func (rh *RandHound) newSession(public abstract.Point, purpose string, time time.Time) (*Session, []byte, error) {
buf := new(bytes.Buffer)
pub, err := public.MarshalBinary()
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
if err = binary.Write(buf, binary.LittleEndian, pub); err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
tm, err := time.MarshalBinary()
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
if err = binary.Write(buf, binary.LittleEndian, tm); err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
if err = binary.Write(buf, binary.LittleEndian, []byte(purpose)); err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
return &Session{
Fingerprint: pub,
Purpose: purpose,
Time: time}, rh.hash(buf.Bytes()), nil
}
func (c *ownedCoder) ownerEncode(payload, payout []byte, p abstract.Point) {
// XXX trap-encode
// Pick a fresh random key with which to encrypt the payload
key := make([]byte, c.keylen)
c.random.XORKeyStream(key, key)
// Encrypt the payload with it
c.suite.Cipher(key).XORKeyStream(payout, payload)
// Compute a MAC over the encrypted payload
h := c.suite.Hash()
h.Write(payout)
mac := h.Sum(nil)[:c.maclen]
// Combine the key and the MAC into the Point for this cell header
hdr := append(key, mac...)
if len(hdr) != p.PickLen() {
panic("oops, length of key+mac turned out wrong")
}
mp, _ := c.suite.Point().Pick(hdr, c.random)
// Add this to the blinding point we already computed to transmit.
p.Add(p, mp)
}
// HashKDF is a random map from G to Z_p, for use as the key derivation function (KDF) in the hash-based Verdict
// construction
func HashKDF(point abstract.Point) abstract.Secret {
bytes, _ := point.MarshalBinary()
cipher := Suite.Cipher(bytes)
// This seems to be the only easy way to get outside data reliably in an abstract.Secret.
return Suite.Secret().Pick(cipher)
}
// Verify takes a signature issued by EdDSA.Sign and
// return nil if it is a valid signature, or an error otherwise
// Takes:
// - public key used in signing
// - msg is the message to sign
// - sig is the signature return by EdDSA.Sign
func Verify(public abstract.Point, msg, sig []byte) error {
if len(sig) != 64 {
return errors.New("Signature length invalid")
}
R := suite.Point()
if err := R.UnmarshalBinary(sig[:32]); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("R invalid point: %s", err)
}
s := suite.Scalar()
s.UnmarshalBinary(sig[32:])
// reconstruct h = H(R || Public || Msg)
Pbuff, err := public.MarshalBinary()
if err != nil {
return err
}
hash := sha512.New()
hash.Write(sig[:32])
hash.Write(Pbuff)
hash.Write(msg)
h := suite.Scalar().SetBytes(hash.Sum(nil))
// reconstruct S == k*A + R
S := suite.Point().Mul(nil, s)
hA := suite.Point().Mul(public, h)
RhA := suite.Point().Add(R, hA)
if !RhA.Equal(S) {
return errors.New("Recontructed S is not equal to signature")
}
return nil
}
// Verifies that the 'message' is included in the signature and that it
// is correct.
// Message is your own hash, and reply contains the inclusion proof + signature
// on the aggregated message
func VerifySignature(suite abstract.Suite, reply *StampSignature, public abstract.Point, message []byte) bool {
// Check if aggregate public key is correct
if !public.Equal(reply.AggPublic) {
dbg.Lvl1("Aggregate-public-key check: FAILED (maybe you have an outdated config file of the tree)")
return false
}
// First check if the challenge is ok
if err := VerifyChallenge(suite, reply); err != nil {
dbg.Lvl1("Challenge-check: FAILED (", err, ")")
return false
}
dbg.Lvl2("Challenge-check: OK")
// Incorporate the timestamp in the message since the verification process
// is done by reconstructing the challenge
var b bytes.Buffer
if err := binary.Write(&b, binary.LittleEndian, reply.Timestamp); err != nil {
dbg.Lvl1("Error marshaling the timestamp for signature verification")
return false
}
msg := append(b.Bytes(), []byte(reply.MerkleRoot)...)
if err := VerifySchnorr(suite, msg, public, reply.Challenge, reply.Response); err != nil {
dbg.Lvl1("Signature-check: FAILED (", err, ")")
return false
}
dbg.Lvl2("Signature-check: OK")
// finally check the proof
if !proof.CheckProof(suite.Hash, reply.MerkleRoot, hashid.HashId(message), reply.Prf) {
dbg.Lvl2("Inclusion-check: FAILED")
return false
}
dbg.Lvl2("Inclusion-check: OK")
return true
}
// Checks the signature against
// the message
func SchnorrVerify(suite abstract.Suite,
kp SchnorrPublicKey,
msg []byte, sig []byte) (bool, error) {
buf := bytes.NewBuffer(sig)
signature := SchnorrSignature{}
err := abstract.Read(buf, &signature, suite)
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
s := signature.S
e := signature.E
var gs, ye, r abstract.Point
gs = suite.Point().Mul(nil, s) // g^s
ye = suite.Point().Mul(kp.Y, e) // y^e
r = suite.Point().Add(gs, ye) // g^xy^e
r_bin, _ := r.MarshalBinary()
msg_and_r := append(msg, r_bin...)
hasher := sha3.New256()
hasher.Write(msg_and_r)
h := hasher.Sum(nil)
// again I'm hoping this just reads the state out
// and doesn't actually perform any ops
lct := suite.Cipher(h)
ev := suite.Secret().Pick(lct)
return ev.Equal(e), nil
}
// PointEncodeTo provides a generic implementation of Point.EncodeTo
// based on Point.Encode.
func PointMarshalTo(p abstract.Point, w io.Writer) (int, error) {
buf, err := p.MarshalBinary()
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
return w.Write(buf)
}
func MarshalPoint(pt abstract.Point) []byte {
buf := new(bytes.Buffer)
ptByte := make([]byte, SecretSize)
pt.MarshalTo(buf)
buf.Read(ptByte)
return ptByte
}
/* Given a Diffie-Hellman shared public key, produces a secret to encrypt
* another secret
*
* Arguments
* diffieBase = the DH shared public key
*
* Return
* the DH secret
*/
func (p *Deal) diffieHellmanSecret(diffieBase abstract.Point) abstract.Secret {
buff, err := diffieBase.MarshalBinary()
if err != nil {
panic("Bad shared secret for Diffie-Hellman given.")
}
cipher := p.suite.Cipher(buff)
return p.suite.Secret().Pick(cipher)
}
/* Verifies that a PolicyApproveMessage has been properly constructed.
*
* Arguments:
* su = the suite that the insurer's public key was derived from.
* insuredKey = the public key of the insured or the client
* insurerKey = the public key of the insurer or "trustee"
*
* Returns:
* whether or not the message is valid.
*/
func (msg *PolicyApprovedMessage) verifyCertificate(su abstract.Suite,
insuredKey abstract.Point) bool {
set := anon.Set{msg.PubKey}
_, err := anon.Verify(su, msg.Message, set, nil, msg.Signature)
correctMsg := msg.PubKey.String() + " insures " + insuredKey.String()
return err == nil && correctMsg == string(msg.Message)
}
// NewServerIdentity creates a new ServerIdentity based on a public key and with a slice
// of IP-addresses where to find that entity. The Id is based on a
// version5-UUID which can include a URL that is based on it's public key.
func NewServerIdentity(public abstract.Point, addresses ...string) *ServerIdentity {
url := NamespaceURL + "id/" + public.String()
return &ServerIdentity{
Public: public,
Addresses: addresses,
ID: ServerIdentityID(uuid.NewV5(uuid.NamespaceURL, url)),
}
}
// accommodate nils
func (sn *Node) sub(a abstract.Point, b abstract.Point) {
if a == nil {
a = sn.suite.Point().Null()
}
if b != nil {
a.Sub(a, b)
}
}
// Returns a hash of the message and the random secret:
// H( m || V )
// Returns an error if something went wrong with the marshalling
func (s *Schnorr) hashMessage(msg []byte, v abstract.Point) (abstract.Scalar, error) {
vb, err := v.MarshalBinary()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
c := s.suite.Cipher(vb)
c.Message(nil, nil, msg)
return s.suite.Scalar().Pick(c), nil
}
/* Adds a new connection to the connection manager
*
* Arguments:
* theirkey = the key of the peer that this server wishes to connect to
*
* Returns:
* An error denoting whether creating the new connection was successful.
*/
func (gcm *ChanConnManager) AddConn(theirKey abstract.Point) error {
newConn, err := coconet.NewGoConn(gcm.dir, gcm.pubKey.String(),
theirKey.String())
if err != nil {
return err
}
gcm.peerMap[theirKey.String()] = newConn
return nil
}
func signH1pre(suite abstract.Suite, linkScope []byte, linkTag abstract.Point,
message []byte) abstract.Cipher {
H1pre := suite.Cipher(message) // m
if linkScope != nil {
H1pre.Write(linkScope) // L
tag, _ := linkTag.MarshalBinary()
H1pre.Write(tag) // ~y
}
return H1pre
}
func (c *Coordinator) AddClient(key abstract.Point, val *net.UDPAddr) {
// delete the client who has same ip address
for k, v := range c.Clients {
if v.String() == val.String() {
delete(c.Clients, k)
break
}
}
c.Clients[key.String()] = val
}
// (Either side) This function computes the shared public key
// by adding public key points over the curve group.
// Since each public key is already g*k where g is the group
// generator this is all we need to do
func SchnorrMComputeSharedPublicKey(suite abstract.Suite,
pkeys []SchnorrPublicKey) SchnorrMultiSignaturePublicKey {
var P abstract.Point = pkeys[0].Y
for _, pkey := range pkeys[1:] {
P.Add(P, pkey.Y)
}
return SchnorrMultiSignaturePublicKey{P}
}
/* Creates a new policy-approved message
*
* Arguments:
* kp = the private/public key of the insuring server.
* theirKey = the public key of the server who requested the insurance
*
* Returns:
* A new policy approved message.
*
* NOTE:
* The approved certificate is a string of the form:
* "My_Public_Key insures Their_Public_Key"
*
* It will always be of this form for easy validation.
*/
func (msg *PolicyApprovedMessage) createMessage(kp *config.KeyPair,
theirKey abstract.Point) *PolicyApprovedMessage {
set := anon.Set{kp.Public}
approveMsg := kp.Public.String() + " insures " + theirKey.String()
msg.PubKey = kp.Public
msg.Message = []byte(approveMsg)
msg.Signature = anon.Sign(kp.Suite, random.Stream, msg.Message,
set, nil, 0, kp.Secret)
return msg
}
func signH1(suite abstract.Suite, H1pre abstract.Cipher, PG, PH abstract.Point) abstract.Secret {
H1 := H1pre.Clone()
PGb, _ := PG.MarshalBinary()
H1.Write(PGb)
if PH != nil {
PHb, _ := PH.MarshalBinary()
H1.Write(PHb)
}
H1.Message(nil, nil, nil) // finish message absorption
return suite.Secret().Pick(H1)
}
func hash(suite abstract.Suite, r abstract.Point, msg []byte) (abstract.Scalar, error) {
rBuf, err := r.MarshalBinary()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
cipher := suite.Cipher(rBuf)
cipher.Message(nil, nil, msg)
// (re)compute challenge (e)
e := suite.Scalar().Pick(cipher)
return e, nil
}
func (c *ownedCoder) inlineEncode(payload []byte, p abstract.Point) {
// Hash the cleartext payload to produce the MAC
h := c.suite.Hash()
h.Write(payload)
mac := h.Sum(nil)[:c.maclen]
// Embed the payload and MAC into a Point representing the message
hdr := append(payload, mac...)
mp, _ := c.suite.Point().Pick(hdr, c.random)
// Add this to the blinding point we already computed to transmit.
p.Add(p, mp)
}
// (Client side) The client requiring the n-signature scheme
// performs the addition of points under the elliptic curve group
// and returns the aggregate commitment as a raw point
// in bytes for transmission to the server
func SchnorrMComputeAggregateCommitment(suite abstract.Suite,
pcommits []SchnorrMPublicCommitment) SchnorrMAggregateCommmitment {
var P abstract.Point = pcommits[0].T
for _, pcommit := range pcommits[1:] {
P.Add(P, pcommit.T)
}
k := SchnorrMAggregateCommmitment{P}
return k
/*buf := bytes.Buffer{}
abstract.Write(&buf, &k, suite)
return buf.Bytes()*/
}
func ElGamalVerify(suite abstract.Suite, message []byte, publicKey abstract.Point,
signatureBuffer []byte, g abstract.Point) error {
// Decode the signature
buf := bytes.NewBuffer(signatureBuffer)
sig := basicSig{}
if err := abstract.Read(buf, &sig, suite); err != nil {
return err
}
r := sig.R
c := sig.C
// Compute base**(r + x*c) == T
var P, T abstract.Point
P = suite.Point()
T = suite.Point()
T.Add(T.Mul(g, r), P.Mul(publicKey, c))
// Verify that the hash based on the message and T
// matches the challange c from the signature
c = hashElGamal(suite, message, T)
if !c.Equal(sig.C) {
return errors.New("invalid signature")
}
return nil
}
func EncryptKey(g abstract.Group, msgPt abstract.Point, pks []abstract.Point) (abstract.Point, abstract.Point) {
k := g.Scalar().Pick(random.Stream)
c1 := g.Point().Mul(nil, k)
var c2 abstract.Point = nil
for _, pk := range pks {
if c2 == nil {
c2 = g.Point().Mul(pk, k)
} else {
c2 = c2.Add(c2, g.Point().Mul(pk, k))
}
}
c2 = c2.Add(c2, msgPt)
return c1, c2
}
func verifyCommitment(suite abstract.Suite, msg []byte, commitment abstract.Point, challenge abstract.Scalar) error {
pb, err := commitment.MarshalBinary()
if err != nil {
return err
}
cipher := suite.Cipher(pb)
cipher.Message(nil, nil, msg)
// reconstructed challenge
reconstructed := suite.Scalar().Pick(cipher)
if !reconstructed.Equal(challenge) {
return errors.New("Reconstructed challenge not equal to one given")
}
return nil
}
func Encrypt(g abstract.Group, msg []byte, pks []abstract.Point) ([]abstract.Point, []abstract.Point) {
c1s := []abstract.Point{}
c2s := []abstract.Point{}
var msgPt abstract.Point
remainder := msg
for len(remainder) != 0 {
msgPt, remainder = g.Point().Pick(remainder, random.Stream)
k := g.Scalar().Pick(random.Stream)
c1 := g.Point().Mul(nil, k)
var c2 abstract.Point = nil
for _, pk := range pks {
if c2 == nil {
c2 = g.Point().Mul(pk, k)
} else {
c2 = c2.Add(c2, g.Point().Mul(pk, k))
}
}
c2 = c2.Add(c2, msgPt)
c1s = append(c1s, c1)
c2s = append(c2s, c2)
}
return c1s, c2s
}
// PointDecodeFrom provides a generic implementation of Point.DecodeFrom,
// based on Point.Decode, or Point.Pick if r is a Cipher or cipher.Stream.
// The returned byte-count is valid only when decoding from a normal Reader,
// not when picking from a pseudorandom source.
func PointUnmarshalFrom(p abstract.Point, r io.Reader) (int, error) {
if strm, ok := r.(cipher.Stream); ok {
p.Pick(nil, strm)
return -1, nil // no byte-count when picking randomly
}
buf := make([]byte, p.MarshalSize())
n, err := io.ReadFull(r, buf)
if err != nil {
return n, err
}
return n, p.UnmarshalBinary(buf)
}
func ElGamalVerify(suite abstract.Suite, message []byte, publicKey abstract.Point,
sig BasicSig) error {
r := sig.R
c := sig.C
// Compute base**(r + x*c) == T
var P, T abstract.Point
P = suite.Point()
T = suite.Point()
T.Add(T.Mul(nil, r), P.Mul(publicKey, c))
// Verify that the hash based on the message and T
// matches the challange c from the signature
c = hashElGamal(suite, message, T)
if !c.Equal(sig.C) {
return errors.New("invalid signature")
}
return nil
}
func SchnorrVerify(suite abstract.Suite, message []byte,
signature net.BasicSignature) error {
publicKey := signature.Pub
r := signature.Resp
c := signature.Chall
// Compute base**(r + x*c) == T
var P, T abstract.Point
P = suite.Point()
T = suite.Point()
T.Add(T.Mul(nil, r), P.Mul(publicKey, c))
// Verify that the hash based on the message and T
// matches the challange c from the signature
c = hashSchnorr(suite, message, T)
if !c.Equal(signature.Chall) {
return errors.New("invalid signature")
}
return nil
}
// Pick a [pseudo-]random curve point with optional embedded data,
// filling in the point's x,y coordinates
// and returning any remaining data not embedded.
func (c *curve) pickPoint(P point, data []byte, rand cipher.Stream) []byte {
// How much data to embed?
dl := c.pickLen()
if dl > len(data) {
dl = len(data)
}
// Retry until we find a valid point
var x, y nist.Int
var Q abstract.Point
for {
// Get random bits the size of a compressed Point encoding,
// in which the topmost bit is reserved for the x-coord sign.
l := c.PointLen()
b := make([]byte, l)
rand.XORKeyStream(b, b) // Interpret as little-endian
if data != nil {
b[0] = byte(dl) // Encode length in low 8 bits
copy(b[1:1+dl], data) // Copy in data to embed
}
util.Reverse(b, b) // Convert to big-endian form
xsign := b[0] >> 7 // save x-coordinate sign bit
b[0] &^= 0xff << uint(c.P.BitLen()&7) // clear high bits
y.M = &c.P // set y-coordinate
y.SetBytes(b)
if !c.solveForX(&x, &y) { // Corresponding x-coordinate?
continue // none, retry
}
// Pick a random sign for the x-coordinate
if c.coordSign(&x) != uint(xsign) {
x.Neg(&x)
}
// Initialize the point
P.initXY(&x.V, &y.V, c.self)
if c.full {
// If we're using the full group,
// we just need any point on the curve, so we're done.
return data[dl:]
}
// We're using the prime-order subgroup,
// so we need to make sure the point is in that subgroup.
// If we're not trying to embed data,
// we can convert our point into one in the subgroup
// simply by multiplying it by the cofactor.
if data == nil {
P.Mul(P, &c.cofact) // multiply by cofactor
if P.Equal(c.null) {
continue // unlucky; try again
}
return data[dl:]
}
// Since we need the point's y-coordinate to make sense,
// we must simply check if the point is in the subgroup
// and retry point generation until it is.
if Q == nil {
Q = c.self.Point()
}
Q.Mul(P, &c.order)
if Q.Equal(c.null) {
return data[dl:]
}
// Keep trying...
}
}