add this
// Cert Pool as the Intermediates list on our VerifyOptions
opts.Intermediates = intPool
// Finally, let's call Verify on our leafCert with our fully configured options
chains, err := leafCert.Verify(opts)
if len(chains) == 0 || err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("certificate verification failed: %v", err)
}
return nil
}
func verifyX509Cert(cert *x509.Certificate, dnsName string, roots *x509.CertPool) error {
verifyOptions := x509.VerifyOptions{
DNSName: dnsName,
Roots: roots,
KeyUsages: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{
x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth,
x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth,
},
}
_, err := cert.Verify(verifyOptions)
return err
}
func (t trustPinChecker) caCheck(leafCert *x509.Certificate, intCerts []*x509.Certificate) bool {
// Use intermediate certificates included in the root TUF metadata for our validation
caIntPool := x509.NewCertPool()
for _, intCert := range intCerts {
caIntPool.AddCert(intCert)
}
// Attempt to find a valid certificate chain from the leaf cert to CA root
// Use this certificate if such a valid chain exists (possibly using intermediates)
if _, err := leafCert.Verify(x509.VerifyOptions{Roots: t.pinnedCAPool, Intermediates: caIntPool}); err == nil {
return true
}
return false
}
func checkCertificate(probeURL *url.URL) (probeResult, *x509.Certificate) {
req, _ := http.NewRequest("HEAD", probeURL.String(), nil)
req.Header.Set("User-Agent", fmt.Sprintf("Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; PromCertcheck/%s; +https://github.com/Luzifer/promcertcheck)", version))
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
switch err.(type) {
case nil, redirectFoundError:
default:
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "Found a redirect.") {
return generalFailure, nil
}
}
resp.Body.Close()
intermediatePool := x509.NewCertPool()
var verifyCert *x509.Certificate
hostPort := strings.Split(probeURL.Host, ":")
host := hostPort[0]
for _, cert := range resp.TLS.PeerCertificates {
wildHost := "*" + host[strings.Index(host, "."):]
if !inSlice(cert.DNSNames, host) && !inSlice(cert.DNSNames, wildHost) {
intermediatePool.AddCert(cert)
continue
}
verifyCert = cert
}
if verifyCert == nil {
return certificateNotFound, nil
}
verificationResult := false
if _, err := verifyCert.Verify(x509.VerifyOptions{
Intermediates: intermediatePool,
}); err == nil {
verificationResult = true
}
if !verificationResult {
return certificateInvalid, verifyCert
}
if verifyCert.NotAfter.Sub(time.Now()) < config.expireWarning {
return certificateExpiresSoon, verifyCert
}
return certificateOK, verifyCert
}
// Normally we can just call cert.Verify(opts), but since we actually want more information about
// whether a certificate is not yet valid or expired, we also need to perform the expiry checks ourselves.
func verifyCertificate(cert *x509.Certificate, opts x509.VerifyOptions, allowExpired bool) error {
_, err := cert.Verify(opts)
if invalidErr, ok := err.(x509.CertificateInvalidError); ok && invalidErr.Reason == x509.Expired {
now := time.Now().UTC()
if now.Before(cert.NotBefore) {
return errors.Wrapf(err, "certificate not valid before %s, and it is currently %s",
cert.NotBefore.UTC().Format(time.RFC1123), now.Format(time.RFC1123))
}
if allowExpired {
return nil
}
return errors.Wrapf(err, "certificate expires at %s, and it is currently %s",
cert.NotAfter.UTC().Format(time.RFC1123), now.Format(time.RFC1123))
}
return err
}
func verify(t *testing.T, cert *x509.Certificate, opts x509.VerifyOptions, success bool, chainLength int) {
validChains, err := cert.Verify(opts)
if success {
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Unexpected error: %#v", err)
}
if len(validChains) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("Expected a valid chain")
}
if len(validChains[0]) != chainLength {
t.Fatalf("Expected a valid chain of length %d, got %d", chainLength, len(validChains[0]))
}
} else if err == nil && len(validChains) > 0 {
t.Fatalf("Expected failure, got success")
}
}
func verifyCertificate(cert *x509.Certificate, rootCerts []*x509.Certificate) bool {
roots := x509.NewCertPool()
for _, root := range rootCerts {
roots.AddCert(root)
}
opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
Roots: roots,
}
if _, err := cert.Verify(opts); err != nil {
fmt.Printf("failed to verify certificate: %s\n", err)
return false
}
fmt.Println("succeeded to verify certificate")
return true
}
// Checks the following:
// (1) cert is valid according to one of the rootCerts.
// (2) the subject key of cert corresponds to kPrin.
// (3) the subject CommonName of cert is allowed by guard.
func validateEndorsementCertificate(cert *x509.Certificate, guard tao.Guard,
kPrin *auth.Prin, rootCerts *x509.CertPool) error {
verifyOptions := x509.VerifyOptions{Roots: rootCerts}
_, err := cert.Verify(verifyOptions)
if err != nil {
return err
}
var hwPublicKey *rsa.PublicKey
hwPublicKey, ok := cert.PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
if !ok {
key, ok := cert.PublicKey.(rsa.PublicKey)
if !ok {
return errors.New("endorsement cert does not contain a valid RSA public key")
}
hwPublicKey = &key
}
ek, err := x509.MarshalPKIXPublicKey(hwPublicKey)
if err != nil {
return err
}
hashedCertKey := sha256.Sum256(ek)
if kPrin.Type != "tpm" && kPrin.Type != "tpm2" {
return errors.New("key principal to be endorsed is not a TPM key, but it's expected to be")
}
hashedBytes, ok := kPrin.KeyHash.(auth.Bytes)
if !ok {
return errors.New("key principal to be endorsed does not have bytes as its auth.Term")
}
if !bytes.Equal(hashedBytes, hashedCertKey[:]) {
return errors.New(fmt.Sprintf(
"endorsement cert endorses %v but needs to endorse %v", hashedCertKey, hashedBytes))
}
machinePrin := auth.Prin{
Type: "MachineInfo",
KeyHash: auth.Str(cert.Subject.CommonName),
}
if !guard.IsAuthorized(machinePrin, "Root", []string{}) {
return errors.New(
"machine endorsed by certificate is not authorized by policy")
}
return nil
}
// verify checks if a certificate has expired
func verify(cert *x509.Certificate) error {
_, err := cert.Verify(x509.VerifyOptions{})
if err == nil {
return nil
}
switch e := err.(type) {
case x509.CertificateInvalidError:
switch e.Reason {
case x509.Expired:
return ErrExpired
default:
return err
}
case x509.UnknownAuthorityError:
// Apple cert isn't in the cert pool
// ignoring this error
return nil
default:
return err
}
}
// given a set of IP addresses this will determine what address, if any, can be used to
// connect to the host certificate
// if none can be found, will return empty string and an err
func addrToUse(candidateIPs []net.IP, cert *x509.Certificate, cas []byte) (string, error) {
if cert == nil {
return "", errors.New("unable to determine suitable address with nil certificate")
}
log.Debug("Loading CAs for client auth")
pool := x509.NewCertPool()
pool.AppendCertsFromPEM(cas)
// update target to use FQDN
for _, ip := range candidateIPs {
names, err := net.LookupAddr(ip.String())
if err != nil {
log.Debugf("Unable to perform reverse lookup of IP address: %s", err)
}
// check all the returned names, and lastly the raw IP
for _, n := range append(names, ip.String()) {
opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
Roots: pool,
DNSName: n,
}
_, err := cert.Verify(opts)
if err == nil {
// this identifier will work
log.Debugf("Matched %s for use against host certificate", n)
// trim '.' fqdn suffix if fqdn
return strings.TrimSuffix(n, "."), nil
}
log.Debugf("Checked %s, no match for host cert", n)
}
}
// no viable address
return "", errors.New("unable to determine viable address")
}
func main() {
interPEMPtr := flag.String("inter", "", "a PEM file containing intermediates")
rootPEMPtr := flag.String("roots", "", "a PEM file containing roots")
crlPtr := flag.String("crl", "", "a CRL file")
flag.Parse()
var rootPool, intermediatePool *x509.CertPool
var roots, intermediates []*x509.Certificate
if nil != rootPEMPtr && len(*rootPEMPtr) > 0 {
rootPool, roots = loadCertPool(*rootPEMPtr)
}
if nil != interPEMPtr && len(*interPEMPtr) > 0 {
intermediatePool, intermediates = loadCertPool(*interPEMPtr)
}
var crlData []byte
if nil != crlPtr && len(*crlPtr) > 0 {
// Get the crl from the args
var err error
crlData, err = ioutil.ReadFile(*crlPtr)
check(err)
}
if len(crlData) > 0 {
// Maybe it's PEM; try to parse as PEM, if that fails, just use the bytes
block, _ := pem.Decode(crlData)
if block != nil {
crlData = block.Bytes
}
crl, err := x509.ParseCRL(crlData)
if err != nil {
panic("could not parse CRL")
}
// check the CRL is still current
if crl.HasExpired(time.Now()) {
fmt.Printf("crl has expired\n")
}
var signer *x509.Certificate
if nil != roots {
signer = findSigningCert(roots, crl)
if nil == signer {
fmt.Printf("Not signed by a root; trying known intermediates\n")
if nil != intermediates {
signer = findSigningCert(intermediates, crl)
}
}
}
if nil != signer {
fmt.Printf("found signer! %v\n", signer.Subject)
opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
Roots: rootPool,
Intermediates: intermediatePool,
}
if _, err := signer.Verify(opts); err != nil {
fmt.Println("Warning! Can't verify signer!")
}
}
issuerData, err := asn1.Marshal(crl.TBSCertList.Issuer)
if nil == err {
issuerString := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(issuerData)
fmt.Printf("%v\n", issuerString)
}
for revoked := range crl.TBSCertList.RevokedCertificates {
cert := crl.TBSCertList.RevokedCertificates[revoked]
fmt.Printf(" %v\n",
base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(cert.SerialNumber.Bytes()))
}
}
}
//isChainValid creates the valid certificate chains by combining the chain retrieved with the provided truststore.
//It return true if it finds at least on validation chain or false if no valid chain of trust can be created.
//It also updates the certificate map which gets pushed at the end of each iteration.
func isChainValid(endEntity *x509.Certificate, intermediates []*x509.Certificate, truststore *certificate.TrustStore, domain, IP string, certmap map[string]certificate.Certificate) bool {
valInfo := &certificate.ValidationInfo{
IsValid: true,
}
// build a CA verification pool from the list of cacerts
interPool := x509.NewCertPool()
for _, entity := range intermediates {
interPool.AddCert(entity)
}
// get a list of domains this certificate is supposedly valid for
// if the end entity is a CA, use its common name
dnsName := domain
if endEntity.IsCA {
dnsName = endEntity.Subject.CommonName
}
// configure the verification logic to use the current trustore
opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
DNSName: dnsName,
Intermediates: interPool,
Roots: truststore.Certs,
}
// Verify attempts to build all the path between the end entity and the
// root in the truststore that validate the certificate
// If no valid path is found, err is not nil and the certificate is not trusted
chains, err := endEntity.Verify(opts)
if err == nil {
// the end entity is trusted, we need to go through each
// chain of trust and store them in database
for i, chain := range chains {
log.WithFields(logrus.Fields{
"trust chain no": i,
"path len": len(chain),
}).Debug("domain: " + domain)
// loop through each certificate in the chain and
for _, cert := range chain {
parentSignature := ""
parentCert := getFirstParent(cert, chain)
if parentCert != nil {
parentSignature = certificate.SHA256Hash(parentCert.Raw)
} else {
log.Println("could not retrieve parent for " + dnsName)
}
updateCert(cert, parentSignature, domain, IP, truststore.Name, valInfo, certmap)
}
}
return true
}
// the certificate is not trusted.
// we store the cert in DB with its validation error
if len(chains) > 0 {
log.WithFields(logrus.Fields{
"domain": domain,
}).Warning("Got validation error but chains are populated")
}
valInfo.ValidationError = err.Error()
valInfo.IsValid = false
parentSignature := ""
c := getFirstParent(endEntity, intermediates)
if c != nil {
parentSignature = certificate.SHA256Hash(c.Raw)
} else {
log.WithFields(logrus.Fields{
"domain": domain,
"servercert": certificate.SHA256Hash(endEntity.Raw),
}).Info("Could not get parent")
}
updateCert(endEntity, parentSignature, domain, IP, truststore.Name, valInfo, certmap)
return false
}
func (conf *config) validCert(cert *x509.Certificate, intermediates []*x509.Certificate) bool {
pool := certPoolWith(intermediates)
_, err := cert.Verify(x509.VerifyOptions{Intermediates: pool})
if err == nil {
return true
}
if _, ok := err.(x509.UnknownAuthorityError); !ok {
// There was an error, but not because the certificate wasn't signed
// by a recognized CA. So we go ahead and use the cert and let
// the client experience the same error.
return true
}
if conf.ExtraRootCerts != nil {
_, err = cert.Verify(x509.VerifyOptions{Roots: conf.ExtraRootCerts, Intermediates: pool})
if err == nil {
return true
}
if _, ok := err.(x509.UnknownAuthorityError); !ok {
return true
}
}
// Before we give up, we'll try fetching some intermediate certificates.
if len(cert.IssuingCertificateURL) == 0 {
return false
}
toFetch := cert.IssuingCertificateURL
fetched := make(map[string]bool)
for i := 0; i < len(toFetch); i++ {
certURL := toFetch[i]
if fetched[certURL] {
continue
}
resp, err := http.Get(certURL)
if err == nil {
defer resp.Body.Close()
}
if err != nil || resp.StatusCode != 200 {
continue
}
fetchedCert, err := ioutil.ReadAll(resp.Body)
if err != nil {
continue
}
// The fetched certificate might be in either DER or PEM format.
if bytes.Contains(fetchedCert, []byte("-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----")) {
// It's PEM.
var certDER *pem.Block
for {
certDER, fetchedCert = pem.Decode(fetchedCert)
if certDER == nil {
break
}
if certDER.Type != "CERTIFICATE" {
continue
}
thisCert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(certDER.Bytes)
if err != nil {
continue
}
pool.AddCert(thisCert)
toFetch = append(toFetch, thisCert.IssuingCertificateURL...)
}
} else {
// Hopefully it's DER.
thisCert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(fetchedCert)
if err != nil {
continue
}
pool.AddCert(thisCert)
toFetch = append(toFetch, thisCert.IssuingCertificateURL...)
}
}
_, err = cert.Verify(x509.VerifyOptions{Intermediates: pool})
if err == nil {
return true
}
if _, ok := err.(x509.UnknownAuthorityError); !ok {
// There was an error, but not because the certificate wasn't signed
// by a recognized CA. So we go ahead and use the cert and let
// the client experience the same error.
return true
}
return false
}
func (hs *clientHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
c := hs.c
var leaf *x509.Certificate
if hs.suite.flags&suitePSK == 0 {
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsg)
if !ok || len(certMsg.certificates) == 0 {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg)
}
hs.writeServerHash(certMsg.marshal())
certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certMsg.certificates))
for i, asn1Data := range certMsg.certificates {
cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
return errors.New("tls: failed to parse certificate from server: " + err.Error())
}
certs[i] = cert
}
leaf = certs[0]
if !c.config.InsecureSkipVerify {
opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
Roots: c.config.RootCAs,
CurrentTime: c.config.time(),
DNSName: c.config.ServerName,
Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(),
}
for i, cert := range certs {
if i == 0 {
continue
}
opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert)
}
c.verifiedChains, err = leaf.Verify(opts)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
return err
}
}
switch leaf.PublicKey.(type) {
case *rsa.PublicKey, *ecdsa.PublicKey:
break
default:
c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate)
return fmt.Errorf("tls: server's certificate contains an unsupported type of public key: %T", leaf.PublicKey)
}
c.peerCertificates = certs
}
if hs.serverHello.ocspStapling {
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
cs, ok := msg.(*certificateStatusMsg)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(cs, msg)
}
hs.writeServerHash(cs.marshal())
if cs.statusType == statusTypeOCSP {
c.ocspResponse = cs.response
}
}
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
keyAgreement := hs.suite.ka(c.vers)
skx, ok := msg.(*serverKeyExchangeMsg)
if ok {
hs.writeServerHash(skx.marshal())
err = keyAgreement.processServerKeyExchange(c.config, hs.hello, hs.serverHello, leaf, skx)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return err
}
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
var chainToSend *Certificate
var certRequested bool
certReq, ok := msg.(*certificateRequestMsg)
if ok {
certRequested = true
// RFC 4346 on the certificateAuthorities field:
// A list of the distinguished names of acceptable certificate
// authorities. These distinguished names may specify a desired
// distinguished name for a root CA or for a subordinate CA;
// thus, this message can be used to describe both known roots
// and a desired authorization space. If the
// certificate_authorities list is empty then the client MAY
// send any certificate of the appropriate
// ClientCertificateType, unless there is some external
// arrangement to the contrary.
hs.writeServerHash(certReq.marshal())
var rsaAvail, ecdsaAvail bool
for _, certType := range certReq.certificateTypes {
switch certType {
case CertTypeRSASign:
rsaAvail = true
case CertTypeECDSASign:
ecdsaAvail = true
}
}
// We need to search our list of client certs for one
// where SignatureAlgorithm is RSA and the Issuer is in
// certReq.certificateAuthorities
findCert:
for i, chain := range c.config.Certificates {
if !rsaAvail && !ecdsaAvail {
continue
}
for j, cert := range chain.Certificate {
x509Cert := chain.Leaf
// parse the certificate if this isn't the leaf
// node, or if chain.Leaf was nil
if j != 0 || x509Cert == nil {
if x509Cert, err = x509.ParseCertificate(cert); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return errors.New("tls: failed to parse client certificate #" + strconv.Itoa(i) + ": " + err.Error())
}
}
switch {
case rsaAvail && x509Cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm == x509.RSA:
case ecdsaAvail && x509Cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm == x509.ECDSA:
default:
continue findCert
}
if len(certReq.certificateAuthorities) == 0 {
// they gave us an empty list, so just take the
// first RSA cert from c.config.Certificates
chainToSend = &chain
break findCert
}
for _, ca := range certReq.certificateAuthorities {
if bytes.Equal(x509Cert.RawIssuer, ca) {
chainToSend = &chain
break findCert
}
}
}
}
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
shd, ok := msg.(*serverHelloDoneMsg)
if !ok {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return unexpectedMessageError(shd, msg)
}
hs.writeServerHash(shd.marshal())
// If the server requested a certificate then we have to send a
// Certificate message, even if it's empty because we don't have a
// certificate to send.
if certRequested {
certMsg := new(certificateMsg)
if chainToSend != nil {
certMsg.certificates = chainToSend.Certificate
}
hs.writeClientHash(certMsg.marshal())
c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal())
}
preMasterSecret, ckx, err := keyAgreement.generateClientKeyExchange(c.config, hs.hello, leaf)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
if ckx != nil {
if c.config.Bugs.EarlyChangeCipherSpec < 2 {
hs.writeClientHash(ckx.marshal())
}
c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, ckx.marshal())
}
if hs.serverHello.extendedMasterSecret && c.vers >= VersionTLS10 {
hs.masterSecret = extendedMasterFromPreMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, preMasterSecret, hs.finishedHash)
c.extendedMasterSecret = true
} else {
if c.config.Bugs.RequireExtendedMasterSecret {
return errors.New("tls: extended master secret required but not supported by peer")
}
hs.masterSecret = masterFromPreMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, preMasterSecret, hs.hello.random, hs.serverHello.random)
}
if chainToSend != nil {
var signed []byte
certVerify := &certificateVerifyMsg{
hasSignatureAndHash: c.vers >= VersionTLS12,
}
switch key := c.config.Certificates[0].PrivateKey.(type) {
case *ecdsa.PrivateKey:
certVerify.signatureAndHash, err = hs.finishedHash.selectClientCertSignatureAlgorithm(certReq.signatureAndHashes, signatureECDSA)
if err != nil {
break
}
var digest []byte
digest, _, err = hs.finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(certVerify.signatureAndHash, hs.masterSecret)
if err != nil {
break
}
var r, s *big.Int
r, s, err = ecdsa.Sign(c.config.rand(), key, digest)
if err == nil {
signed, err = asn1.Marshal(ecdsaSignature{r, s})
}
case *rsa.PrivateKey:
certVerify.signatureAndHash, err = hs.finishedHash.selectClientCertSignatureAlgorithm(certReq.signatureAndHashes, signatureRSA)
if err != nil {
break
}
var digest []byte
var hashFunc crypto.Hash
digest, hashFunc, err = hs.finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(certVerify.signatureAndHash, hs.masterSecret)
if err != nil {
break
}
signed, err = rsa.SignPKCS1v15(c.config.rand(), key, hashFunc, digest)
default:
err = errors.New("unknown private key type")
}
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return errors.New("tls: failed to sign handshake with client certificate: " + err.Error())
}
certVerify.signature = signed
hs.writeClientHash(certVerify.marshal())
c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certVerify.marshal())
}
c.dtlsFlushHandshake()
hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
return nil
}
func CheckCertAgainRoot(x509Cert *x509.Certificate, certPool *x509.CertPool) ([][]*x509.Certificate, error) {
opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
// TODO DNSName: "test.example.com",
Roots: certPool,
}
return x509Cert.Verify(opts)
}
